ANSWERS TO REVIEW QUESTIONS
prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem
Previous daf Bava Kama 11
BAVA KAMA 11 - dedicated by Reb Gedalia Weinberger of New York, an Ohev
Torah and Marbitz Torah whose tireless efforts on behalf of Klal Yisroel
have produced enormous benefits for the Lomdei Hadaf over the years.
(a) We just refuted the suggestion that the Tana Kama of the Beraisa ('Yavi
Eidim le'Beis-Din') and Aba Shaul ('Yavi Adudah le'Beis-Din') argue over
P'chas Neveilah, to avoid creating a problem with Rav (or Rava ['Lo
Nitzr'cha Ela li'P'chas Neveilah']), and we conclude that both Tana'im hold
'P'chas Neveilah de'Nizak'. The basis of their Machlokes is - whether
'Torach Neveilah' (the trouble of extricating the Neveilah from the pit) is
the onus of the Mazik' (Aba Shaul) or of the Nizak' (the Rabbanan).
(b) Acherim learns from the Pasuk "*Kesef Yashiv le'Be'alav, ve'ha'Meis*
Yih'yeh Lo' - that it is up to the Nizak to extricate the carcass from the
pit (like Aba Shaul).
(c) Assuming that a carcass is worth more outside the pit than inside it,
Abaye's problem with Acherim's D'rashah is - why it is necessary at all,
seeing as it is in the Nizak's interest to raise the carcass.
(d) Rava answered him - that the Beraisa speaks in a case where the value of
the carcass is the same inside the pit as outside it, and he backs this up
with a popular saying 'A beam in town is worth a Zuz, and so is a beam in
(a) When Shmuel said 'Ein Shamin Lo le'Ganav ve'Lo le'Gazlan', he meant -
that it was customary for Dayanim not to assess a stolen object (which meant
that, in the event of its having depreciated after the theft, the thief
would return it together with the balance). In fact, they would obligate the
thief to replace the stolen article with a new one. They would however,
assess damaged articles.
(b) The problem with his conclusion 'va'Ani Omer Af le'Sho'el, (ve'Aba [Rav]
Modeh Li)' is - its ambiguity. It is unclear whether 'Af le'Sho'el Shamin
(like Nezikin), or ' ... Ein Shamin' (like Ganav and Gazlan).
(c) We try to solve our problem from an episode where someone broke a bolt
that he borrowed from his friend, and Rav ruled that he must replace the
bolt with a new one, in which case, a proof that Shmuel must have meant 'Ein
Shamin'. We counter this proof however - with Rav Kahana and Rav Asi there -
who exclaimed 'Is that the Din?', to which Rav remained silent (indicating
that the Halachah is 'Ein Shamin', and that this is also the opinion of
(d) 'Ula Amar Rebbi Elazar, Shamin le'Ganav u'le'Gazlan. Rav Papi Amar, Ein
Shamin'. The Halachah in the case of ...
1. ... Ganav and Gazlan is - Ein Shamin.
2. ... a borrower - Shamin.
(a) If a Shilya (a placenta) appears without a baby inside - the woman must
nevertheless observe fourteen days of Tum'ah immediately (followed by
twenty-six days of Taharah), because 'Ein Shilya be'Lo V'lad' (there is no
such thing as a Shilya without a baby inside - and if no baby is visible,
then it must have melted).
(b) A woman who gives birth - is Tamei even if she does not see any blood
(and this is known as a 'Leidah Yeveshta').
(c) The criterion that renders a woman Tamei Tum'as Leidah is - that the
majority of the baby emerged in the Shilya or part of the Shilya (see
(a) Ula Amar Rebbi Elazar says in the case of a Shilya, part of which
emerged on one day, and the remainder on the next - that we reckon the
fourteen days of Tum'ah already from the first day (in case the majority of
the baby emerged with it).
(b) Rava objects to Rebbi Elazar's ruling - on the grounds that, bearing in
mind that the first day is no more than a Safek, going le'Chumra on the
first day will lead to a Kula on the fifteenth, which one will then reckon
as the first day of Taharah, rendering Tahor any blood that she may see on
(c) Rava therefore amends the text to read - ' ... Chosheshin Lah mi'Yom
Rishon', meaning that one considers her Tamei on the first day, but begins
counting the fourteen days of Tum'ah from the second (le'Chumra, but not
le'Kula, as we shall now see.
(d) She subsequently counts ...
1. ... fifteen days of Tum'ah?
2. ... twenty-five days of Taharah - because as far as the days of Taharah
are concerned, we are also strict, to begin counting them considering the
second day of Tum'ah as her first day, but end the count, as if the first
day was her first day of Tum'ah.
(a) The underlying principle on which Rebbi Elazar's Chidush is based is -
'Ein Miktzas Shilya be'Lo V'lad' (even a small part of a Shilya that emerges
from the womb contains part of a baby)
(b) Were it not for this principle - we would not render the woman Tamei on
the first day, because of a S'fek S'feika (see Tosfos DH 'Shilya'), maybe no
part of the baby emerged at all, and even if it did, maybe it was not a
majority. And we would then consider the second day as her first of Tum'ah.
(c) The Mishnah in Chulin forbids eating part of a Shilya of an animal that
emerges whilst the mother is still alive, on the grounds - that maybe the
majority of the baby emerged with it and (even if it returns) it will
forbidden because of Neveilah, even if one subsequently Shechted the mother.
