ANSWERS TO REVIEW QUESTIONS
prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem
Previous daf Bava Kama 54
BAVA KAMA 54 (Rosh Hashanah) - dedicated by Rabbi Eli Turkel and his wife.
May they be blessed with much Nachas from their children and grandchildren
and may all of their prayers be answered l'Tovah!
(a) "ve'Nafal Shamah" is a 'K'lal', and "Shor va'Chamor", a 'P'rat'. The
significance of a 'K'lal u'P'rat' is - 'Ein bi'Ch'lal Ela Mah she'bi'P'rat'
(the 'K'lal' incorporates the 'P'rat' exclusively).
(b) We know that a Bor is liable for any animals other than an ox or a
donkey - because the Torah adds a K'lal "Ba'al ha'Bor Yeshalem", which
includes whatever is similar to the 'P'rat'.
(c) The P'rat comes to exclude - anything that is not a live creature.
(a) We initially think that birds will not be included in the 'K'lal u'P'rat
u'Ch'lal' - because they are not similar to Shor va'Chamor, inasmuch as
their corpses are not Metamei by means of touching or carrying.
(b) Initially, we include birds - from the fact that the Torah writes two
P'ratim ("Shor va'Chamor"), when one, ought to have sufficed.
(c) In fact, we reply, we need both Pesukim. Had the Torah written only ...
1. ... "Shor" and not "Chamor" - we would have confined the Chiyuv of Bor to
animals that are fit to go on the Mizbe'ach?
(d) We could learn animals that are not Kadosh bi'Vechorah from "Shor" (not
because an ox is not Kadosh bi'Vechorah, but) - because the word is
otherwise superfluous (and from a superfluous word, it is possible to
Darshen 'Im Eino Inyan' (even something that is not inherent in the word
2. ... "Chamor" and not "Shor" - we would have confined it to animals that
are Kadosh bi'Vechorah from birth (but not horses and camels ... ).
(a) We now learn (momentarily) from "ve'ha'Meis Yihyeh Lo" (and not from the
'Klal u'P'rat u'Ch'lal') - that a pit is Chayav for whatever dies, even
(b) In spite of this D'rashah, the Rabbanan need a Pasuk ("Chamor") to
preclude Keilim, and Rebbi Yehudah is able to include them (from "O") -
because when a vessel breaks, it is as if it died?
(c) And by the same token, according to Rav, who obligates a Bor for the
Havlas, the Rabbanan need a Pasuk - to preclude new Keilim, and that is what
Rebbi Yehudah includes, because vapors do break new vessels.
(d) Despite the fact that both a person and a donkey are incorporated in
"ve'ha'Meis Yihyeh Lo", we preclude ..
1. ... Keilim from Bor - because breaking a vessel is not really the same as
2. ... Adam - because Adam is not of the same species as an ox and a donkey?
(a) We cannot preclude both Adam and Keilim from one D'rashah - because, if
we had the choice, we would opt to preclude Adam, who is a living thing, and
it is more likely that the Torah comes to preclude living things, since that
is what the Pasuk is talking about.
(b) We reject the current D'rashah from "ve'ha'Meis Yihyeh Lo" - on the
grounds that Rava has already used this Pasuk to preclude Shor Pesulei
ha'Mukdashin, as we learned earlier.
(a) We finally learn that one is liable for birds in a pit from the Pasuk
"Kesef Yashiv li'Be'alav" - which include anything that has an owner.
(b) This D'rashah ought to include Adam and Keilim, too. The Rabbanan
preclude them however - from "Shor O Chamor" respectively, as we already
(c) Rebbi Yehudah concedes the D'rashah of "Shor", 've'Lo Adam', Rava
explains - but we do not know what he learns from "Chamor".
(a) 'Nafal le'Tocho Shor Chashu, Chayav'. The Tana cannot mean a Shor
belonging to a 'Chashu' - because that would imply that if the Shor belonged
to a Pike'ach, he would be Patur (which makes no sense).
(b) Rebbi Yochanan therefore concludes that he must mean a Shor that is a
'Chashu', from which we can extrapolate - that if the Shor would be a
Pike'ach, he would be Patur (which initially, appears senseless too).
(c) Rebbi Yirmiyah interprets Rebbi Yochanan to mean - that when the Tana
says that he is Chayav for a 'Chashu' ox, he means that he is *even* Chayav
for a 'Chashu' ox, and certainly for one that is a Pike'ach. Otherwise we
would have thought that it was its 'stupidity' that caused it to fall into
the pit, and he would be Patur.
(d) Initially, Ravina establishes the Beraisa 'Nafal le'Tocho bar Da'as,
Patur' - by Adam (and not Shor).
(a) the inference that Bor is Patur if a ben Da'as falls in, but not if the
person who falls in is not a ben Da'as (i.e. a 'Chashu') is unacceptable -
because of the D'rashah "Shor", 've'Lo Adam' (which exempts the owner,
whatever sort of Adam falls into the pit).
(b) So we attempt to explain 'ben Da'as' as - Miyn bar Da'as (the species of
bar Da'as [alias Adam]).
(c) We finally reinterpret the previous Beraisa on the basis of another
Beraisa, which states that if a Shor ben Da'as falls into a pit - the owner
of the pit is Patur.
(a) Rava finally echoes Rebbi Yochanan ('Shor she'Hu Chashu ... '), in
disagreement with Rebbi Yirmiyah. According to him, the Tana of our Mishnah
specifies a Shor which is a 'Chashu' - because if a Shor Pike'ach were to
fall in, he would be Patur.
(b) The reason for this is - because we expect a healthy ox to look where it
is going (just like we expect a person to do).
