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Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem

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Beitzah 40

BEITZAH 36-40 (Siyum!) - Ari Kornfeld has generously sponsored the Dafyomi publications for these Dafim, for the benefit of Klal Yisrael.



(a) According to Rav, fruit that is given to someone to look after, follows the Techum of the trustee. Shmuel says - that it follows the T'chum of the owner.

(b) According to the Rabbanan in a Mishnah in Bava Kama, if Reuven authorizes Shimon to bring his belongings into his Chatzer, he automatically takes full responsibility for any damages that they sustain. Rebbi says that he does not take responsibility for them, unless he specifically says so.

(c) Rav rules like the Rabbanan; Shmuel rules like Rebbi. We try to establish that Rav *here* follows his opinion *there* - since the owner's belongings enter the trustee's domain regarding *responsibility*, they will also enter his domain regarding *Techumin*; whereas, according to Shmuel, in the same way as the owner retains ownership regarding responsibility *there*, so he will retain ownership *here* with regard to T'chum Shabbos.

(d) We reject that contention however, concluding that it would be possible for ...

1. ... Rav to say that the fruit follows the Techum of the trustee, even according to Rebbi - on the grounds that Rebbi only said that one *cannot take for granted* that the trustee takes responsibility for the owner's belongings (as long as he has not said so); whereas Rav is talking about someone who *specifically undertakes* to look after the fruit. In that case, even Rebbi will agree that the fruit follows the T'chum of the trustee.
2. ... Shmuel to say that the fruit follows the Techum of the depositor, even according to the Rabbanan - because it is only in the case in Bava Kama, where the owner *will be delighted* for the trustee to take responsibility, that the Rabbanan place the owner's belongings in the domain of the trustee; whereas in our case, where the owner will *not be at all pleased* for the trustee to take over ownership as regards T'chumin, even the Rabbanan will agree that the fruit remains in the ownership of the depositor.
(a) Rav will establish the Reisha of our Mishnah (which permits the trustees of the fruit of a man who lives in another town to bring it to him, provided he made an Eiruv) - when they designated a room for him (indicating that the fruit is to remain in his domain).

(b) We answer the Seifa of our Mishnah (which permits the visiting guests to take food back with them, provided, before Shabbos, the owner placed it in their domain through a third person) in two ways; the first, that handing the fruit to a third person on behalf of the (new) owners is similar to designating them a room. Alternatively - the very fact that he handed it to a third person on their behalf, indicates that he wishes the fruit to be entirely in their domain.

(a) The meat that was hung on the bolt of the door where Rav Chana bar Chanila'i - was given to his host on his behalf before Yom-Tov.

(b) Rav Chana himself had come, by means of an Eiruv, from a town that was outside T'chum Shabbos.

(c) When Rav Chana asked Rav Huna whether he was permitted to take the meat back with him to his home-town - he replied that it depended on who had hung the meat there: if *he* had had hung it there, then he *was* permitted to take it back with him; whereas if it was *the butchers* (or the inn-keeper) who had hung it there, then he was *not*.

(a) The fact that Rav Huna was a disciple of Rav creates a problem - because, according to Rav, the fruit follows the trustee, who in this case, was the inn-keeper. So why did Rav Huna permit Rav Chana to carry the meat home, even if *he* was the one to have hung it up, seeing as the meat acquired Shevisah with the inn-keeper.

(b) When the Gemara answers that 'Ibra de'Dasha' is different - it means that he himself hanging up the meat, and not giving it to the inn-keeper to do so, is equivalent to the owner designating a corner for him to put his things.

(c) We still have a problem or two with the other half of Rav Huna's statement (that if others hung up the meat on Rav Chana's behalf, he would be forbidden to take it with him):