(d) The Mishnah continues ' 'Siman V'lad be'Ishah, Si'man V'lad bi'Veheimah'
(in other words, we learn the Din of the Shilya of an animal from that of a
(a) The Mishnah in Chulin now poses on Rebbi Elazar's ruling - inasmuch as,
seeing as the Tana forbids part of a Shilya of an animal, based on 'Ein
Miktzas Shilya be'Lo V'lad', what is Rebbi Elazar coming to teach us?
(b) To resolve this problem, we explain that, without Rebbi Elazar, we might
have thought 'Yesh Miktzas Shilya be'Lo V'lad', and the reason that the Tana
forbids even part of the Shilya that emerged is - because we decree a part
of the Shilya on account of the whole one (which would definitely be
forbidden because of Neveilah).
(c) This decree would not apply to a human Shilya - because seeing as we
count her days from the second day (as we explained earlier), everyone would
know that a part of a Shilya is a Safek, and not definitely Tahor (and no
decree is therefore necessary). Consequently, we need Rebbi Elazar to teach
us 'Ein Miktzas Shilya be'Lo V'lad', both in the case of a human Shilya and
in that of an animal.
(a) Ula Amar Rebbi Elazar says that a first-born son who is killed during
the first thirty days - does not need to be redeemed.
(b) The Pasuk "u'Feduyav mi'Ben Chodesh Tifdeh" - comes specifically to
preclude a baby who *died* from Pidyon ha'Ben, since his premature death
proves that he was a Nefel (a premature baby who could not live), but not a
healthy baby who was killed.
(c) The Beraisa quoted by Rami bar Chama learns this from the Pasuk "Ach
Padoh Sifdeh es Bechor ha'Adam" - from the word "Ach", which always comes to
(a) We learned in a Mishnah in Kidushin that a large animal is acquired by
means of a Kinyan Mesirah (and not Meshichah - see Rashi and Tosfos in
Kidushin). Ula Amar Rebbi Elazar says with Meshichah - on the basis of the
Beraisa 'va'Chachamim Omrim, Zu ve'Zu (both a small animal and a large one)
(b) Rebbi Shimon says 'Zu ve'Zu be'Hagbahah'.
(c) Ula Amar Rebbi Elazar also says that, when brothers divided their
father's estate, we assess the clothes that *they* (but not their [wives -
Rosh, and] chidren) are wearing (out of the estate) - because (women and)
children generally shun going to Beis-Din (since it is considered degrading
(d) When Rav Papa said that sometimes one does even assess the clothes that
'they' are wearing - he was referring to fine clothes that the oldest son is
wearing, because the other brothers are only too pleased that, he, as the
family representative, is smartly dressed.
(a) Ula Amar Rebbi Elazar also ruled that a Shomer who hands the article he
is guarding to another Shomer for safekeeping, is Patur. This is certainly
the case if a Shomer Chinam hands it to a Shomer Sachar, where he improves
the Shemirah, but it also pertains to the reverse case, where he has
down-graded the level of Shemirah - because he did after all, hand it to a
ben Da'as (a sane, grown-up person).
(b) The ramifications of this ruling are - that he (the first Shomer) will
be Patur from Onsin (from which he would also have been Patur had he
retained it) on the basis of the Shevu'ah of the second Shomer (but not from
(c) Rava disagrees. In his opinion - not only is a Shomer Sachar who handed
the article to a Shomer Chinam (thereby down-grading the level of Shemirah)
Chayav, but even a Shomer Chinam who handed it to a Shomer Sachar (where he
improves the Shemirah) is Chayav too ...
(d) ... because the owner can say to the first Shomer 'I handed *you* my
article for safekeeping, because I trust you and I accept your Shevu'ah. But
I don't trust the man to whom you entrusted it, and I don't accept his
(a) Ula Amar Rebbi Elazar also said that a creditor may claim Avadim in lieu
of his debt. When Rav Nachman asked Ula ...
1. ... whether he meant even from the Yesomim (assuming that the borrower
had died) - he replied 'No, only from the borrower himself'.
(b) It is obvious that the creditor can claim the Eved directly from the
debtor - because everything that the debtor owns is Meshubad to the
creditor, even the shirt on his back.
2. ... that this was obvious - he replied that he was speaking when the
borrower had designated the Eved as an Apotiki (the acronym of 'Apa Tehei
Ka'i', meaning that he now has special rights to claim from this particular
property), and then sold him, the Chidush being that the creditor is now
empowered to claim him from the purchaser (even though he cannot claim it
from the debtor's Yesomim should the debtor himself die [according to the
prevalent theory at this point).
(c) In fact, he connected this Halachah with a statement of Rava, who said -
that if someone designated ...
1. ... his Eved as an Apotiki and then sold him - he can claim him from the
(d) The reason for this difference is - because whereas an ox has no Kol
(that it is an Apotiki, and the purchaser cannot therefore safeguard himself
against losing it), an Eved has.
2. ... his ox as an Apotiki and then sold it - he is not permitted to claim
(a) After Rav Nachman had left, Ula said that Rebbi Elazar had really
permitted claiming the Eved even from the Yesomim.
(b) When Rav Nachman got to hear about it, he commented - that Ula had
evaded him because he was afraid of him.
(c) Ula, who maintained that Avadim (in this regard), are like Karka, was
afraid - that Rav Nachman, who held that Avadim were like Metaltelin, might
overwhelm him with arguments proving him wrong.