ANSWERS TO REVIEW QUESTIONS
prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem
Previous daf Bava Kama 84
(a) Rebbi Shimon bar Yochai learns that "Ayin Tachas Ayin" must mean Mamon -
because otherwise, it would not be possible to punish a blind man who
blinded his friend or a lame one who made him lame. And by punishing some
people and not others, we would be contravening the Pasuk "Torah Achas
(b) We reject Rebbi Shimon's proof however, on the grounds that - not
punishing someone whom one cannot be punished would not be considered a
contravention of "Torah Achas ... " ...
(c) ... any more than the case of a T'reifah who murdered somebody and who
cannot be sentenced to death ...
(d) ... because the witnesses, who testified about a man who, to all intents
and purposes, was already dead, cannot become Eidim Zomemin.
(a) de'Bei Rebbi Yishmael learns 'Mamon' from the Pasuk "Kein *Yinasen*
Bo" - since "Yinasen" has implications of Mamon.
(b) To reconcile this with the fact that (in the previous phrase, ("Ka'asher
*Yiten* Mum ba'Adam") "Yiten" certainly does not mean Mamon - by explaining
that although "Yiten" S'tam does not necessarily imply Mamon, here where it
is superfluous (since the Torah just wrote "Kasher Yiten Mum ba'Amiso,
Ka'asher Asah Kein Ye'aseh Lo") it is.
(c) And the Torah only writes "Ka'asher *Yiten* Mum ba'Adam", because it
needed to write "Kein Yinasen Bo"?
(a) de'Bei Rebbi Chiya learns from the Pasuk there (in connection with Eid
Zomem) "Yad be'Yad" - 'Davar ha'Niten mi'Yad le'Yad', (meaning that they
only pay Mamon, rather than have their hands cut off).
(b) Despite the fact that "Regel be'Ragel" cannot be explained in the same
way, we nevertheless Darshen "Yad be'Yad" like this - because, having
already written "va'Asisem Lo Ka'asher Zamam La'asos le'Achiv", the entire
phrase is superfluous ...
(c) ... and the Torah only writes "Regel be'Ragel" because it needed to
write "Yad be'Yad".
(a) Abaye learns 'Mamon' from Tana de'Bei Chizkiyah, who Darshens from "Ayin
Tachas Ayin, Nefesh Tachas Nefesh" - ve'Lo Ayin ve'Nefesh Tachas Ayin'. And
if one were to interpret "Ayin Tachas Ayin" literally, there is always the
fear that the Mazik might die in the process of removing his eye (which
would be a case of 'Ayin ve'Nefesh Tachas Nefesh').
(b) We reject Abaye's proof too, supporting our point from the Mishnah in
Makos, which states - that if Beis-Din assessed someone for Malkos, and in
spite of that assessment, he died whilst Malkos was being administered, they
are absolved from guilt (because they did their duty).
(c) Similarly, in our case - before removing the Mazik's eye, they would
assess that he could survive. If in spite of that assessment he died, they
are absolved from guilt (because they did their duty).
(a) Rav Z'vid in the name of Rava learns 'Mamon' from the D'rashah of "Petza
Tachas Patza", and Rav Papa in the name of Rava learns it from the D'rashah
of "ve'Rapo Yerapei". The two respective D'rashos from these two Pesukim
are - that the Mazik must pay for the Tza'ar and for the doctor's fees, even
when there is Nezek, too.
(b) Rav Z'vid and Rav Papa learn 'Mamon' from there - because if the Mazik's
was sentenced to have his limb removed, then why would we need a Pasuk to
obligate the Mazik Tza'ar and Ripuy, seeing as he would automatically
experience pain and require medical attention, just as the Nizak did?
(c) We reject their respective proofs however - by establishing the Pasuk of
Tza'ar and Refu'ah by a Mazik who did not suffer the same degree of Tza'ar
or need the same medical attention as the Nizak, and the Pasuk comes to
sentence the Mazik to the difference.
(a) The last proof for 'Mamon' is that of Rav Ashi. who initially learns
from the 'Gezeirah-Shavah' "Ayin Tachas Ayin", "Shalem Yeshalem Shor Tachas
ha'Shor" (that just as the latter Pasuk refers to Mamon, so too, the
former). We query this however, on the grounds that it would be more likely
to derive the 'Gezeirah-Shavah' from Adam - from the Pasuk "ve'Nasasta
Nefesh Tachas Nafesh", which refers literally to Miysah (in which case "Ayin
Tachas Ayin" will be taken literally too, to mean a limb for a limb).
