(Permission is granted to print and redistribute this material
as long as this header and the footer at the end are included.)


prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem

Previous daf

Bava Kama 98



(a) We just cited Rav Ashi, who explains that, according to the Tana of the Beraisa, if the price of fruit dropped anyway, due to a bountiful harvest - the borrower is permitted to accept a coin that is larger than the one he borrowed. The problem with this is - that at the end of the day, he receives more silver than he lent, which he is able to melt down and convert into more pieces of silver, which is surely Ribis.

(b) We conclude by citing Rav Papa and Rav Huna B'rei de'Rav Yehoshua, who dealt with just such a case. The two men there went to Agardimus - an expert Arab banker.

(c) When we say ' ... ad Yud bi'Temanya' we mean that if there were more than ten old coins in eight of the new ones (i.e. more than a twenty-five percent increase, then he would have to accept eight new coins for the eleven or twelve old ones) that he had lent him, but if the increase was twenty-five percent or less then he would be permitted to take a full ten, or nine ... new coins for the ten or nine old ones that he lent him.

(a) If Reuven threw Shimon's coin into the sea - he is obligated to pay, irrespective of whether the water is clear or not (because throwing is a proper act, and not just G'rama).

(b) Rabah exempts someone from paying in similar circumstances, only when he knocked the owner's hand from underneath, causing the coin to fly into the sea. Since he did not touch the coin itself, it is considered no more than G'rama (which is Patur mi'Dinei Adam).

(c) He will be liable to pay however, even according to Rabah - if the water is murky at the time when he knocked the owner's hand, because, seeing as the purse is not visible, it is no longer considered G'rama.

(a) The Beraisa says - that one forbids the redemption of Ma'aser-Sheini with money that he has in Kastera or Har ha'Melech (which due to the distance or to the fact that they are guarded, are all but impossible to obtain) or in a purse that is lying at the bottom of the sea (even if the water is clear).

(b) Rabah reconciles his previous statement with this Beraisa - by differentiating between other areas of Halachah and Ma'aser which is different, inasmuch as the money must not only be there, but it must also be available too (as the Torah writes in Re'ei "ve'Tzarta ha'Kessef be'Yadcha").

(a) Rabah exempts someone who erases the face of a coin - provided he does this using a hammer, in which case the coin remains fully intact (i.e. nothing of the metal has been removed), but not if he files it away.

(b) The Beraisa states - that if someone strikes his Eved ...

1. ... on his ear and deafens him, or on his eye and blinds him - he is obligated to set him free.
2. ... on the wall next to his ear ... - the Eved remains (as we learned in ha'Chovel).
(c) Rava asked Rabah from the Reisha, where we see - that, even though the Eved remains intact, it is considered a direct wound (and not just G'rama), and he is Chayav.

(d) We answer that Rabah follows his own reasoning with regard to someone who deafens his parents, where he rules - that he is Chayav Miysah, because the deafness is caused by a movement of blood (in which case, we see that deafness does not leave the person concerned intact).

(a) If Reuven nicks the ear of Shimon's cow, Rabah exempts him from paying - because a cow with a nicked ear is not worth any less than a cow with its ear unblemished.

(b) He is not liable for disqualifying the cow from the Mizbe'ach - since most cows do not go on the Mizbe'ach anyway.

(c) The Beraisa rules - that someone who weighed against the ashes of the Parah Adumah or who worked with the cow whilst it was still alive, is Patur mi'Dinei Adam, ve'Chayav be'Dinei Shamayim.

(d) From the fact that the Beraisa presents specifically the case of 'Melachah' - we can infer that had he damaged the cow in a way that (unlike Melachah) was discernible, he would be Chayav be'Dinei Adam, too. So why did Rabah exempt Reuven for nicking the ear of Shimon's cow?

(a) To reconcile Rabah with the Beraisa, we reply that the Tana had good reason for presenting specifically the case of Melachah - to teach us that even though the damage is not discernible, he is nevertheless Chayav be'Dinei Shamayim.

(b) Rabah exempts Reuven for burning Shimon's Sh'tar - because all he has really damaged is the paper, and how much is that worth?

(c) The problem Rami bar Chama has with Rabah's ruling, assuming that Shimon ...

1. ... has witnesses is - that why can they not then simply re-write the Sh'tar, in which case, he does not sustain any loss to begin with.
2. ... does not have witnesses is - that in that case, how do we know how much is written in the Sh'tar (so how do we know how much to charge Reuven)?
(d) Rava answers - that in fact, Rabah is speaking when there are no witnesses, and that nevertheless, Shimon is believed however much he claims.



