ANSWERS TO REVIEW QUESTIONS
prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem
Previous daf Bava Basra 47
BAVA BASRA 46 & 47 - dedicated by Reb Gedalia Weinberger of New York, an
Ohev Torah and Marbitz Torah whose tireless efforts on behalf of Klal
Yisroel have produced enormous benefits for the Lomdei Hadaf over the years.
(a) We learned in our Mishnah that an Uman and an Aris do not have a
Chazakah. The Beraisa adds - that their sons do?
(b) In the Seifa, the Beraisa teaches us that a Gazlan does not have a
Chazakah either; and the Tana adds - that his son doesn't either.
(c) To reconcile ...
1. ... the Seifa with the Reisha, we cannot establish the Beraisa when the
son claims that he inherited the field from his father - because then, the
same ruling would apply it the Reisha (and the Uman and the Aris would not
be believed either).
2. ... the Reisha with the Seifa, we cannot establish it when they claimed
that they had purchased the field directly from the owner - because there
again the same ruling would apply in the Seifa (and the son of the Gazlan
would be believed too).
(a) So we establish the Beraisa when witnesses testified that the owner had
admitted to their respective fathers that he had sold him the field before
his death. Consequently - we can now believe the son of the Uman and the
Aris when they claim that their father subsequently bought the field from
the owner, since their claim is substantiated by the witnesses.
(b) We do not however, believe the son of the Gazlan, because of a statement
of Rav Kahana - who renders the owner's admission to the Gazlan meaningless,
because we presume that he threatened to hand over the owner together with
the donkey to the governor, and his admission was prompted by fear.
(a) The Gazlan's grandson however, is able to establish a Chazakah - should
he claim that he bought the animal from his father who was not a Gazlan
(because of the principle 'To'anin le'Yoresh', and although we not have
believed his grandfather, we would have believed his father).
(b) Even he however, would not be able to do so - if his claim was based on
his grandfather's ownership.
(c) The alternative version of this ruling (that sometimes even the son of a
Gazlan can establish a Chazakah) speaks - when he claims that he received it
from his grandfather (the father of the Gazlan), and he is believed with a
'Migu', because he could have claimed to have purchased the donkey from the
(d) Despite the fact that we established the Seifa of the Beraisa when
witnesses testify that the owner admitted that he sold the donkey to the
Machzik, the Uman and the Aris in the Reisha are not believed - because the
Reisha (both of the Reisha and of the Seifa) does not speak in such a case
(a) According to Rebbi Yochanan, the Gazlan referred to by the Tana is the
one who stole the field on which he is now tying to establish a Chazakah;
according to Rav Chisda - 'Gazlan' of the Beraisa refers to someone who is
known to murder for the sake of the victim's money.
(b) The difference between the two opinions is - that according to Rebbi
Yochanan, the Gazlan can establish a Chazakah on other fields, whereas
according to Rav Chisda, he cannot.
(a) The Beraisa rules that an Uman and an Aris who changed their
professions - can establish a Chazakah from that moment on.
(b) We learned earlier in a Mishnah that a husband and wife, a father and
son cannot establish a Chazakah on each other's property - until that is,
the man divorces his wife and the son leaves his father's table (e.g. in
order to get married).
(a) Ben she'Chilek' is coming to teach us - that, once the son leaves his
father's table, the relationship that renders them like Apotropsin on each
other's property no longer applies, and they are no longer Mochel each
(b) We might otherwise have thought - that, due to their close relationship,
they are always Mochel each other if the one eats the Peiros from the
other's field, and cannot therefore establish a Chazakah.
(c) The problem with the Tana's ruling that after a man divorces his wife,
they can establish a Chazakah on each other's property is - that, seeing as
they hate each other, this appears to be obvious.
(a) We answer the current Kashya by establishing the case by a Safek
Megureshes - where the husband threw his wife a Get, and we do not know
whether it fell closer to her (in which case she is divorced) or closer to
him (in which case she is not).
(b) The answer itself is based on a statement of Rebbi Zeira Amar Rebbi
Yirmiyah bar Aba Amar Shmuel, who said - that in every case of Safek
Megureshes, the man must continue to sustain his wife.
(c) Consequently, we may have thought - that the man therefore designated
the field for his wife to eat the Peiros, in order to sustain herself.
(d) We do not say that however - because, having begun to divorce his wife,
he clearly hates her, and is unlikely to feed her so liberally, only
begrudgingly, bit by bit, as he is forced by Beis-Din to do so.