(c) We know that Rav's explanation is the correct one - because it has the
support of a Beraisa.
(d) The Beraisa says that if an ox falls into a pit ...
1. ... at night or if the ox is blind - the owner of the pit is liable.
2. ... when it is healthy and during the day - he is Patur.
(a) Regarding an animal falling into a pit, separating the animals from Har
Sinai, paying double for stealing an animal, returning a lost animal or
unloading it and muzzling a working animal the Mishnah says - that all
animals have the same Din as a Shor.
(b) The two other regards that all animals are compared to 'Shor' are -
Kil'ayim and Shabbos.
(c) This comparison extends to wild beasts and birds too.
(d) The reason the Torah refers specifically to "Shor va'Chamor" in all the
cases is - because they were the most commonly used animals.
(a) We learn that all animals are included in the Chiyuv of Bor - from Kesef
Yashiv li'Be'alav" ('Kol de'Is Leih Ba'alim'), as we learned on the previous
(b) All animals were included in the Mitzvah to separate the animals from
Har Sinai, from the Pasuk "Im *Beheimah* Im Ish Lo Yichyeh". We learn from
the Pasuk ...
1. ... "Zos ha'Beheimah Asher Tocheilu ... Ayal u'Tzvi ... " - that whenever
the Torah writes "Beheimah", it incorporates Chayah.
(c) We learn the Mitzvos of unloading an animal and not muzzling a working
animal from a 'Gezeirah-Shavah' ("Chamor" and "Shor" respectively) - from
2. ... "*Im* Beheimah ... " - that birds are included in the command to
separate the animals from Har Sinai.
3. ... "Al Kol D'var Pesha" - that a thief is obligated to pay double for
all animals that he stole (even though the Torah singled out "Shor
4. ... "le'Chol Aveidas Achicha" - that one must return any lost article
that one finds, including any species of animal, even though the Torah
singled out "Shor va'Chamor".
(d) Kil'ayim too, is derived from Shabbos with the Gezeirah-Shavah of "Shor"
or "Behemtecha". Kil'ayim requires two 'Gezeirah-Shavahs - one for the Isur
of plowing with two animals together, and one for the Isur of breeding them
(a) By Shabbos, the Torah specifically includes all animals when it writes
in Yisro (in the first set of Aseres ha'Dibros) "Avdecha, va'Amascha
u'Vehemtecha". Rebbi Yossi in the name of Rebbi Yishmael (in a Beraisa)
learns from the fact that, in the second set in Va'eschanan, the Torah
writes "ve'Shorcha va'Chamorcha u've'Chol Behemtecha" - that (by means of
the 'Gezeirah-Shavah' that we just explained), this inclusion extends to the
other cases too.
(b) We do not consider "Behemtecha" of the first Dibros to be a 'K'lal', and
''Shorcha va'Chamorcha" of the second Dibros, a 'P'rat', precluding all
other species - because "ve'Chol Behemtecha" of the second Dibros forms a
second 'K'lal', to include them.
(c) Birds whose carcasses (unlike those of oxen and donkeys) are not
Metamei, are not automatically included in 'Beheimah'. We reject the
original suggestion (to include them in the Isur Melachah on Shabbos on the
grounds that either "Shor" or "Chamor is superfluous), because both in fact,
are necessary (as we explained on the previous Amud). In fact, we include
them - from the word "*ve'Chol* Behemtecha".
(d) We query the explanation that "Kol" is (not a 'K'lal', but) a Ribuy
(including everything), on the basis of a Beraisa. The Beraisa learns from
the Pasuk "ve'Nasata ha'Kesef *be'Chol* Asher Te'aveh Nafshecha ('K'lal'),
ba'Bakar, u'va'Tzon, u'va'Yayin u'va'Sheichar (Prat), *u've'Chol* Asher
Tish'alcha Nafshecha" ('P'rat') - that only something that is 'P'ri mi'Pri'
(such as wine from grapes or oil from olives) and that grew from the ground
(including animals) can be purchased with Ma'aser Sheini.
(a) The previous 'K'lal u'P'rat u'Ch'lal' regarding Ma'aser comes to
exclude - mushrooms, water and salt (which are not P'ri mi'P'ri), and fish
(which grow from water, but not from the ground).
(b) We reconcile "Kol" being a 'Ribuy' with this Beraisa - by
differentiating between "Kol", which is a 'Ribuy', and be'Chol', which is a
(c) Alternatively, we conclude, "Kol" is normally a 'Klal' (and not a
'Ribuy'). But here (by Shabbos) it is a Ribuy, because the Torah ought to
have written "Behemtecha", like it did in the first Dibros.
(d) Even though "Kol" (in the Pasuk in Shabbos) is a 'Ribuy', as we just
concluded, the Torah nevertheless needs to write "Behemtecha" in the first
Dibros, and "Shor" and "Chamor" in the second - to learn from them the
'Gezeirah-Shavah' on to unloading an animal, muzzling an working animal,
Kil'ayim of plowing and Kil'ayim of breeding, as we learned above.
(a) Bearing in mind that a person is certainly forbidden to work on Shabbos,
the problem now is why we do not use the 'Gezeirah-Shavah' to include a
person in the prohibition of Kil'ayim of plowing (together with any animal)?
(b) Papuna'i was the only one who knew how to solve this problem. 'Papuna'i'
is - Rav Acha bar Ya'akov.
(c) Rav Acha bar Ya'akov resolves it from the Pasuk "Lema'an Yanu'ach
Shorcha va'Chamorcha" - from which we infer that the Torah restricts the
comparison of animals to people (or vice-versa), to working on Shabbos, but
not to any other issue.