ANSWERS TO REVIEW QUESTIONS
prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem
Previous daf Bava Basra 138
(a) Rav Yehudah Amar Shmuel rules that if Shimon rejects the property that
Reuven writes out to him, he nevertheless acquires it. According to Rebbi
Yochanan - he does not.
(b) Rebbi Aba bar Mamal explains that they do not in fact, argue - because
Rebbi Yochanan speaks when Shimon objected from the outset, whereas Shmuel
is speaking when he accepted the Sh'tar and only started to object
(c) A gift might be considered detrimental to a person (and not an asset) -
because of the Pasuk in Mishlei "Soneh Matanos Yichyeh" ('Someone who
dislikes gifts will live long' [see Rashash]).
(d) The status of a gift which the beneficiary rejects is - one of Hefker,
which anyone may acquire (like the opinion of Resh Lakish in K'riysus).
(e) If the beneficiary was initially silent, should he now decide that he
does not want the gift - he has no option but to give it to someone else or
to declare it Hefker.
(a) Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak connects the case of Reuven who handed Levi a
gift on behalf of Shimon in front of Shimon, to a Machlokes between Raban
Shimon ben Gamliel and the Rabbanan. The Tana Kama rules in this case, where
the property includes Avadim, and where the beneficiary is a Kohen - that,
despite the beneficiary's retraction, the Avadim may eat Terumah.
(b) According to Raban Shimon ben Gamliel - since the beneficiary objected,
he does not acquire the Avadim.
(c) In spite of the fact that one is not obligated to sustain one's Eved
Cana'ani, a person might nevertheless not want to accept (specifically) an
Eved as a gift - because of the moral obligation to sustain him, a financial
burden that he cannot, or does not, want.
(d) Raban Shimon ben Gamliel actually says that the property reverts to the
owner or to his heirs. We did indeed cite Resh Lakish a little earlier, who
holds that in such a case, the property is Hefker - but that does not tally
with the opinion of Raban Shimon ben Gamliel.
(a) The problem with the Tana Kama's ruling is - how it is possible to force
the beneficiary to accept a gift against his will.
(b) Rava (or Rebbi Yochanan) therefore establishes the Machlokes - when he
was silent when the benefactor handed the Sh'tar to (or made the Kinyan
with) the Sheli'ach, and protested only when the Sheli'ach handed him the
Sh'tar or the gift (by refusing to accept it).
(c) According to the Chachamim, the beneficiary's initial silence construes
acceptance, and his subsequent objection, a change of heart, which cannot
undo the acceptance. But Raban Shimon ben Gamliel - attributes his initial
silence to the fact that the beneficiary did not consider it worthwhile
protesting as long as the gift was in the hands of a third person.
Consequently, his ultimate objection reflects his initial decision to reject
(d) In spite of the principle 'Halachah ke'Raban Shimon ben Gamliel
be'Mishnaseinu', we rule like the Chachamim in our Sugya - because the term
'be'Mishnaseinu' (as opposed to 'be'Mishnah'), precludes Beraisos).
(a) In a case where a Shechiv-Mera says 'T'nu Masayim Zuz li'Peloni,
ve'Shalosh Me'os li'Peloni, ve'Arba Me'os li'Peloni', the Beraisa rules -
that we do not go after the dates on the Sh'taros of their respective gifts.
Consequently, should the Shechiv-Mera's creditor claim from them before they
have received their money, they are all obligated to pay their father's
(b) If the creditor claimed from them ...
1. ... after they had received the money - he would not be able to claim
from them at all, since the Metaltelin of the heirs are not Meshubad to
their father's (or benefactor's) creditor.
(c) This ruling would apply even if the creditor were to claim *after* the
beneficiaries had already received their portions - if the gift consisted of
Karka to the amounts mentioned, and not cash.
2. ... but in the case of a Matnas Bari - we would examine the dates on the
Sh'tar to determine who pays (like the Din in the Seifa, as we shall see
(d) This Din will only apply if the Shechiv-Mera bequeathed *all* his
property in this way, but if he retained some, then it would have the Din of
a Matnas Bari and would require a Kinyan (as we shall see in the following
(a) In the case of the Beraisa, if the creditor claimed a debt of nine
Dinrim, the beneficiaries pay - in proportion to the amounts that they
received; two, three and four Dinrim respectively.
(b) If however, the owner had said 'T'nu Masayim Zuz li'Peloni, ve'Acharav
Shalosh Me'os li'Peloni ve'Acharav Arba Me'os li'Peloni' - then (based on
the principle that the creditor cannot claim Meshubadim as long as the
debtor still has B'nei Chorin), he will claim first from the last
beneficiary, whatever is still owing, from the one before, and if there is
still money owing, from the first one.
(a) The Beraisa rules that if a Shechiv-Mera said 'T'nu Masayim Zuz
li'Peloni B'ni Bechor ...
1. ... ka'Ra'uy Lo' - he receives two hundred Zuz over and above his Cheilek
(b) And the Tana says the same thing with regard to a wife. In a case where
the Shechiv-Mera said 'T'nu Masayim Zuz li'Pelonis Ishti ...
2. ... bi'Vechoraso' - then he receives whichever is more of two hundred Zuz
and the Cheilek Bechor.
1. ... ka'Ra'uy Lah' - she receives two hundred Zuz over and above her
(c) The common reason to both of the above latter rulings - is the fact that
it is forbidden to detract from one wife's Kesuvah and from the Bechor's
extra portion. That is why both have the upper hand.
2. ... 'bi'Kesuvasah' - then she receives whichever is more of two hundred
Zuz and her Kesuvah.
