THOUGHTS ON THE DAILY DAF
brought to you by Kollel Iyun Hadaf of Har Nof
Rosh Kollel: Rav Mordecai Kornfeld
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1) USING TWIGS ON YOM TOV FOR PURPOSES OTHER THAN FUEL FOR A FIRE
QUESTION: The Gemara records a Machlokes whether wet twigs are Muktzah or
not on Yom Tov. RASHI explains that according to the opinion that wet twigs
are Muktzah, this is because of the principle that "Lo Nitnu Etzim Ela
l'Hasakah" -- the sole purpose of wood on Yom Tov is as fuel for a fire, and
therefore a wet twig, which cannot be used as fuel for a fire, is Muktzah,
because it has no use at all now. The other opinion says that it may still
be used for a very large fire, and therefore it is not Muktzah.
2) GOOSE GIZZARDS
The Gemara implies that the twig could be moved for other purposes, even not
for a fire; since it is fit for a fire, it may be used for any purpose.
RASHI (DH b'Retiva), and as quoted in TOSFOS (DH v'Hilchasa), says that this
is true according to the opinion that "Lo Nitnu Etzim Ela l'Hasakah." But
according to that principle, it should *only* be permitted to use the twigs
for a fire! Why is it permitted to use the twigs for other purposes?
ANSWER: Rashi does not mean that this opinion literally holds that "Lo Nitnu
Etzim Ela l'Hasakah." Rather, Rashi means to say that this opinion holds
that since the main purpose of wood is for a fire, if it is not fit for its
main purpose, then it is not on a person's mind and it is Muktzah, and may
not be used for any purpose. But if it is fit for its main purpose, then it
may be used for any purpose.
QUESTION: Rava rules that a woman may not take a piece of wood from a broken
utensil to use as firewood, since it was not prepared for such use before
Yom Tov. The Gemara infers from here that Rava must hold like Rebbi Yehudah,
who prohibits items like this as Muktzah on Yom Tov. The Gemara questions
this, though, from another statement of Rava. Rava, on Yom Tov, told his
servant to roast a goose and throw the intestines to a cat. The Gemara
learns from this that Rava rules in accordance with Rebbi Shimon, who argues
with Rebbi Yehudah and permits moving an item on Yom Tov for the sake of
animals even though it was designated for human use, and not for animals,
before Yom Tov.
Rashi (DH Kivan d'Mesrechi) writes that the goose intestines were still fit
for human consumption on Yom Tov.
How can it be inferred from Rava's ruling that he holds like Rebbi Shimon?
Perhaps Rava agrees with Rebbi Yehudah and not with Rebbi Shimon; Rebbi
Yehudah prohibits giving animals an object designated for humans *only* when
the object is *no longer fit* to be used by a person. (Because the object is
no longer fit for its originally designated use, of feeding humans, it is
considered Nolad and is Muktzah). But if the object can *still* be used by a
person (that is, it is fit for its designated use), then even Rebbi Yehudah
agrees that it is not Muktzah and it may be given to animals! Why, then,
does the Gemara say that Rava's action shows that he rules like Rebbi
Shimon? The goose intestines were still fit for humans!
The type of Muktzah that our Sugya is discussing is usually referred to as
"Muchan l'Adam Eino Muchan l'Behemah." It is important to remind ourselves
that there are two distinct types of Muktzah which are included in this
expression: (1) When the laws of Shabbos or Yom Tov prevent man from using
an object -- for example, on Shabbos a live animal is not fit for human use
since it is forbidden to slaughter an animal on Shabbos -- that object is
Muktzah and may not be used for any purpose. Even though live animals are
sometimes fed to dogs, since this animal is not fit for humans at present it
is Muktzah (even according to Rebbi Shimon) and may not be fed to dogs.
(This is a type of Mutkzah Machmas Isur.) (2) When something happens to an
object on Shabbos that makes it unfit for man, it may not even be fed to
dogs (this is a type of Nolad). For example, if the animal was alive before
Yom Tov (and was fit for man, since he could slaughter and eat it on Yom
Tov) and then it died on Yom Tov, becoming unfit for man, it remains Muktzah
and may not be fed to dogs.
In Rava's case, the intestines of the animal fit into neither category!
There is no law of Yom Tov preventing the intestines from being used by man,
and nothing happened to the intestines making them unfit for human use.
(a) RASHI (here and in Shabbos 142b) explains that goose intestines are not
fit for man *not* because any change occurred to them, but because it is Yom
Tov, and it is not the normal manner to eat goose intestines on Yom Tov.
Therefore, it is considered as if the laws of Yom Tov prohibit this item
from human use (category (1) above), and that is why it would be prohibited
to give them to animals according to Rebbi Yehudah.
(b) TOSFOS (here, DH v'Shadi, and Shabbos 29a, DH Achlan) challenges Rashi's
explanation from the Gemara in Shabbos (128a) which states that it is
permitted to move raw meat on Shabbos because it is possible for people to
eat the meat in such a state. Certainly it is not the normal manner to eat
raw meat on Shabbos, and yet it does not become Muktzah! Tosfos therefore
explains that goose intestines are edible as soon as the goose is
slaughtered (*before* Yom Tov); however, shortly thereafter (*on* Yom Tov)
the intestines spoil and become inedible. Since the intestines are no longer
fit for man, they become Muktzah according to Rebbi Yehudah. (Tosfos
understands that they fall into the second category mentioned above, which
is Asur due to Nolad.)
Perhaps Rashi maintained that goose intestines cannot be compared to raw
meat for the following reason. Rava slaughtered the goose because he
intended to eat its meat, and the intestines are secondary to the meat.
Relative to the meat, the intestines are not fit for use on Yom Tov. Raw
meat, though, stands by itself and is not secondary to anything else, and
therefore it is not Muktzah. (M. Kornfeld)