ANSWERS TO REVIEW QUESTIONS
prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem
Previous daf Bava Kama 41
BAVA KAMA 41 - Sponsored by the generous contributions of an anonymous donor
in Manchester, England. May he be blessed with a Kesivah va'Chasimah Tovah,
and a year of physical and spiritual growth and prosperity.
(a) The Tana of our Mishnah discusses Kofer. A Tam that kills a person ...
1. ... is not Chayav to pay Kofer.
(b) The ox is Chayav Miysah - irrespective of whether the ox killed a
grown-up who is Chayav to keep the Mitzvos or a Katan, who is not.
2. ... is nevertheless Chayav Miysah.
(c) If an ox kills a person worth ...
1. ... a hundred Manah - he must pay thirty Shekalim.
2. ... one Dinar - he must pay thirty Shekalim, too.
(a) We ask how an animal can ever be a Mu'ah le'Adam, seeing as it must be
put to death after the first killing. Rav Ashi objects to Rabah's answer
that it is possible when the animal chased three people and Beis-Din
assessed that it would have killed them had it caught them - on the grounds
that, in terms of warning (to becomes a Mu'ad) such an assessment is
meaningless, until the animal actually kills.
(b) Rav Ashi himself answers 'K'gon she'Siken li'Sheloshah B'nei Adam', by
which he means that the ox gored three people on three consecutive days,
though they only died later on the same day, at which point the ox becomes
both Chayav Miysah and a Mu'ad simultaneously.
(c) We reject the answer of Rav Z'vid (that it becomes a Mu'ad by killing
three animals) on the grounds that a Mu'ad for animals is not a Mu'ad for
people, as we learned above. And we reject the answer of ...
1. ... Rav Shimi (that it first killed three Nochrim) - on the grounds that
a Mu'ad le'Nochrim is not a Mu'ad le'Yisre'elim either.
(d) Rav Papa establishes a Mu'ad le'Adam when it is simply not physically
possible to kill it - because immediately after the warning, it ran away
(three times), before it could be put to death.
2. ... Resh Lakish (that it first killed three T'reifos) - that, by the same
token, a Mu'ad le'T'reifos is not a Mu'ad for healthy people.
(a) Rav Acha B'rei de'Rav Ika answers that the Zomemei Zomemin themselves
became Zomemin - meaning that after each of the first two (or three) pairs
of witnesses testified, another pair rendered them Zomemin. Then, after the
third (or fourth) pair testified, that pair came again to render the final
pair Zomemin too, only this time, another pair came and rendered *them*
Zomemin on all their testimonies. Consequently, the ox becomes a Mu'ad in
one moment, since now all the previous testimonies take effect
(b) This is only clear-cut however, according to those who only require the
Mazik ox to be warned, but according to those who require the owner to be
warned, there is a problem - namely, that if it is the owner who needs to be
warned, he requires not only three days, but three separate warnings on
three separate days (and he only had one set of three warniings on one day.
(c) We establish that the final witnesses added that the owner was standing
by his herd each time his ox gored and witnessed the goring.
(a) According to Ravina, it is possible to find a Mu'ad le'Adam in a case
where the witnesses were able to identify the owner's herd, but not the
individual ox. The owner is then Chayav - to keep watch over his entire
herd, as if they were all goring oxen.
(b) One specific animal become Mu'ad - when after the third (or the fourth)
goring, the witnesses recognized the ox retroactively, rendering it a Mu'ad.
(a) The Tana learn from the Pasuk ...
1. ... "ve'Lo Ye'achel es Besaro" - that, if an ox that killed a person, and
that ought to be stoned, was Shechted, its flesh may not be eaten.
(b) ben Zoma explains the word "Naki" to mean - like a person says to his
friend 'So and so went free from his property, and he got nothing out of
2. ... "u'Ba'al ha'Shor Naki" - that one may also not derive any benefit
(c) The Tana declines to explain the Pasuk literally - because we do not
need a Pasuk to teach us that a stoned ox may not be eaten.
(a) Rebbi Avuhu Amar Rebbi Elazar interpret "Lo Ye'achel", "Lo Sochal" and
"Lo Sochlu" wherever they occur to mean - that they are not only forbidden
to eat, but also, be'Hana'ah (to derive any benefit from them).
(b) He extrapolates this from the Pasuk "la'Ger Asher bi'She'arecha Titnenah
va'Achalah" - implying that, if not for the special Pasuk permitting it, it
would be forbidden to to benefit from a Neveilah in this way. And this in
turn teaches us that "Achilah" (Lo Sochlu Kol Neveilah") incorporates
(c) Nevertheless, the Tana declines to establish "ve'Lo Ye'achel es Besaro"
with regard to a prohibition forbidding Hana'ah from an ox that was stoned
(but permitting it if it is Shechted) - because Rebbi Avahu was referring
to adding Hana'ah to the basic La'av of eating, but not that it "Lo Sochal"
should be confined to Hana'ah.
(d) We know to split Rebi Avuhu's Din in this way - because otherwise, the
Torah ought to have written "Lo Yehaneh". But why should it write "Lo
Sochal", and mean Hana'ah?