(b) We might nevertheless prefer to learn the 'Gezeirah-Shavah' from the
Pasuk by Shor - in order to learn Nizakin from Nizakin (as we saw on the
(c) Due to the doubt from which "Tachas" to learn it, Rav Ashi switches to a
third "Tachas", which refers to both Adam and Mamon - to "Tachas Asher Inah"
(in connection with a case of rape - in Ki Seitzei).
(a) Rebbi Eliezer states in a Beraisa "Ayin Tachas Ayin" Mamash. This cannot
be correct - in view of all the D'rashos that we have just cited, proving
that "Ayin Tachas Ayin" must mean Mamon.
(b) Rabah explains Rebbi Eliezer to mean that the Mazik is not assessed like
an Eved, which Abaye queries - on the grounds that if that were so, how
would he be assessed, seeing as a ben Chorin does not have a value.
(c) So Rav Ashi explains that what Rebbi Eliezer means - is that we assess
not the Nizak, but the Mazik (which explains the word 'Mamash' used by him
[since it resembles paying for the Nizak's eye with his own]).
(a) When the case of a child whose hand had been bitten off by a donkey was
brought before Rav Papa bar Shmuel, he ruled - that he had to pay four
things (see Tosfos DH 'Ziylu').
(b) He explained to Rava that he meant four things besides Nezek. When Abaye
pointed out that the damage had been done by a donkey (and not by a human) -
he told him to assess him like an Eved (though initially, he omitted to add
'like an Eved').
(c) When the father refused to assess him like an Eved because he considered
it undignified - Rav Papa pointed out to him that he had no right to forego
his son's rights, on the basis of this argument.
(d) To which the father replied - that he would appease his son when he grew
(a) When the case of the child whose hand had been chewed by an ox came
before Rava, he ruled that they should assess the child like an Eved. They
queried him however, on the basis of another statement of his - where he
said that anyone who needs to be assessed like an Eved - cannot claim his
due in Bavel.
(b) Rava reconciles his current ruling with his other statement - by
establishing the assessment (not in order to claim, but) in anticipation of
the Nizak seizing it without asking Beis-Din (in which case, he would be
permitted to keep it).
(c) Rava's latter statement tallies with another statement of his. He stated
that the damage done to ...
1. ... an ox by an ox or to an ox by a human - may be claimed in Bavel.
(d) The reason of the latter ruling cannot be ascribed to the fact that the
Torah uses the word "Elohim" ("Ad ha'Elohim Yavo D'var Sheneihem" [which in
this context, means 'expert judges']) - because in that case, the two cases
in the former ruling are contained in that Parshah, too.
2. ... a human by a human or to a human by an ox - may not.
(a) We assume that there are no expert judges in Bavel - because the
definition of an expert judge is one with Semichah, and there is no Semichah
(b) We suggest that 'the damage to an ox by an ox and to an ox by a human'
is Chayav because of 'Shelichusaihu ka'Avdinan' like by Hoda'os and
Halva'os' - (when two witnesses testify that Reuven admits that he owes
Shimon money or when there are two witnesses to that effect, respectively),
where Beis-Din in Bavel will issue a ruling even though they do not have
Semichah, because they are doing the job of Semuchim.
(c) We think at this stage that the reason that 'the damage of a human by a
human and to a human by an ox' is Patur in Bavel is because the amount needs
to be assessed. We reject this explanation however, on two scores, one of
them because in the former case, as well as in the latter, it is easy to go
and find out the market value of the Nizak in the market (so that *the
initial lack of knowledge of his value is not really a criterion*). And we
reject it *even if it were* - because how would we then explain the fact
that the payment of Kefel and Daled ve'Hey is not enforced in Bavel (even
though the amount is known)?
(d) Neither is the criterion solely the fact that we do not judge K'nasos in
Bavel, because 'the damage of a human by a human and to a human by an ox' is
not a K'nas. Perhaps we suggest, whatever is uncommon, is not judged in
Bavel, but we refute that too, on the basis of Rav Papa, who, when
confronted with a case involving Bo'shes - ordered the Mazik to pay four
(a) Rav Papa is proved wrong however, from a statement of Rav Nachman (who
was famed for his expertise in money-matters). When Rav Chisda consulted Rav
Nachman about a how much Bo'shes to pay in a certain case that came before
him (in Perek ha'Meni'ach) the latter retorted - 'Chisda Chisda, K'nasa
(b) We finally conclude that we only claim in Bavel cases (of Mamon, not of
K'nas) with two specifications - a. that they are common and b. that they
involve a real loss of pocket.