1. Rav Hillel asked Rav Ashi from the Din of Shor shel Petem - from which we see that since the owner has in mind to place the animal in the domain of whoever will purchase it from him on Yom-Tov, the animal follows the T'chum of the purchaser. How much more so should this piece of meat follow the T'chum of Rav Chana bar Chanilai, in whose domain the butchers placed it already before Yom-Tov?
2. Ravina ask Rav Ashi from Rebbi Dosa (like whom Rebbi Yochanan ruled on Daf 37b) - from which we see that, when there is only one shepherd in town, and there is no doubt that it is to him that the owner will give his animal, then the animal automatically follows the shepherd; how much more so Rav Chana bar Chanilai, into whose domain the butchers specifically placed it?
3. Rav Ashi himself ask Rav Kahana from the Mishnah of 'ha'Beheimah ve'ha'Keilim ke'Raglei ha'Ba'alim' - from which we see that a person's belongings follow him as regards Techumin. In that case, why should the meat not automatically follow Rav Chana, who was the owner, irrespective of who hung the meat on the bolt? Note: It is unclear as to why they did not ask these three, Kashyos on Rav himself, who holds that the fruit follows the trustee and not the owner.
(a) We conclude that Rav Chana bar Chanila'i was a great man who was deeply involved in his Torah-study. The issue no longer concerned carrying the meat back to his home-town, which Rav Huna would clearly have permitted in all cases - The issue at stake here was 'Basar she'Nis'alem min ha'Ayin' (meat that escaped one's attention, even for a short space of time (and that a raven might subsequently have exchanged for non-Kaasher meat). Rav forbids the meat (unless it has a Si'man that one recognizes), and Rav Huna, as a disciple of Rav, followed the opinion of his Rebbe.

(b) Rav Huna maintained that, had Rav Chana hung up the meat, then he would inevitably have kept an eye on it (in spite of his concentration in his learning) - because it is human nature to follow up on one's own actions; but if it was others who hung it up, then, due to his concentration on his learning, Rav Chana bar Chanilai would not have kept an eye on it (neither would those who hung it up have cared to keep an eye on *his* meat).

(a) Our Mishnah forbids watering and Shechting the Midbari'os, but permits watering and Shechting the Baysos.
The Tana of our Mishnah describes ...
  1. ... Baysos - as animals that stay overnight in the town (i.e. they come in from their grazing-grounds.
  2. ... Midbari'os - as those that remain in their graziing-grounds.
(b) The Tana includes watering in his statement - as a side Chidush: to teach us to water the animal before Shechting it, to facilitate its stripping (because the water loostens the skin).

(c) The Tana of the Beraisa describe Midbari'os - as animals that leave for their grazing-grounds after Pesach, and return only when the first rains come (in Mar-Cheshvan), and Baysos - as animals that return each night.

(d) ) According to Rebbi, both of these are considered Baysos. Midbari'os - are animals that do not return from their grazing-grounds at all.

(a) Rebbi Shimon bar Rebbi asked his father about 'Patzilei Temarah' - dates that do not ripen on the tree, which are then placed in palm-branch baskets to ripen.

(b) Rebbi replied that, in Rebbi Shimon's opinion, they are not Muktzah, because only 'G'rogeros and Tzimukin' (figs and grapes that one placed on the roof to dry - to become dried figs and raisins) are Muktzah.

(c) The two specifications of 'G'rogeros and Tzimukin' are - 1. that (having been fit to eat as figs and grapes) they have been pushed away by the owner; and 2. that they are unfit to eat until the finished product is ready. Patzilei Temarah, on the other hand (which are not fit to eat to begin with, and) which cannot be described as having been pushed away by the owner, are not Muktzah.




(a) To answer the apparent discrepancy between Rebbi in his words to his son (where he does *not* appear to hold of Muktzah), and Rebbi in the Beraisa (where he apparently *does*), we answer initially that the Midbari'os in our Mishnah are comparable to G'rogros and Tzimukim (currently maintaining that, since, when all's said and done, they are unfit to eat, the owner *does*push them away). In the second answer, we assume that Rebbi really holds like he says in the Beraisa - and what he said to his son was only that *that* was the opinion of Rebbi Shimon, but not that he necessarily ruled like Rebbi Shimon.

(b) In the third answer, he really holds like Rebbi Shimon (like he told his son) - and in the Beraisa, where he was speaking to the Rabbanan who disagreed with him, he was saying that, as far as *he* was concerned, the animals are not Muktzah anyway (because he holds like Rebbi Shimon). Would they not agree with him, he was asking them, that at least those animals that come in from their grazing-grounds when the first rains arrive, are not Muktzah (even according to Rebbi Yehudah)?

***** Hadran Alach Mashilin Peiros, u'Selika Maseches Beitzah *****

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