ANSWERS TO REVIEW QUESTIONS
prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem
Previous daf Bava Kama 102
(a) The Tana Kama of a Beraisa forbids soaking flax and washing clothes in
wine of Shevi'is - which he learns from "le'Ochlah", 've'Lo le'Mishrah ...
(b) Rebbi Yossi learns from "Lachem" - that soaking flax and washing clothes
in wine of Shevi'is is permitted.
(c) The Tana Kama learns from "Lachem" - that any species that (unlike food)
gives benefit after it has been destroyed, is permitted.
(d) When washing clothes, the benefit from the fuel comes only when the
garments are clean. In order to benefit from the wine in which the flax is
soaking - it will take three to four days.
(a) Despite the fact that the benefit of the soaking and the washing come
only after the wine has been destroyed, the Tana Kama nevertheless forbids
it - because we are talking about fruit which S'tam is meant for eating (and
he is the Tana who holds the S'vara 'S'tam Eitzim le'Hasakah Hein Omdin',
which means that go after the regular use of each individual species, both
le'Kula amd le'Chumra.).
(b) Rebbi Yossi nevertheless permits it - because he does not hold 'S'tam
Eitzim le'Hasakah Ninhu' (and it is forbidden to use wood as a torch, but
permitted to use food for laundering).
(c) And the Torah writes le'Ochlah" - to forbid using food as a cure.
(d) He includes soaking and washing from "Lachem" and precludes healing
(despite the fact that they both benefit the user only after they have been
destroyed) - because the former is 'Shaveh ba'Kol' (is something which
everyone needs), whereas the latter (which applies only to sick people), is
(a) The Beraisa learns "le'Ochlah", 've'Lo li'Melugma ... ve'Lo le'Ziluf ...
ve'Lo La'asos Mimenah Apiktozan'. The meaning of ...
1. ... 'Ziluf' is - sprinkling wine around the house to create a pleasant
(b) The author of this Beraisa is - Rebbi Yossi, who confines the Isur to
things that are not Shaveh ba'Kol (whereas according to the Rabbanan, the
Beraisa should have included 've'Lo li'Mishrah ... ve'Lo li'Kevusah'.
2. ... 'Apiktozan' is - something that one eats as a vomitive (after having
eaten in excess).
(a) Rebbi Yehudah in our Mishnah rules that in the case where the dyer
changed the instructions and dyed the wool the wrong color, he must return
the wool to the owner, who pays the least of the Sh'vach and the expenses.
Rav Yosef turned his back to Rav Huna - when he ruled like Rebbi Yehudah ...
(b) ... because, he claimed, seeing as it is a Machlokes ve'Achar-Kach
S'tam, where the Halachah is not like the S'tam.
(c) When this incident took place - Rav Yosef was sitting behind Rebbi Aba.
(a) At the same sitting, Rav Huna also ruled like Yehoshua ben Korchah. The
Rabbanan in a Beraisa, forbid lending Nochrim money prior to their festivals
or claiming one's debts from them - in case they then go and offer thanks to
(b) Rebbi Yehoshua ben Korchah - differentiates between claiming a
documented loan (which he forbids) and an oral one (which he permits due to
the fear that he might lose his money (because who knows whether the
witnesses will be available later?).
(c) Rav Yosef acceptes this ruling of Rav Huna more the previous one -
because (based on the principle 'Yachid ve'Rabim, Halachah ke'Rabim') had he
not issued it, we would have ruled like the Rabbanan.
(a) As we just explained, Rav Yosef considered Rav Huna's ruling redundant
because it is Machlokes ve'Achar-Kach S'tam. The S'tam Mishnah in Bava
Metzi'a states 'Kol ha'Meshaneh, Yado al ha'Elyonah - ve'Chol ha'Chozer Bo,
Yado al ha'Elyonah'.
Alternatively, he might concede that Bava Metzi'a is an independent
Masechta, yet he still queried Rav Huna - because this S'tam Mishnah appears
as Hilchesa P'sikta (a set of Mishnos which does not really belong there,
and Rebbi clearly inserted it there because nobody argues with it, because
it is Halachah).
(b) Rav Huna counters Rav Yosef's argument, by pointing out that otherwise,
we would apply the principle 'Ein Seider le'Mishnah'.
(c) In fact, Rav Yosef would not have questioned Rav Huna, had the S'tama
occurred in most other Masechtos. He queried it simply because it happened
to occur in Bava Metzi'a - because he concedes that in two Masechtos, we say
'Ein Seider le'Mishnah', only he holds that Nezikin (by which he means the
three Bavas, Kama, Metzi'a and Basra, are all considered one Masechta).
(d) Rav Huna holds that the three Bavas are three Masechtos.
(a) In a case where a Sheli'ach puchases barley with the money that was he
received to purchase wheat in an investment partnership, one Beraisa rules
that he bears the full liability for any losses, and enjoys the full
benefits from any gains. The second Beraisa says - that although he must
bear the brunt of any losses, the owner shares the gains with him.
(b) Rebbi Yochanan establishes the two Beraisos as a Machlokes Tana'im, and
they argue over whether Shinuy is Koneh or not. The author of the first
Beraisa - is Rebbi Meir, who holds Shinuy Koneh, and of the second, Rebbi
Yehudah, who holds that it is not (though we rejected this interpretation of
Rebbi Yehudah, earlier).
(c) According to Rebbi Yehudah, despite the fact that the Sheli'ach is not
Koneh, he must nevertheless bear the full brunt of the loss - as a
punishment for deviating from his instructions.
