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Bava Kama 112

BAVA KAMA 112 - Today's Daf has been dedicated by Mr. Kenneth Polinsky in honor of his wife, Dvora Risa, and children, Miriam, Elisheva, Tzvi and Avigayil. May Hashem grant them the health, strength and peace of mind to continue to support Torah and raise their children as Yere'ei Shamayim.



(a) Rav Ada bar Ahavah cites Rami bar Chama in connection with the following Beraisa. 'Hini'ach Lahen Avihen Ma'os shel Ribis, af-al-Pi she'Yod'in whe'Hein shel Ribis, Ein Chayavin Le'hachzir', from which Rami bar Chama proves - 'Reshus Yoresh ki'Reshus Loke'ach'.

(b) Rava refutes the proof by citing the Pasuk "Al Tikach me'Ito Neshech ve'Sarbis". The Torah forbids the taking of Ribis - to ensure that the borrower 'can live with the creditor' (as the Pasuk concludes "ve'Chei Achicha Imach").

(c) Rava refutes Rami's proof, from this Pasuk - which seems specifically to confine the obligation of returning Ribis to the owner to the lender (precluding the heirs from a Gezeiras ha'Kasuv irrespective of whether they acquire the Ribis or not).

(a) If Rami bar Chama argues with Rava with regard to the Beraisa, he will certainly argue with him with regard to our Mishnah. The reverse might not be true - because of Rava's Limud from the Pasuk (in which case he will agree with Rava, even though there has been no Yi'ush).

(b) Others reverse the above statement. According to them, Rami bar Chama might argue with Rava with regard to the Beraisa, but he will agree with regard to the Mishnah - because it is possible to establish the Mishnah when the heirs ate the Gezeilah (in which case they are Patur from paying anyway - as Rava explained above).

(c) The preferred version is the first one (though according to some, it is the second).

(a) Regarding the case of 'ha'Gozel u'Ma'achil es ha'Ganav, the Beraisa obligates Gedolim, but exempts Ketanim from paying - because they cannot, as a rule, be taken to court (the author of this Beraisa is Sumchus, as we shall see later).

(b) Rami bar Chama establishes the first statement - before Yi'ush.

(c) The Beraisa adds that if the Gedolim say 'Ein Anu Yod'in Cheshbonos she'Chishev Avinu Imach'. This cannot however, be taken literally - because, seeing as they admit that they received the Gezeilah, we would then apply the principle 'Bari ve'Shema, Bari Adif'.

(d) Rava therefore establishes that what they actually said was - that they do in fact, know about their father's dealings with the owner, and that nothing remains unpaid (turning it into a case of 'Bari u'Bari').

(a) Yet another Beraisa obligates both Gedolim and Ketanim to pay for the stolen cow which their father left them. The problem with this Beraisa is - why Yesomim Ketanim should be any more Chayav than when their ox entered the Nizak's Chatzer and caused damage (where they are Patur, because they cannot be taken to Beis-Din to claim from their property).

(b) Rav Papa therefore establishes the Beraisa - when the animal is still available to be reclaimed. Consequently, seeing as they admit that they received it, there is no reason why the owner should not take it back.

(c) The author of this Beraisa is - Sumchus, as we shall soon see.

(a) Rava rules that, Yesomim whose father leaves them a borrowed cow, are permitted to use it until the prescribed time expires - but they are Patur from Onsin.

(b) In a case where, believing the cow to be their father's, they Shecht it and eat it - they are obligated to pay for cheap meat (which amounts to two thirds of the market-price of what they ate).

(a) If their father left them Karka, Rava concludes, they are Chayav. Some learn this with regard to the Reisha (obligating them to pay Onsin) - and it goes without saying that in the Seifa, seeing as they actually ate the meat, they will be obligated to pay in full for the animal that they Shechted) from that field.

(b) Others learn Rava's final statement with regard to the Seifa (where they actually ate the meat). But in the Reisha - Rava would hold that they are Patur.

(c) On the one hand, Rava might ...