(a) In similar vein, the Beraisa continues 'u'Shechiv-Mera she'Amar T'nu
Masayim Zuz li'Peloni Ba'al Chovi *ka'Ra'uy Lo*, Notlan ve'Notel es Chovo'.
In a case where he said 'T'nu Masayim Zuz li'Peloni Ba'al Chovi *be'Chovo*',
the Tana rules - that he takes the two hundred Zuz (even if it amounts to
less than the debt).
(b) The problem with the Reisha is - how we know that the Shechiv-Mera wants
to give his creditor anything more than the actual payment of the debt.
(c) To answer this Kashya, Rav Huna told Rav Nachman that the author of the
Beraisa must be Rebbi Akiva - who holds that a person does not use excessive
Lashon for nothing. Consequently, when the Shechiv-Mera added the words
'la'Ra'uy Lo', he must have meant to include the two hundred Zuz, over and
above the debt.
(a) We learned in the Mishnah in 'ha'Mocher es ha'Bayis' that someone who
sells a house has not sold the pit or the enclosure - even if he stipulated
'Umka ve'Ruma' (which are used independently, and need to be included in
their own right).
(b) Rebbi Akiva holds that the seller nevertheless needs to purchase a path
to his pit, because a person who sells, sells generously. However (based on
the principle that we just cited in his name), he says that in a case where
the seller stipulates that he is not selling the pit or the enclosure - he
obviously means to retain the path to his pit and enclosure, which he no
longer needs to purchase.
(c) The Rabbanan - would also agree with Rebbi Akiva, if there was something
to include. However, since they hold that a seller tends to sell
begrudgingly, he retains the path to his pit anyway, leaving us with nothing
(d) Despite the fact that the Rabbanan agree with Rebbi Akiva in this point,
Rav Huna cites specifically Rebbi Akiva - because he is the one who said it.
(Alternatively, we might have said that the Beraisa goes like Rebbi Akiva
and his disputant).
(a) According to Rebbi Meir, if a Shechiv-Mera says that so-and-so owes him
a Manah, witnesses are permitted to document his statement, even without
recognizing the debtor, or without knowing about the debt. Consequently,
when claiming with that Sh'tar, the heirs are required to bring witnesses to
verify their claim.
(b) The Chachamim however, rule - that the witnesses may only record the
Shechiv-Mera's statement if they know all the facts. Consequently, when the
heirs claim with that Sh'tar, they will not automatically be required to
verify their claim.
(c) In spite of the fact that with a Shechiv-Mera, there may not always be
time to verify all the facts, the Chachamim disagree with Rebbi Meir -
because they are afraid that the second Beis-Din may err and rely on the
(d) Rav Nachman quoting Rav Huna - switches the opinions. According to him,
Rebbi Meir says 'Ein Kosvin', and the Rabbanan, 'Kosvin'.
(a) Rav Dimi from Neherda'a ruled - 'Ein Chosheshin le'Beis-Din To'in', like
Rav Nachman in the Rabbanan.
(b) Rava rules - that Beis-Din may not perform a Chalitzah without knowing
for sure that the so-called Yavam is genuine.
(c) Similarly, he said - they may not perform a Miy'un (the walking-out of a
girl under bas-Mitzvah who was married by her mother or brother) without
knowing for sure that the man concerned is actually the girl's husband.
(d) Consequently - the two women concerned are permitted to marry on the
basis of the original Sh'tar, without having to verify the identity of the
(a) We reconcile the rulings of Rava and Rav Dimi from Neherda'a - by
differentiating on the one hand, between a Beis-Din relying on a Beis-Din
(Rava's case), where we are afraid that the second Beis-Din will fully rely
on the actions of the first, and their relying on witnesses (Rav Dimi) on
the other, which we trust, they will not do without corroborating the facts.
(b) The problem with the text that quotes, not Rava himself, but 'Rava Amar
Rav Sechorah Amar Huna', who says 'Ein Choltzin Ela-im-Kein Makirin ... ')
is - that they actually hold (in Yevamos) Choltzin Af-al-Pi she'Ein Makirin
... ', and it is Rava who argues with them there and says 'Ein Choltzin'.
(a) When the Tana of our Mishnah writes 'ha'Av Tolesh u'Ma'achil le'Chol Mi
she'Yirtzeh' - he is referring to the previous Mishnah 'ha'Kosev Nechasav
li'Veno (le'Achar Moso)', and he means that as long as the father is still
alive, he may pick fruit from the field that he gave his son, and give it to
whoever he wishes.
(b) The fruit that is detached when the father dies - is shared by all his
(c) When the Mishnah writes 'u'Mah she'Hini'ach Talush, Harei Hu shel
Yorshin', it implies - that what is still attached to the ground, will go to
the son to whom he donated the field ...
(d) ... even fruit that is already ripe and ready to pick (though many
Rishonim disagree with this).
(a) The Tana of the Beraisa holds in the above case, if the son to whom the
father gave the field then sold it to a third person and the father died -
the purchaser owns the field.
(b) When the Tana continues 'Shamin es ha'Mechubarin le'Loke'ach', he
means - that seeing as the fruit is not included in the sale, its value must
be assessed and the purchaser must pay that amount value to all the heirs.
(c) Ula resolves the discrepancy between the inference from our Mishnah
(which considers the attached fruit as part of the land which goes to the
son together with the field]) and the ruling of the Beraisa, (which does
not) - by confining our Mishnah specifically to the son who received the
gift from his father, because, due to the close relationship between a
father a son, he gave him the field on that understanding. It will not
extend to a third person (such as the purchaser), who does not enjoy that
sort of relationship with the original owner of the field or even with the
son who sold him the field.
(d) In the equivalent case, but where the recipient of the field was not the
benefactor's son, but somebody else - the attached fruit will go to the
sons, like the ruling in the previous Beraisa.