(d) Rebbi Elazar queries this explanation however. Rebbi Meir might agree in
the second Beraisa, that the Sheli'ach does not acquire the goods - because
he only holds 'Shinuy Koneh' in connection with an article that improved
intrinsically (e.g. regarding eating it, wearing it or putting it to some
other use), but not with regard to goods that was purchases for investment
purposes where, as long as there is monetary gain, the owner doesn't really
care what the Sheli'ach purchases, and there is no Shinuy.
(a) So Rebbi Elazar - establishes both Beraisos like Rebbi Meir, and the
reason that they share the increase in the second Beraisa, is because the
Sheli'ach has not acquired the goods (as we explained in Rebbi Yehudah).
(b) They laughed at Rebbi Yochanan's interpretation of the second Beraisa
(where the owner takes half the improvement) - because, seeing as he
considers the Sheli'ach to have deviated from the owner's instructions
(only, according to Rebbi Yehudah, he is not Koneh), how does the owner of
the money acquire a share in the goods, seeing as the seller sold it to the
purchaser, and not to him?
(c) This is not a problem with Rebbi Elazar's explanation - because
according to him, the Sheli'ach has not withdrawn from the Shelichus (so
whatever he purchases, he does so on behalf of the owner).
(d) Nor would it have been a problem had the Sheli'ach purchased wheat, as
he was asked to do - for the same reason, since the Sheli'ach would then be
purchasing the goods on behalf of the owner, as Rebbi Avahu explained to Rav
Shmuel bar Sasarti.
(a) The Mishnah in Erchin states that if someone declared his property
Hekdesh or who undertook to pay someone's Erech with regard to his wife's
and children's' clothes and the new clothes that he dyed for them - the
treasurer of Hekdesh does not have the right to claim them.
(b) The additional example that the Tana includes in this list is - the
shoes that the Makdish bought on behalf of his wife and children.
(c) Rebbi Avahu attempts to prove from the fact that the new clothes that he
dyed for his wife are not Hekdesh - that it must be because a man does not
intend to include his wife's possessions in the Hekdesh. Otherwise, who told
the seller of the dye that the man was purchasing it on behalf of his wife?
(d) Rebbi Aba however, rejects Rebbi Avahu's proof. The reason that his the
dyed clothes do not belong to Hekdesh he says, is -because a man does not
intend to include any of his wife's clothes (irrespective of whether they
are technically hers or not).
(a) Despite the fact that, as Rebbi Aba just explained, it is a matter of
the owner's intentions, the Mishnah in Erchin authorizes the treasurer to
take the Ma'arich's Tefilin - because a person may well include his Tefilin
in the Hekdesh (because he thinks he is performing a Mitzvah), but that does
not mean that he will include his wife's clothes, which he will avoid doing
at all costs, to avoid Eivah (strife).
(b) Bearing in mind that the Mishnah currently under discussion is talking
about a case of Erchin as well as Hekdesh, Rav Oshaya rejects Rebbi Aba's
explanation, from the Mishnah there 'Chayvei Erchin Memashkenin Osan' -
which teaches us that when it comes to Erchin, the Torah does not consider
the Makdish's intentions.
(c) Rebbi Aba therefore amends his original counterproof. The reason that
the clothes that the Makdish dyed on behalf of his wife do not belong to
Hekdesh is - because Chazal decreed that before a man declares his property
Hekdesh or vows to give an Erech, all that pertains to them becomes theirs.
(a) Rav Sheishes explains the Beraisa ...
1. ... 'ha'Lokei'ach Sadeh be'Shem Chaveiro, Ein Kofin Oso Li'mekor' - to
mean that if Reuven buys a field from Shimon in the name of the Resh Galusa,
the latter is not obligated to sell it to Reuven to him.
(b) The buyer would find it necessary to do this - to dissuade would-be
claimants from staking their claims in the field (out of fear of the Resh
2. ... 've'Im Amar Lo al-M'nas, Kofin' - that if he stipulated that the Resh
Galusa must sell it to him, then he must do so.
(c) We reconcile this with the B'nei Ma'arva, who hold of the S'vara (that
we cited earlier) 'Mi Hodi'o le'Ba'al Chitin' - by establishing the Beraisa
too, when he informed the seller, as well as the witnesses, that he was
buying the field on behalf of the Resh Galusa.
(d) We reject Rav Sheishes' explanation however, from the Seifa of the
Beraisa 've'Im Amar Lo al-M'nas, Kofin' - because what authority do we have
to force the Resh Galusa to sell it to him? Why can he not decline on the
grounds that he asked neither for the respect (in using him as a symbol of
fear), nor for the degradation of having to sell a field at somebody else's
(a) Abaye finally establishes the Reisha of the Beraisa to mean
'ha'Lokei'ach Sadeh be'Shem Chaveiro Resh Galusa'. He is speaking - when he
purchased a field in the name of the Resh Galusa, in which case, the seller
is not obligated to sell it to him again with a new Sh'tar.
(b) The reason that the he would want a new Sh'tar is - in order to
safeguard the field agaist the heirs of the Resh Galusa, who might claim the
field and produce the Sh'tar to prove it.
(c) The reason that the seller is not obligated to write a new Sh'tar on
behalf of the purchaser for this is - because he should have stipulated it
and failed to do so.
(d) He establishes the Seifa 've'Im Amar Lo al-M'nas, Kofin' to mean - that
if the buyer stipulated that the seller should write him a Sh'tar, then he
is obligated to do so.