(c) That explain why, in Bavel, we do not claim ...
1. ... 'the damage of a human by a human and to a human by an ox' - which is
(d) When Rava said that a Shor that damaged is not subject to claim in
Bavel, we know that he meant 'Shor de'Azik Shor', because if he was
referring to Shor de'Azik Adam, why did he say *Shor* de'Azik, seeing as
even *Adam* de'Azik Adam does not apply in Bavel either?
2. ... Bo'shes - which does not involve a real loss of pocket.
(a) We reconcile this statement of Rava with his previous statement (that
Shor de'Azik Shor does pay in Bavel) - by establishing that case by a Shor
*Mu'ad* that damaged, whereas the current case pertains to a Tam.
(b) Rava also said that there is no such thing as a Mu'ad in Bavel - because
seeing as a Shor Tam that damages is not judged, how can the animal ever
become a Mu'ad?
(c) To explain the discrepancy that on the one hand, there is no such thing
as a Shor Mu'ad in Bavel, and on the other, Rava speaks about claiming from
a Mu'ad in Bavel, we try to establish the case of a Mu'ad in Bavel when
either the Mu'ad ox or the Beis-Din of Semuchin was brought from Eretz
Yisrael to Bavel. We reject both suggestions however, due to the fact
neither is common, and we learned earlier, that whatever is uncommon, cannot
be claimed in Bavel.
(d) The case of an ox that is a Mu'ad in Bavel to which Rava refers must
therefore be - that of Shein ve'Regel (which did not *become* a Mu'ad, but
was one all the time).
(a) Rebbi argues with ben Azai in a Beraisa. Assuming that Rebbi interprets
"Kevi'ah" to mean a burn without a real wound, when ...
1. ... he says 'Kevi'ah Ne'emrah Techilah', he means - that Kevi'ah on its
own implies even a burn without a wound. Consequently, when the Torah adds
Chaburah', it means to indicate that one is only Chayav for pain when there
is a wound.
(b) This is the opinion of Rava, according to whom - the author of our
Mishnah (which obligates the Mazik to pay for pain without a wound) is ben
2. ... ben Azai (who interprets ''Kevi'ah'' to mean a burn with a wound)
says 'Chaburah Ne'emrah Techilah', he means - that "Chaburah" comes to
indicate that "Kevi'ah" means a burn without a wound.
(c) Rav Papa refutes Rava's explanation with the words 'Ipcha Mistavra' -
meaning that it would be more logical to explain their respective statements
to fit their final opinions than to the initial meaning of the word Kevi'ah,
as Rava explained.
(d) Based on the fact that Rebbi interprets "Kevi'ah" to mean a burn with a
1. ... when he says 'Kevi'ah Ne'emrah Techilah', he means that seeing as the
Torah begins with "Kevi'ah", implying a burn with a wound, "Chaburah" comes
to indicate that in this case, it comes to include a burn without a wound
(in which case, he is the author of our Mishnah).
2. ... when ben Azai says 'Chaburah Ne'emrah Techilah', he means - that,
seeing as "Kevi'ah" implies even a burn without a wound, "Chaburah" (which
is not superfluous), must come to indicate that here, one is only Chayav for
a burn with a wound.
(a) Alternatively, according to both opinions, Kevi'ah could mean either a
burn with a wound or a burn without one, and they argue over a 'K'lal
u'P'rat' which are not together. The K'lal in this case, is "Kevi'ah", and
the P'rat, "Chaburah".
(b) If they were together - we would consider them a regular 'K'lal
u'P'rat', and based on the principle 'Ein bi'Ch'lal Ela Mah she'bi'P'rat',
we would require a burn with a wound.
(c) ben Azai considers them as if they were together, and the burn must
incorporate a real wound. The Rabbanan say - that this cannot be considered
a 'K'lal u'P'rat u'Ch'lal', in which case "Kevi'ah" means a burn without a
wound, and "Chaburah" a burn with one.
(d) According to Rebbi, the Torah needs to write "Chaburah to teach us -
that even there is a wound, the Mazik still pays for the pain (and we do not
apply the principle 'Mishum Rish'ah Achas Atah Mechayvo ... ').