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prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem

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Bava Kama 103


(a) We just explained the Reisha of the Beraisa to mean that if Reuven purchases a field in the name of the Resh Galusa, the seller is not obligated to provide him with a new Sh'tar.
Why is this not obvious? Why might we have thought otherwise?

(b) How does the seller in fact, counter this argument?

(c) And we explained the Seifa to mean that if the buyer stipulated that the seller should write him a Sh'tar, then he is obligated to do so. Why is this too, not obvious? How else, might we have interpreted his stipulation?

(d) And how does the buyer counter this argument?

(a) What happened to the flax that Rav Kahana had already paid for but had not yet received?

(b) What was Rav Kahana's problem? Was it based on a difference of opinion between Rav Kahana and the seller?

(c) What did Rav rule?

(d) What do we mean when we suggest for a brief moment, that Rav holds like the B'nei Ma'arva, who say 'Mi Hodi'o le'Ba'al Chitin'?

(a) On what grounds do we immediately repudiate this suggestion?

(b) Why should Rav Kahana then been entitled to receive the full value of the flax?

(c) We conclude that the transaction of the flax had been in the form of an Amanah.
What is an Amanah?

(d) Why did Rav therefore forbid taking the higher price? In which case would he have permitted it?

(a) What does the Tana of our Mishnah learn from the Pasuk in Vayikra "La'asher Hu Lo" written in this connection?

(b) If he is not permitted to give it to the owner's son or Sheli'ach, how come that he can give it to the Sheli'ach Beis-Din?

(c) What must the Ganav do in the above case should the owner die?

(d) Bearing in mind that the Ganav owes the owner the principle plus a Chomesh, is he obligated to travel to Madai if all that he still needs to pay is ...

  1. ... the Chomesh?
  2. ... a P'rutah of the principle?
  3. ... less than a P'rutah of the principle?
(a) And what does the Tana say about a Ganav who, after having admitted that he swore falsely, paid the Keren and claimed that he had already paid the Chomesh?

(b) How long can this go on for?

(c) The same, says the Tana, applies to a Pikadon and to an Aveidah, a well as to Sesumes Yad and Oshek.
What is ...

  1. ... 'Sesumes Yad'?
  2. ... 'Oshek'?
(d) In all these cases, what other obligation must the Ganav fulfill besides the Keren and Chomesh?
Answers to questions



(a) If someone steals from one of five people and he doesn't remember from which of them, Rebbi Tarfon in a Beraisa rules that, in the event that all five claim from him, he places the money in front of them and leaves (see Tosfos).
What does Rebbi Akiva say?

(b) On what do we base our premise that the author of our Mishnah is neither Rebbi Tarfon nor Rebbi Akiva?

(c) We initially try to establish our Mishnah like Rebbi Akiva by restricting his opinion to where the Ganav had sworn and then admitted. Why do we begin with this assumption?

(d) Rebbi Tarfon is lenient with the Ganav even in the case where the Ganav swore.
Doesn't he hold of the D'rashah of "la'Asher Hu Lo"? What does Rebbi Elazar b'Rebbi Tzadok say?

(a) Does Rebbi Akiva agree with the concept of Takanas ha'Shavin?

(b) What distinction does Rebbi Shimon ben Elazar in another Beraisa draw between someone who *purchased* something and someone who *stole* something from five people (and doesn't know to whom to pay)?

(c) How do we disprove our previous interpretation of the Machlokes (particularly Rebbi Akiva's opinion) ...

  1. ... from here (Rav Huna bar Yehudah)?
  2. ... from the story of a Chasid who bought an article from one of two people ... and Rebbi Tarfon and Rebbi Akiva repeated their argument (Rava)?
(d) With regard to the previous Kashya, how do we know that the Chasid did not become a Chasid only after the above incident?
(a) It is now clear that Rebbi Akiva obligates the Ganav and the purchaser to pay all five people even if he did not swear first. What is then the Machlokes between Rebbi Tarfon and Rebbi Akiva?

(b) Who will then be the author of our Mishnah?

(c) What does Rebbi Tarfon rule in a Beraisa in a case of 'Omer li'Shenayim Gazalti le'Echad Mikem Manah ve'Eini Yode'a Eyzeh Mikem'?

(d) What problem does this present on our current contention that the author of our Mishnah is Rebbi Tarfon?

(a) So how do we finally establish the Machlokes between Rebbi Tarfon and Rebbi Akiva? In which case do they argue, when the Ganav swore or when he didn't?

(b) And how does Rava then establish our Mishnah? Who is the author?

(c) What makes our Mishnah different than the case over which the Tana'im argue?

(d) And how does Rava distinguish between whether the Ganav swore or not? Why does our Mishnah need to speak in a case where he did?

Answers to questions

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