1. ... obligate the Yesomim to pay in the Reisha - because he holds that the Chiyuv to pay Onsin began when the father borrowed the ox.
2. ... exempt them - if he holds that the obligation only begins when the O'nes takes place, and since, in this case, that occurred under the jurisdiction of the Yesomim, the fact that their father left Karka will not help to obligate them.
(a) Rava's ruling is connected to a similar ruling of Rav Papa. Rav Papa says that someone who Shechted a cow on Shabbos ...
1. ... which he stole before Shabbos - must pay Daled ve'Hey, since the obligation to pay Keren fell due already before Shabbos, and his Chiyuv Miysah for Shechting on Shabbos does not exempt his from paying Daled ve'Hey, which is a K'nas (as we have learned in Kesuvos).
2. ... which he borrowed before Shabbos - is Patur from Keren as well as from Daled ve'Hey.
(b) The reason that he is Patur from
1. ... Keren is - because he is Chayav Miysah for breaking Shabbos, and Rav papa holds that the Chiyuvim of a Shomer only take effect at the time when something happens to the animal. Consequently, the Chiyuvim of the Shomer and the Chiyuv Miysah occurred simultaneously, and he is Patur from the former.
2. ... Kefel, Daled ve'Hey - because these Chiyuvim only apply to a Ganav or a To'en Ta'anas Ganav.
(c) The second Lashon of Rava follows the opinion of his Talmid Rav Papa.

(d) We reject the text which exempts the borrower from Daled ve'Hey for Shechting the cow on Shabbos, on the grounds that wherever there is no Keren, there is no Kefel, Daled or Hey either - because the reason that we gave is more basic than this one (since, as we explained, Kefel, Daled ve'Hey do not apply to them in the first place).

(a) In view of the current Sugya, the Tana of the Beraisa extrapolates from the Pasuk "ve'Heishiv es ha'Gezeilah *Asher Gazal*" - that the Yesomim are only required to return the stolen object that their father left, if it is still intact.

(b) The Tana adds that if on the other hand, the object *is* intact, both Gedolim and Ketanim are obligated to return it - Sumchus however, exempts the Ketanim from returning it.




(a) Rebbi Yirmiyah's young brother-in law locked the door in front of Rebbi Yirmiyah - to prevent him from acquiring the house upon the death of his father.

(b) Rebbi Avin declined to accept Rebbi Yirmiyah's witnesses, who were ready to testify that he had already acquired the house during the lifetime of his father-in-law, who had sold or given it to him - based on the principle that one cannot accept witnesses in the absence of one's disputant (and a Katan is always considered absent).

(c) Rebbi Avin justifies his ruling - according to Sumchus, who says 'Ketanim Peturin', at which expressed surprise that they should rule like an individual opinion to deprive him of his rights.

(d) Rebbi Avahu, who then became involved in the case, tried to support Rebbi Yirmiyah with a statement by Rav Yosef bar Chama, who said - that if a Katan takes his Avadim with him to forcibly claim a field from the current owner (or to forcibly take away the Eved), we do not wait until the Katan grows up to retrieve it from him. We do so immediately.

(e) We differentiate between the two cases however, by pointing out - that - whereas Rav Yosef bar Chama is speaking when the Katan has no prior Chazakah, in our current case, Rebbi Yirmiyah's brother-in-law has the backing of a Chazakah from his father (vindicating Rebbi Avin's ruling).

(a) 'Amar Rav Ashi Amar Rav Shabsa'i Mekablin Eidim she'Lo bi'F'nei Ba'al-Din'. Rebbi Yossi b'Rebbi Chanina explains this statement - when either the creditor or the witnesses are very ill or when the witnesses are planning to go overseas (and will no longer be available when they become needed).

(b) In addition - the Beis-Din must have issued him with a summons, which he ignored.

(c) Mar Ukva explains the identical statement issued by Rav Yehudah Amar Shmuel - when, after opening the proceedings, the Beis-Din issued him with a summons, which he ignored.


1. This would not apply if they had not yet opened the proceedings against him - because then, he could claim that he wants to go to the Beis-Din ha'Gadol in Eretz Yisrael ...
2. ... which he cannot claim once the proceedings have begun, assuming that the local Beis-Din has a letter from the Beis-Din ha'Gadol requesting that they take the case in hand.
(a) 'Kiyum ha'Sh'tar' is - the substantiation of a document, which entails the witnesses verifying their signatures in front of Beis-Din and Beis-Din's adding their stamp of approval.

(b) According to Rav, should the witnesses wish to go overseas, the claimant is entitled to substantiate the Sh'tar even in the absence of the defendant. Rebbi Yochanan - prohibits it.