(a) Alternatively, we might learn it from "Lo Ye'achel *es Besaro*" - wjich
is superfluous, and which implies that, even though he made the flesh like
meat (which refers to Shechitah), it is nevertheless forbidden.
(b) We suggest that "ve'Lo Ye'achel es Besaro" might pertain specifically to
where the animal was Shechted with a sharp piece of rock, but not to where
it was Shechted with a knife - since the former is similar to stoning,
whereas the pater is not.
(c) We refute this on the basis of a Mishnah in Chulin - which validates the
Shechitah of someone who Shechts with a scythe, a sharp piece of rock or a a
(d) We have proved with this Mishnah - that Shechitah with a sharp piece of
rock is called Shechitah. Consequently it would be illogical to distinguish
between a Shor ha'Niskal that one Shechted with a sharp rock and one that
one Shechted with a knife.
(a) Having concluded that we learn both the prohibition to eat a 'Shor
ha'Niskal' that was Shechted and to derive benefit from it, from "ve'Lo
Ye'achel es Besaro", we learn from "u'Ba'al ha'Shor Naki" - to include
Hana'as Oro (the prohibition of deriving benefit from the animal's skin).
(b) We will shortly discuss the opinions of other Tana'im who learn other
things from "u'Ba'al ha'Shor Naki". They learn Hana'as Oro - from the word
"es" in "es Besaro".
(c) Our Tana is Shimon ha'Amsuni or Nechemyah ha'Amsuni, who does not
Darshen the word "es" wherever it appears in the Torah. He retracted from
all the 'esin' that he had Darshened up to that point - when he arrived at
"es Hashem Elokecha Tiyra", since there was no creature on earth whose awe
can compare with that of Hashem.
(d) When they asked him what he would do with the numerous D'rashos he had
made up to that point - he replied that just as he would receive reward for
those D'rashos, so too would he receive reward for retracting from them.
(a) The Tana who argues with Shimon ha'Amsuni - is Rebbi Akiva.
(b) He learns from the "es" in "es Hashem Elokecha Tiyra" - 'Le'rabos
(a) When Rebbi Eliezer in a Beraisa learns from "u'Ba'al ha'Shor Naki",
'Naki me'Chatzi Kofer', he is referring to - a Tam that killed a person.
(b) Rebbi Akiva objects to Rebbi Eliezer's D'rashah on the grounds - that -
seeing as the payment of damages performed by a Tam are confined to the body
of the ox, and an ox that killed someone must be put to death and is Asur
be'Hana'ah, why do we need a Pasuk to exempt a Tam from Chatzi Kofer?
(c) Rebbi Eliezer counters this objection - by establishing the case when
only one witness saw the ox killing, or even when the owner himself saw it,
in which case the ox is not put to death (see Tosfos DH 'Al Pi').
(d) We establish the case when the owner admitted to his ox having gored the
person, despite the fact that normally due to the principle 'Modeh bi'K'nas
Patur', he would be exempt from paying - because Rebbi Eliezer holds that
Kofer (even in the case of a Tam) is a Kaparah and not a K'nas.
(a) An animal that meant to kill another animal, but inadvertently killed a
person, or that meant to kill a Nochri and inadvertently killed a Yisrael -
is not put to death.
Regarding the question which answer did Rebbi Eliezer give Rebbi Akiva
first, Rav Kahana says in the name of Rava 'Miskaven, whereas Rav Tivyomi
said in the name of Rava 'Heimis' ('Eid Echad'). Each of them gave a Mashal
to support his opinion.
(b) The third case mentioned by Rebbi Eliezer in the Beraisa is - an animal
that meant to kill a Nefel (an eighth month baby that would have died anyway
within thirty days) but inadvertently killed a healthy child.
(c) We quote this Beraisa - as an alternative to Rebbi Eliezer's previous
answer. Here, he uses these cases to counter Rebbi Akiva's objection, since
we have here another case where the ox is not put to death, and would
therefore have to pay Chatzi Kofer (if not for "u'Ba'al ha'Shor Naki").
(d) The Beraisa of 'Miskaven' considered a bigger Chidush than that of 'Eid
Echad' - because there is no reason to exempt him from paying, whereas in
the case of 'Eid Echad' there is; where the owner himself witnessed the
killing, he may be Patur because of 'Modeh bi'K'nas Patur', and when another
single witness saw it, the absence of two witnesses may well absolve him
from having to pay.
1. Rav Kahana compared it to - a fisherman who, even after he has caught big
fish, will continue fishing for small ones; so too, the fact that Rebbi
Eliezer had brought a strong proof for his words did not deter him from
adding another proof, albeit a weak one (as we just explained).
2. Rav Tivyomi compared it to a fisherman with a limited number of
receptacles. Upon catching a large fish, he throws the small fish that he
has already caught back into the water. So too here, Rebbi Eliezer only
brought the proof from 'Heimis' because he had nothing better at the time.
But when he discovered the proof from 'Miskaven', he cited that instead.