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prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem

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Bava Kama 89


(a) Rav Idi bar Avin tries to prove Takanas Usha from a Beraisa. The Tana speaks about witnesses who testifies that a man divorced his wife and paid her Kesuvah and who are subsequently declared Zomemin on both scores.
How much would they have to pay if other witnesses concurred with them that she is divorced, and they become Zomemin only with regard to the Kesuvah, inasmuch as they testify that she has not yet received it?

(b) How much do they have to pay the woman now that they have been declared Zomemin even regarding the fact that the woman is found to be still married?

(c) What does the Tovas Hana'ah comprise?

(d) How does Rav Idi bar Avin try to prove Takanas Usha from here?

(a) How does Abaye ...
  1. ... refute Rav Idi's proof? Why might the Kesuvah be different than Nechsei mi'Lug?
  2. ... then attempt to prove from here that it must be the woman who receives the Tovas Hana'ah from the sale of her Kesuvah?
(b) How does Rav Shalman refute Abaye's proof? What is 'Ravach Beisa'?

(c) Rava concurs with Abaye however (though not for the same reason).
What logical reason does he give for the fact that the Tovas Hana'ah goes to the woman?

(a) How do Rav Papa and Rav Huna Brei de'Rav Yehoshua try to prove Takanas Usha from our Mishnah, which states 'ha'Eved ve'ha'Ishah Pegi'asan Ra'ah ... ve'Heim she'Chavlu ba'Acheirim Peturin'?

(b) We counter this by pointing out that even *with* Takanas Usha, we could ask the same Kashya.
How is that?

(c) How do we therefore answer both Kashyos with one sweep?

(a) We ask why the woman is not forced to sell her Kesuvah and pay the Nizak with the Tovas Hana'ah', and we answer by establishing the Mishnah like Rebbi Meir.
What does Rebbi Meir say about a woman selling her Kesuvah?

(b) What is Rebbi Meir's reason for this Chumra?

(c) How does this reason render the answer we just gave unacceptable?

(d) And on what grounds do we refute the suggestion that Tovas Hana'ah is only words, and words are not Meshubad to the Nizak?

(a) We finally answer the Kashya (about selling her Kesuvah and paying the Nizak with the Tovas Hana'ah) by quoting Shmuel.
What does Shmuel say about Reuven who sells his Sh'tar Chov to Shimon and then wishes to forego his debt? How is the problem now solved?

(b) But how does this solve the problem? Let her sell the Kesuvah ...

  1. ... to a third person, and leave him with the possibility that she will not let her husband off the hook, and the Nizak with a fair chance of receiving his due?
  2. ... to the Nizak himself, who has nothing to lose, seeing as she is not giving him anything anyway?
Answers to questions



(a) The Tana rules in a Beraisa that if a woman wounded her husband, we do not force her to sell her Kesuvah.
In light of what we just learned, what problem do we have with this Beraisa?

(b) This Tana, we answer, definitely holds like Rebbi Meir.
What do we mean by that?

(c) What is the point of not forcing her to sell her Kesuvah, we persist, seeing as her husband will divorce her anyway and claim the damages out of her Kesuvah.
What do we answer?

(a) In which case would we force the woman to sell her Kesuvah in order to pay the Nezek that she owes her husband?

(b) Then why does the Tana not obligate her to do so?

(c) We ask on this from the Beraisa 'Ke'shem she'Lo Timkor ve'Hi Tachtav, Kach Lo Tafsid ve'Hi Tachtav'.
How do we initially interpret the Beraisa?

(a) To answer the above Kashya, Rava establishes the Beraisa by Kesuvas B'nin Dichrin.
What is 'Kesuvas B'nin Dichrin'?

(b) What is the Beraisa now saying?

(c) Why might we have otherwise thought that she loses it?

(d) Why does she not in fact, lose the Kesuvas B'nin Dichrin in both cases?

(a) One Beraisa rules that Avdei Mi'lug go out free if the woman knocks out their tooth or eye, but not if the man does so.
What does a second Beraisa say?

(b) On the assumption that both Tana'im hold 'Kinyan Peiros (of the husband) La'av ke'Kinyan ha'Guf', what do we initially assume is to be the basis of the Machlokes?

(c) Why then in the second Beraisa, does the Eved not go free if the man knocked out the Eved's tooth or eye?

(d) Alternatively, both Tana'im hold of Takanas Usha, and the first Beraisa was written before the Takanah.
How on the other hand, might this Tana even be speaking after the Takanah, and still the Eved goes free for the woman?

(a) What sort of Hekdesh does not override a Shibud?

(b) What does 'Chametz Motzi Miydei Shibud' mean?

(c) How do we reconcile Rava with the Mishnah in Pesachim, which permits a Jew to eat Chametz that was Meshubad to a Nochri, after Pesach?

(d) How is it possible to reconcile the Tana who holds 'Lo le'Ishah ve'Lo le'Ish like Rava'?

Answers to questions

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