(a) Rebbi Shimon says 'Davar ha'Gorem le'Mamon - ke'Mamon Dami'. He is speaking when Reuven stole Chametz before Pesach and, after Pesach, Levi burned it (depriving Reuven of the possibility of saying to Shimon 'Harei she'Lecha Lefanecha').

(b) The Rabbanan disagree with Rebbi Shimon. According to Rav Dimi bar Chanina - Rabah's ruling is confined to the Rabbanan, who hold 'Davar ha'Gorem le'Mamon, La'av ke'Mamon Dami', but according to Rebbi Shimon, Reuven will be liable to pay for burning Shimon's Sh'tar.

(c) Rav Huna Brei de'Rav Yehoshua refutes Rav Dimi bar Chanina's explanation - on the grounds that Rebbi Shimon's ruling 'Davar ha'Gorem le'Mamon ke'Mamon Dami' is confined to something that is intrinsically Mamon (such as Chametz after Pesach), but not to a Sh'tar, which is not.

(a) Rav Huna Brei de'Rav Yehoshua bases his rejection of Rav Dimi bar Chanina on a statement of Rabah, who states that if Levi burned Chametz that Reuven stole from Shimon before Pesach ...
1. ... 'be'Mo'ed (from the sixth hour and onwards) - he is Patur (because Chametz at that time is worth nothing to any Jew, and is therefore not considered intrinsically Mamon).
2. ... after Pesach, according to Rebbi Shimon ... - he is Chayav (because, due to the fact that Chametz after Pesach that was not kept over Pesach, is fit to eat, it is intrinsically Mamon, and Rebbi Shimon holds 'Davar ha'Gorem le'Mamon ke'Mamon Dami').
3. ... according to the Rabbanan - he is Patur, because ' ... La'av ke'Mamon Dami').
(b) Ameimar says that according to those who hold of 'Diyna de'Garmi' (damage that he did directly) - Reuven will be obligated to pay for the Sh'tar that he burned.

(c) Rafram - obligated Rav Ashi, who burned someone's Sh'tar in his childhood, to pay in full.

(a) We already discussed the Beraisa 'Shor she'Heimis ad she'Lo Nigmar Diyno ... ' (in Perek 'Shor she'Nagach Daled ve'Hey'). The Tana of the Beraisa draws a distinction between an owner who, after his ox killed someone, sold it, Shechted it or declared it Hekdesh *before* it had been sentenced to stoning - in which case these transactions are valid, and afterwards - in which case they are not.

(b) He also says that if a Shomer returned the ox that gored someone to death to its owner ...

1. ... before the sentence - the return of the ox is valid, and he is Patur from paying.
2. ... after the sentence - it is not, and he remains liable.
(c) Rabbi Ya'akov disagrees - with the previous ruling. According to him, the Shomer is Patur in both cases.

(d) According to Rav Chisda, the basis of their Machlokes is whether one can say to the owner of Isurei Hana'ah 'Harei she'Lecha Lefanecha'. Other practical ramifications of this Machlokes will be - whether a Shomer may return someone's Chametz to him after Pesach, or whether he must replace it.

(a) Rabah concludes that in fact, even the Tana Kama concedes that one can say to the owner of Isurei Hana'ah 'Harei she'Lecha Lefanecha', and the Tana Kama's reason for saying 'Hichziro Shomer le'Beis Ba'alav Eino Muchzor' is - because, based on the fact that an ox cannot be sentenced in its absence, the owner can say to the Shomer 'You had no right to take my ox to Beis-Din, thereby causing it to be sentenced' (whereas in the case of Chametz after Pesach, the Shomer did not perform any act to deprive the owner of the opportunity of eating it).

(b) Rebbi Ya'akov, on the other hand, holds - that the ox can be sentenced even in its absence, in which case, the Shomer cannot be blamed for the sentence, and is therefore Patur.

(c) Rabah knows that this is the Rabbanan's reason and not because they hold that one cannot say to the owner 'Harei she'Lecha Lefanecha' - because if that was the case, then they should have argued with Rebbi Ya'akov in the case of Chametz after Pesach.

(d) Neither can Rabah's reason in the Rabbanan be because the Shomer failed to return the owner's ox to him, thereby depriving him of the possibility of saving it (as the Lashon suggests) - because then, the same would apply to Chametz after Pesach (and why would the Rabbanan then agree there that he can say 'Harei she'Lecha Lefanecha'?). And besides, on what basis would Rebbi Ya'akov then argue with the Rabbanan, seeing as even though the ox was sentenced in its absence, the Shomer should nevertheless be guilty for not returning the ox earlier.

