ANSWERS TO REVIEW QUESTIONS
prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem
Previous daf Bava Basra 131
BAVA BASRA 131 - sponsored by Mr. and Mrs. Avi Berger of Queens, NY.
Despite the passage of time, let us not forget the tragic deaths of
Mordechai Refael and Tzirel Schivschuurder and their three youngest
children, Hashem Yikom Damam, in the Sbarro bombing last year. May the
father of all orphans give strength to the remaining children to continue in
their parents ways. Mazel Tov to the two sons who have since found spouses.
May Hashem protect them from all harm as well as the third brother, who
insisted on joining an active combat unit in the army, and the younger
(a) Rava asked whether Rebbi Yochanan ben Berokah's Din is confined to a
Shechiv-Mera, or whether it also extends to a Bari. The reason that it might
not extend to a Bari is - because unlike the former, he is not yet in the
category of "ve'Hayah be'Yom Hanchilo es Banav".
(b) 'Kesuvas B'nin Dichrin' is - the condition that a husband writes in the
Kesuvah, promising that the sons that his wife bears him will inherit her
Kesuvah (over and above their regular portion of his inheritance), in the
event that she dies before he does.
(c) The Mishnah in Kesuvos says that in the event that the Kesuvas B'nin
Dichrin was omitted from the Kesuvah - the wife's sons will nevertheless
(d) Rebbi Nasan extrapolates from that Mishnah that Rebbi learned his
Mishnah like Rebbi Yochanan ben Berokah - because the Tana cites the Lashon
of Kesuvas B'nin Dichrin as 'B'nin Dichrin di'Yehavyan Lichi Mina'i, Inun
*Yarsun* Kesef Kesuvasech' (permitting a man to bequeath to one of his sons
at the expense of the others.
(a) Rebbi answered 'Yasvun' T'nan' - meaning that 'Kesuvas B'nin Dichrin' is
a Matanah and not a Yerushah (in which case, even the Rabbanan will agree
that this is permitted.
We have now resolved Rava's She'eilah (whether Rebbi Yochanan ben Berokah
incorporates a Bari, too) - because the Mishnah is speaking about a Matnas
Bari, yet both Rebbi Nasan and Rebbi agree that, if the text in the Mishnah
reads 'Yarsun', the author will be Rebbi Yochanan ben Berokah (whose ruling
clearly extends to a Bari).
(b) He retracted however, on the basis of a ruling that the sons are not
permitted to claim 'K'suvas B'nin Dichrin from Meshubadin'. He expressed his
retraction with the words - 'I behaved childishly and spoke arrogantly
against Nasan the Babylonian'.
(c) That ruling would clash with his amendment - inasmuch as if the wording
was 'Yasvun' (implying a Matanah from now, as opposed to 'Yarsun', which
implies only after his death), then why could the sons not claim from
Meshubadim, any less than the rest of the Kesuvah, which their mother may
claim from Meshubadim.
(d) The problem now is - that Rebbi Nasan's Kashya remains.
(a) Rav Papa pointed out to Abaye that irrespective of the wording, there is
another problem with the entire institution of Kesuvas B'nin Dichrin -
inasmuch as it is a 'Davar she'Lo Ba le'Olam' (which is not Koneh).
(b) Neither can we circumvent it by establishing the Mishnah like Rebbi
Meir, who holds 'Adam Makneh Davar she'Lo Ba le'Olam' - because here it is
also *to* someone who is not yet born, in which case even Rebbi Meir agrees.
(c) Rav Papa therefore answers both Kashyos with one swoop - by reminding us
that we are speaking about a Takanas Chachamim, who have the power (of
'Hefker Beis-Din Hefker') to give one person's property to someone else even
if it, or he, is not yet in the world; and we use the same explanation to
establish the Mishnah in Kesuvos even like the Rabbanan, who will admit, for
the same reason, that here, the father may bequeath his property to one of
(a) Abaye initially attempted to justify Rebbi's ...
1. ... reply to Rebbi Nasan - by explaining that he was only answering Rebbi
Nasan's use of the Lashon 'Yarsun', which suggests that he holds like Rebbi
Yochanan ben Berokah.
(b) He changed his mind however, by quoting the Seifa of the Mishnah, which
states 'Lo Kasav Lah B'nan Nukvan di'Yehavyan Lichi Mina'i Yehavyan Yasvan
be'Veisi ad de'Tilakchun le'Guvrin' - with regard to the Takanah of Mazon
2. ... retraction - by explaining it to mean that he needed to use the word
'Yasvun' (not because he needed to answer Rebbi Nasan's Kashya, but),
because of Rav Papa's Kashya (from 'Ein Adam Makneh ... ').
(c) This now obviates the need to answer Rebbi Nasan at all - because the
Lashon of the Seifa is one of Matanah, giving the Mishnah the format of
'la'Zeh bi'Yerushah, ve'la'Zeh be'Matanah', and we already learned that in
such a case, even the Rabbanan concede that both are valid (even when it is
to two people, such as here, the sons and the daughters).
(d) We did indeed concluded earlier that when the Yerushah and the Matanah
involve two people, they require 'Toch K'dei Dibur' - but that is no
problem, since here, seeing as the two Takanos were made simultaneously, it
is considered 'Toch K'dei Dibur'.