(a) Rav Nachman, quoting Rav Huna states that an Uman, an Aris, a husband
and wife and a father and son who claim that they purchased a field - if
they bring proof (such as a document of sale or witnesses), even though we
just learned that they cannot establish a Chazakah.
(b) The one exception to the rule is - a Gazlan (or anyone who acquires the
field from him) ...
(c) ... who is not believed even if he produces a Sh'tar that the owner sold
him the field - because of Rav Kahana (whom we already cited on the previous
Amud), who ascribes the proofs to the Gazlan's threat (as we explained
(a) The source for this ruling is the Mishnah in Gitin 'Lakach mi'Sikrikun
ve'Chazar ve'Lakach mi'Ba'al ha'Bayis, Mekcho Bateil'. The case is - when
Reuven bought something from a Sikrikun (a Nochri Gazlan, who killed people
for their money), and then bought it from the owner for whom he even wrote a
Sh'tar. The transaction is invalid, because the owner only went through with
it out of fear of the Sikrikun ...
(b) ... how much more so, in our case - where the Nigzal sold it to the
(c) In spite of the Mishnah, Rav Huna needs to teach us this in order to
preclude from the opinion of Rav - who restricts the Mishnah to where the
owner instructed the purchaser in front of the witnesses to go and acquire
the object, but not to where he actually wrote him a Sh'tar or received
money from the purchaser, in which case he would acquire it, according to
(a) Rav Huna holds like Shmuel, though Shmuel will concede that the
purchaser from the Sikrikun ... - does acquire the article, if the owner
(b) Rav Bibi concludes in the name of Rav Nachman 'Karka Ein Lo, Aval Ma'os
Yesh Lo', by which he means that - although the Gazlan (in the case of Rav
Huna) does not receive the field, he does get his money back ...
(c) ... because we might otherwise have thought - that we penalize the
Gazlan, and he loses his money too.
(d) Rav Bibi confines this to where the witnesses actually saw the Gazlan
hand the money to the Nigzal, but not to where they testify that the Nigzal
admitted that he received the money or even if they wrote this in the
Sh'tar. Rav Nachman rules ...
1. ... in the latter case that the Nigzal is not obligated to return the
money - on the basis of Rav Kahana's statement (that we cited earlier),
which leads us to assume that no money actually exchanged hands.
2. ... in the former case that he is - because we do not suspect the
witnesses of testifying falsely (even out of fear of the Sikrikun).
(a) In a case of 'Talyuhu ve'Zavin', Rav Huna holds - 'Z'vineih Z'vini'.
This means that if Reuven suspends Shimon on a tree until he sells him his
field, if Shimon accedes to his request, the sale is valid).
(b) Rav Nachman does not agree with Rav Huna - as we see from Rav Bibi, who
quoted him as saying that the Nigzal must return the money to the Gazlan (a
clear sign that Rav Nachman holds 'Talyuhu ve'Zavin La'av Z'vineih Z'vini').
(c) We refute the suggestion that the reason for this is because in any
event, a person only sells his personal effects because he has to, and not
because he wants to - on the grounds that whereas that is true of internal
(personal) pressure, perhaps external pressure is different.
(a) We learn from the Pasuk ...
The ultimate source of 'Talyuhu ve'Zavin, Z'vineih Z'vini' is - the S'vara
that due to the pain or fear of the O'nes (in conjunction with the fact that
he receives payment for the article), the owner is Makneh it with a full
1. ... "Yakriv Oso" - that if someone refuses to bring the Korban that he
undertook to bring, Beis-Din beat him until he brings it.
(b) We reconcile the two D'rashos - by re-interpreting "Yakriv Oso" to mean
that they beat him until he declares that he is willing to bring it.
2. ... "li'Retzono" - that he has to want to bring it (and cannot be forced
to do so against his will),
(c) This is not a good source however, from which to learn that someone who
accedes to external pressure is called 'willing' - because maybe this
D'rashah is confined to the realm of Korbanos, where a person wants to
attain a Kaparah.
(d) Neither can we learn it from the equivalent Halachah by someone who has
to be beaten before agreeing to give his wife a Get - because there he only
agrees wholeheartedly because it is a Mitzvah to listen to the words of the
Chachamim (but who says that it also extends to a sale, which is neither a
Kaparah nor a Mitzvah?).