(a) Rebbi Ya'akov, who maintains that it is possible to conclude the Din of an ox even in its absence, counters the Rabbanan's proof from the principle 'ke'Miysas ha'Ba'alim, Kach Miysas ha'Shor' - by pointing out that the logic behind the Din that one cannot sentence a person in his absence is, because this deprives him of the opportunity of defending himself, a logic that does not apply to an ox.

(b) We learn from the Pasuk "Ad Omdo Lifnei ha'Eidah la'Mishpat" - that a person cannot be sentenced in abstentia.

(a) Rabah bar Shmuel told Rav Chisda - that they had learned the Beraisa basing 'Gazal Matbei'a ve'Nifsal ... Chametz ve'Avar Alav ha'Pesach, Peiros ve'Hirkivu ... ve'Shor Ad she'Lo Nigmar Diyno, Omer Lo Harei she'Lecha Lefanecha' on the Pasuk "ve'Heishiv es ha'Gezeilah Asher Gazal", 'Ke'en she'Gazal' (and all of these are 'Ke'en she'Gazal').

(b) They extrapolated from this Beraisa that the author must be the Rabbanan of Rebbi Ya'akov - because they (unlike Rebbi Ya'akov) draw a distinction between 'Shor Ad she'Lo Nigmar Diyno' (which is Patur), and 'le'Achar she'Nigmar Diyno', which is Chayav.

(c) Rav Chisda asked him not to tell this to the B'nei ha'Yeshivah, because it would embarrass him. This is - because the Beraisa also includes 'Chametz va'Avar Alav ha'Pesach', which he maintained earlier, is the opinion of Rebbi Ya'akov exclusively. And this Beraisa now proved him wrong.

(d) Rav Papa reconciles this Beraisa, which includes 'Peiros ve'Hirkivu' in the Din of 'Omer Lo Harei she'Lecha Lefanecha' with our Mishnah, which rules 'Meshalem ke'Sha'as ha'Gezeilah' - by establishing the former when the entire batch has rotted (which is discernible), and the latter, when some of it has and some of it hasn't (which is not).

(a) If a craftsman wrecks the vessel he has been handed to fix, a carpenter breaks the wagon or the cupboard he has been given to repair or a builder smashes or damages the stones of the wall he has been commissioned to demolish - the Tana of our Mishnah rules that he is liable to pay.

(b) If the latter is hammering the wall on one side, and stones ...

1. ... fall from the other side (from the vibrations, but partly because the wall is not firm) - he is Patur.
2. ... fall from the other side, but as a direct result of his having hammered too hard - he is liable.
(c) Rav Asi qualifies our Mishnah. In his opinion, a carpenter who breaks the cupboard he is manufacturing will be Patur (despite the fact the materials belong to the person who commissioned him) - because the moment he completes the object he is manufacturing, he acquires it ('Uman Koneh bi'Shevach K'li').

(d) Rav Asi therefore establishes the Reisha of our Mishnah 'Nasan le'Umnin Le'saken ve'Kilkelu ... Chayav Le'shalem' - when the owner gave the craftsman the object to repair (as we explained in the Mishnah).

(a) The Seifa speaks specifically when the owner handed a craftsman a wagon or a cupboard to repair - from which we try and extrapolate that the Reisha must be speaking when he provided him with the raw materials to manufacture from scratch, yet he is Chayav (a Kashya on Rav Asi).

(b) We refute the Kashya however - on the grounds that the Seifa might just as well be coming to elaborate on the Reisha, to demonstrate that it is speaking when he gave him the article to repair (and not to balance it).

(c) And we try to substantiate Rav Asi, by proving that the Seifa must be coming to elaborate on the Reisha - because otherwise, having taught us that the artisan is Chayav when he receives wood and manufactures the article from scratch (where we might have said 'Uman Koneh bi'Shevach K'li'), then the Seifa, where he received a cupboard to repair (and where 'Uman Koneh bi'Shevach K'li' is not applicable) would be redundant.

(d) We refute this proof too, however - by applying the reverse argument to the one that we presented earlier: it may well be that the Tana mentions the Seifa (to balance the Reisha) to revealing that the Reisha is speaking when he gave him raw materials ... , in order to teach us that 'Ein Uman Koneh bi'Shevach K'li'.

Next daf


For further information on
subscriptions, archives and sponsorships,
contact Kollel Iyun Hadaf,