REVIEW QUESTIONS ON GEMARA AND RASHI
prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem
Previous daf Bava Basra 52
BAVA BASRA 52 & 53 - these Dafim have been dedicated anonymously l'Iluy
Nishmas Tzirel Nechamah bas Tuvya Yehudah.
(a) The Beraisa (regarding the Din of receiving a Pikadon from a woman, an
Eved or a Katan) concludes that if any of them leave instructions at the
time of death, to return the Pikadon to whoever it might be, one follows the
Why does the Tana refer specifically to the time of death?
(b) What does the Tana mean when he adds 've'Im La'av, Ya'aseh Pirush
(c) Why can it not mean that if they did not leave instructions, the Pikadon
is automatically returned to the husband, the master or the father ... ?
(a) Some versions add 've'Ika de'Amri, Ya'aseh Pirush le'Pirushan'.
does this imply?
(b) On what grounds do we reject this Lashon?
(c) When the wife of Rabah bar bar Chanah died, she left instructions to
hand a set of very expensive ear-rings to Marsa and his grandsons.
(d) According to the first Lashon, Rav instructed Rabah bar bar Chanah to
follow the previous ruling (depending on whether his wife was trustworthy or
What did he rule, according to the second Lashon?
(a) We learned in the Beraisa with regard to someone who accepted a Pikadon
from a Katan 'Ya'aseh Lo Segulah'. Rav Chisda interprets this to mean that
he should sell it and invest in a Seifer-Torah.
What Peiros would the
Katan then get out of it?
(b) What does Rabah bar Rav Huna say?
(c) Why not invest in a business?
(a) We learned in our Mishnah that a father and son cannot establish a
Chazakah on each other. Rav Yosef says 'Afilu Chalku'.
What does he mean
(b) What does Rava say?
(c) What is the general consensus of opinion in this matter?
(d) What does the Beraisa say about a son who left his father's domain and a
woman who received a divorce from her husband?
(a) According to Rav, if, following the death of the father, the eldest
brother is managing the affairs of the house, and there are Onos and
Sh'taros written in his name (which he claims, are his personal property),
the onus lies on him to prove that the Sh'taros are in fact, his, and not
the joint property of the siblings.
From where did he claim to have
received the property that he purportedly sold? What are 'Onos'?
(b) What is Rav's reason, seeing as the Sh'taros are written in his name?
(c) What does Shmuel say?
(d) If Shmuel referred to Rav as 'Aba', because that was his real name ('Aba
Aricha'), why do we call him Rav?
(a) Shmuel maintains that once the eldest brother died, Rav would concede to
Shmuel that (assuming that he left behind heirs) it would be up to the
siblings to prove that they were joint owners.
Why is that?
(b) What objection does Rav Papa raise to Shmuel's ruling?
(c) Why should this case be any worse that a case where, after living on the
property for three years, the heirs claim that they received it from their
father, who had previously lived on the property for one day, where they are
believed, even though their father would not have been?
(d) Rav Papa substantiated his Kashya by citing a ruling of Rava.
basis did Rava rule that the pair of wool-comer's scissors which Yesomim
inherited from their father was to be returned forthwith? What did the
original owner claim?
(a) Rava's ruling in turn, was based on a statement of Rav Huna bar Avin.
What did Rav Huna have to say about objects that people tend to lend or to
(b) What is the final comment regarding Rav Papa's query on Shmuel's ruling?
(c) What distinction does Rabeinu Chananel draw between 'Tiyuvta' and
(d) On what basis do we reject this distinction? If there is no Halachic
difference between the two, how will we explain Chazal's use of, sometimes
the one, and sometimes the other?
(a) The Rashbam rules completely like Rav.
Answers to questions
Bearing in mind the principle
that the Halachah is like Shmuel in money-matters, why does he do that?
(b) What does Rabeinu Chananel quoting Reb Yisrael Gaon say?
(a) How does Rav Chisda qualify Rav's ruling (that the onus of proof of
ownership lies with the elder brother)? In which case will this not be
(b) According to Rabah, the proof Rav required is witnesses.
Rav Sheishes say?
(c) How do we know that they are arguing according to Rav, and not Shmuel?
(d) Based on the fact that there is no indication or reason to rule like one
more than the other, like whom does Rabeinu Chananel rule?
(a) Rava asked Rav Nachman whether he held like Rav or Shmuel, Rabah or Rav
Our Mishnah concludes 'Nosen Matanah ve'ha'Achin she'Chalku ve'ha'Machzik
be'Nechsei ha'Ger, Na'al, Gadar u'Paratz, Harei Zu Chazakah'.
What did he reply?
(b) What similar case does the Beraisa incorporate in this ruling?
(c) Why does the Tana introduce the latter with 've'Chein'? Why might we
have thought that the woman is believed any more than the eldest brother?
(d) Then on what basis might she not be believed?
(e) Why does the Tana mention that the Almanah inherited the Sh'taros from
her paternal grandfather?
How can the
Tana then precede this statement with the words 'Bameh Devarim Amurim
be'Machzik, Aval ... ', implying that these cases are not subject to
(a) Rav Hoshaya (or Sheravya) cites a Beraisa be'Kidushin de'Bei Levi:
'Na'al, Gadar u'Paratz Kol she'Hu, Harei Zu Chazakah'.
Answers to questions
What sort of
transaction is the Tana referring to?
(b) We might infer from here that if the purchaser made the Kinyan not in
the seller's presence, then he does not acquire the property.
Rava interpret the Beraisa?
(c) Will it make any difference if the purchaser already paid?
(d) In which case will the purchaser acquire the field with money alone
(even in a place where a transaction concerning Karka requires a Sh'tar)?