(c) Rav Sheishes derives Rebbi Yochanan's opinion from the Pasuk "ve'Hu'ad bi'Ve'alav ve'Lo Yishmerenu" - from which we learn that the owner of the ox must stand beside his ox whilst it is being sentence (in other words, without the owner being present, he cannot be implicated. By the same token, without the defendant being present, he cannot be implicated by means of the Sh'tar being substantiated).

(d) Rava rules like Rav ...

1. ... even if the defendant vehemently objects that the Sh'tar is a forgery?
2. ... but not if he asks for time to bring witnesses who will prove the Sh'tar false, in which case we wait until his return.
(a) If Monday, Thursday and Monday pass, and he has not returned, Beis-Din write a Pesicha, and ninety days later, an Adrachta.
1. A Pesicha is - a Sh'tar placing the debtor in Cherem for not paying his debts.
2. ... an Adrachta - is a Sh'tar authorizing the creditor to go and find a suitable field for assessment against his debt, which will then be sold.
(b) The significance of the first set of thirty days is that we assume him to be looking for a loan. The significance of ...
1. ... the second set is - that, not having found an available loan, we assume that he is looking for a purchaser to buy his property.
2. ... the third set - that the purchaser himself is looking for the cash to pay for the field.
(c) In the event that the defendant declares at the outset that he is not accepting the summons to Beis-Din - we write an Adrachata immediately.

(d) And we write an Adrachta immediately in the case of a Pikadon - because he has no excuse to delay returning it.

(a) Initially, we ascribe the fact that we do not write an Adrachta on Metaltelin - to the fact that the creditor will eat up all the Metaltelin, and, should the debtor turn up with witnesses, he will be unable to retrieve his property.

(b) We would however, write one - if the creditor had Karka (which the debtor could subsequently claim should the need arise).

(c) We conclude however, that Beis-Din do not write an Adrachta on Metaltelin - because we are also afraid that, even if the creditor possesses Karka, its value may drop, and the debtor will lose out. Note that the creditor is assured of obtaining his money, because, until he does, the debtor is in Cherem (Rosh). Also bear in mind that the moment the debtor refuses to pay, we write an Adrachta on Metaltelin, too.

(d) Beis-Din will inform the defendant when writing an Adrachta on his property. They will not do so - in the event that he lives too far away to reach (as we shall se shortly).

(a) We initially think that Beis-Din will inform the defendant, even if he is overseas - if he either has relatives (whom we will inform in his place), or if there are caravans, in which case, we will give the caravan time to go and return.

(b) We think that in this case, Beis-Din wait a further twelve months before giving the Adrachta to the claimant - but conclude that, on the assumption that the initial ruling to write an Adrachta was made at Monday's sitting of Beis-Din, we wait for the Sheli'ach Beis-Din to leave on Tuesday and return on Wednesday (i.e. one day's journey), in time to hand the Adrachta to the creditor at Thursday's sitting. Should the debtor, currently be residing further afield, we do not wait at all, but write the Adrachta immediately on Monday (since he is to blame for traveling so far at such a crucial time.

(c) We refute the original contention, in spite of the episode with Ravina, who made Mar Acha (whose debtor was in Mechuza) wait twelve months for his Adrachta until the caravans returned from Mechuza and he could inform him upon his return - on the ground that Ravina's ruling was confined to that case, because Mar Acha was a tough guy, and the debtor would not have been able to retrieve his property, once it fell into Mar Acha's hands.

(a) Ravina rules that a Sheli'ach Beis-Din who informs Beis-Din that one of the litigants refuses to accept the summons is believed like two witnesses. But this only pertains to a Shamta (an oral Cherem), not to a Pesicha (a written one) - because the litigant concerned is obligated to pay the Sofer's fee, and the credibility of the Sheli'ach Beis-Din does not extend to money matters.

(b) He also rules that Beis-Din will even issue a litigant who is due back in town with a summons to a Din Torah, through a woman or neighbors who happen to be going that way. This will not apply to a case where ...

1. ... the litigant is currently at home (i.e. in the same town as Beis-Din) - because they will probably not carry out their Shelichus, thinking that the Sheli'ach Beis-Din probably met the litigant and informed him directly.
2. ... the litigant is due to pass the entrance to Beis-Din on his way home - because then they will think that Beis-Din will probably inform him anyway, as he walks past.
3. ... he is not due to return that day - because they will probably forget to tell him when he does.
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