(a) Rav Nechumi (or Rav Chananyah bar Minyumi) queried Abaye on his previous
assumption that the two cases in the Mishnah in Kesuvos constitute 'Toch
K'dei Dibur'. He asked him whether the two Takanos could not have been
established in two different Batei-Din, negating that assumption.
(b) Rebbi Elazar ben Azaryah in the Mishnah in Kesuvos, learned that a
daughter's rights to Mezonos only take effect after her father's death -
from Kesuvas B'nin Dichrin, which is a Yerushah, and can only take effect
after their father's death.
(c) Abaye tried to prove from there - that the two Takanos must have been
instituted by the same Beis-Din (simultaneously). Otherwise, how could Rebbi
Elazar ben Azaryah learn one from the other.
(d) We reject Abaye's proof however - on the grounds that even if they were
instituted by two different Batei-Din, it is possible that the one modeled
its Takanah on the other (to avoid people asking why the Chachamim
instituted them at different times).
(a) What we have now achieved is - to vindicate Rebbi, who is forced to
amend the Mishnah of B'nin Dichrin from 'Yarsun' to 'Yasvun', in order to
establish it like the Chachamim too (and not just like Rebbi Yochanan ben
Berokah, even though he rules like him anyway, as we learned on the previous
(b) This does not affect our proof that Rebbi Yochanan ben Berokah's ruling
extends to a Bari - which is evident already from Rebbi Nasan's Kasha?
(a) Rav Yehudah Amar Shmuel rules that if someone writes all his property to
his wife - he has merely appointed her as an Apotropus (a guardian) over his
(b) Shmuel is speaking about a Shechiv-Mera (who is concerned that his
children should respect their mother.
(c) What prompted Chazal to institute this Takanah was - the assumption that
a father would not leave his sons penniless giving everything to his wife,
in which case, he must have he meant to appoint her the guardian of his
estate, so that she should gain prestige in the eyes of her children.
(d) Nevertheless, we will later classify this as one of the three Halachos
without a logical reason - because in spite of the reasoning, we would not
normally ignore a written document on the basis of a S'vara.
(a) This Halachah is cited here - because Rava will shortly repeat the
She'eilah that he asked with regard to Rebbi Yochanan ben Berokah's opinion
(b) It is obvious that Shmuel's Takanah extends to one's oldest son, though
we are not sure whether it also extends to a younger son - because whereas,
on the one hand, a father definitely would like the brothers to show respect
to their older brother, it is not certain that he would wish the same for a
younger brother (and if not, then the Matanah remains a Matanah).
(c) We resolve the She'eilah by citing Rav Chanila'i bar Idi Amar Shmuel,
who states - that the above ruling even extends to a baby in his cot
(clearly incorporating a younger brother).
(a) By 'Peshita B'no ve'Acher, Acher be'Matanah, u'Beno Apotropus', we
mean - that if a Shechiv-Mera leaves his property to a anyone other than a
son, it is considered a Matanah, whereas if he leaves it to his son, he
appoints him an Apotropus.
(b) Initially, we refute the suggestion that it speaks in one case, where a
man writes half his property to his son and half to someone else - because
then, seeing as he did not leave all his property to his son, why should the
third person take all?
(c) We could resolve this problem - by adding that there were other sons, in
which case, Shmuel's ruling might apply, since the father left nothing for
the remaining sons.
(d) Yet we insist on rejecting that explanation - because it will then
differ from the She'eilos that follow, which are all two separate case and
not one, as we shall now see.
(a) We erase the text 'Ishto ve'Acher, le'Acher be'Matanah, ve'Ishto
Apotropus', because since, as we just explained, all the dual cases are two
independant cases, it would be pointless to repeat what Shmuel has already
(b) Shmuel concedes that 'Ishto Arusah ve'Ishto Gerushah, be'Matanah' -
because he loves neither of them sufficiently to want his children to
(c) In a case where a Shechiv-Mera left everything to his son, if he also
left behind ...
1. ... a wife but no other sons - then he has given him a Matanah (because a
man does not expect his wife to respect his son).
2. ... a wife and sons - then he has appointed him an Apotropus, since he
wants his brothers to pay him respect, as we learned earlier.
(a) We already issued a ruling in the case of a betrothed woman and a
divorced wife, and we now ask what the Din will be if a Shechiv-Mera leaves
all his property to one of three women; two of them, a daughter when there
are sons (her brothers), and a daughter when there are brothers (her
uncles). The third She'eilah concerns - a case where he leaves all his
property to his wife when he leaves over his sons from another wife (her
(b) The basis of these She'eilos is - whether a man would want his sons to
respect his wife who is not their mother but their sister, their niece or
(c) Ravina states that all the above five women do not acquire except for a
betrothed woman and a divorced wife. The only two that do not, according to
Rav Ivya in the name of Rava are - when there are brothers and when there
are step-sons (i.e. it is not feasible for a man to want them to respect
their niece and their stepmother, though he does expect them to respect
(d) The sole case over which they therefore argue is -the latter one,
whether he expects his sons to respect their sister (Ravina) or not (Rav