(Permission is granted to print and redistribute this material
as long as this header and the footer at the end are included.)


prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem

Previous daf

Bava Kama 112

BAVA KAMA 112 - Today's Daf has been dedicated by Mr. Kenneth Polinsky in honor of his wife, Dvora Risa, and children, Miriam, Elisheva, Tzvi and Avigayil. May Hashem grant them the health, strength and peace of mind to continue to support Torah and raise their children as Yere'ei Shamayim.


(a) Rav Ada bar Ahavah cites Rami bar Chama in connection with the following Beraisa. 'Hini'ach Lahen Avihen Ma'os shel Ribis, af-al-Pi she'Yod'in whe'Hein shel Ribis, Ein Chayavin Le'hachzir'.
What does Rami bar Chama prove from there?

(b) Rava refutes the proof by citing the Pasuk in Behar "Al Tikach me'Ito Neshech ve'Sarbis".
Why does the Torah forbid the taking of Ribis?

(c) How does Rava refute Rami's proof from this Pasuk?

(a) If Rami bar Chama argues with Rava with regard to the Beraisa, he will certainly argue with him with regard to our Mishnah.
Why might the reverse not be true?

(b) Others reverse the above statement. According to them, Rami bar Chama might argue with Rava with regard to the Beraisa, but he will agree with him with regard to the Mishnah.
Why is that?

(c) Which is the preferred version?

(a) Regarding the case of 'ha'Gozel u'Ma'achil es ha'Ganav, the Beraisa obligates Gedolim, but exempts Ketanim from paying.
Why are Ketanim Patur from paying?

(b) How will Rami bar Chama establish the first statement?

(c) The Beraisa adds that if the Gedolim say 'Ein Anu Yod'in Cheshbonos she'Chishev Avinu Imach', they are Patur.
Why can this not be understood literally?

(d) How does Rava therefore establish this statement?

(a) Yet another Beraisa obligates both Gedolim and Ketanim to pay for the stolen cow which their father left them.
What is the problem with this Beraisa?

(b) So how does Rav Papa establish it?

(c) Who is then the author of this Beraisa?

(a) Rava rules that, Yesomim whose father leaves them a borrowed cow, are permitted to use it until the prescribed time expires.
Are they liable for Onsin?

(b) What does he say regarding a case where, believing the cow to be their father's, they Shecht it and eat it?

(a) If their father left them Karka, Rava concludes, they are Chayav. Some learn this with regard to the Reisha (obligating them to pay Onsin).
What would Rava then say in the Seifa (with regard to obligating them to pay in full for the animal that they Shechted)?

(b) Others learn Rava's final statement with regard to the Seifa.
What would he then hold in the Reisha?

(c) What are the ramifications of this Machlokes in Rava? Why might he ...

  1. ... obligate the Yesomim to pay in the Reisha?
  2. ... exempt them?
(a) Rava's ruling in the above case, is connected to a similar ruling of Rav Papa.
What does Rav Papa say with regard to someone paying Daled ve'Hey, for Shechting a cow on Shabbos ...
  1. ... which he stole before Shabbos?
  2. ... which he borrowed before Shabbos?
(b) Why, in the latter case, is he Patur from ...
  1. ... Keren?
  2. ... Kefel, Daled ve'Hey?
(c) Which of the two Leshonos of Rava follows the opinion of his Talmid Rav Papa?

(d) On what grounds do we reject the text which exempts the borrower from Daled ve'Hey for Shechting the cow on Shabbos, on the grounds that wherever there is no Keren, there is no Kefel, Daled or Hey either?

(a) In view of the current Sugya, what does the Tana of the Beraisa extrapolate from the Pasuk in Vayikra "ve'Heishiv es ha'Gezeilah *Asher Gazal*"?

(b) The Tana adds that if on the other hand, the stolen object that the father left his sons *is* intact, both Gedolim and Ketanim are obligated to return it. What does Sumchus say?

Answers to questions



(a) Why did Rebbi Yirmiyah's young brother-in law lock the door in front of Rebbi Yirmiyah?

(b) On what grounds did Rebbi Avin decline to accept Rebbi Yirmiyah's witnesses, who were ready to testify that he had already acquired the house during the lifetime of his father-in-law, who had sold or given it to him?

(c) According to which Tana does Rebbi Avin justify his ruling? How did Rebbi Yirmiyah react to this?

(d) Rebbi Avahu, who then became involved in the case, tried to support Rebbi Yirmiyah with a statement by Rav Yosef bar Chama.
What did Rav Yosef bar Chama say about a Katan who takes his Avadim with him to forcibly claim a field from its current owner (or to forcibly take away the Eved)?

(e) How do we differentiate between the two cases (to vindicate Rebbi Avin)?

(a) 'Amar Rav Ashi Amar Rav Shabsa'i, Mekablin Eidim she'Lo bi'F'nei Ba'al-Din'. How does Rebbi Yossi b'Rebbi Chanina explain this statement (in one of three ways) See Tosfos DH 've'Shalchu Lo'?

(b) What additional conditional is required?

(c) And how does Mar Ukva explain the identical statement issued by Rav Yehudah Amar Shmuel?

(d) Why ...

  1. ... would this not apply if they had not yet opened the proceedings against the defendant?
  2. ... can he not say that even if they had?
(a) What is Kiyum ha'Sh'tar?

(b) According to Rav, should the witnesses wish to go overseas, the claimant is entitled to substantiate the Sh'tar even in the absence of the defendant. What does Rebbi Yochanan say?

(c) How does Rav Sheishes derive Rebbi Yochanan's opinion from the Pasuk "ve'Hu'ad bi'Ve'alav ve'Lo Yishmerenu"?

(d) Rava rules like Rav. Will this apply even if the defendant ...

  1. ... objects?
  2. ... asks for time to bring witnesses who will prove that the Sh'tar is a forgery?
(a) If Monday, Thursday and Monday pass, and the defendant has not returned, Beis-Din write a Pesicha, and ninety days later, an Adrachta.
What is ...
  1. ... a Pesicha?
  2. ... an Adrachta?
(b) The significance of the first set of thirty days is that we assume him to be looking for a loan.
What is the significance of ...
  1. ... the second set?
  2. ... the third set?
(c) How will the Din differ if the defendant declares at the outset that he is not going to Beis-Din?

(d) On what grounds do we write an Adrachta immediately in the case of a Pikadon?

(a) What reason do we initially ascribe to the fact that we do not write an Adrachta on Metaltelin?

(b) Under which circumstances would we then write one?

(c) We conclude however, that Beis-Din do not write an Adrachta on Metaltelin.
Why is that?

(d) Beis-Din will inform the defendant when writing an Adrachta on his property.
When will they not do so?

(a) In which two circumstances do we initially think Beis-Din will inform the defendant, even if he is overseas?

(b) We think that in this case, Beis-Din wait a further twelve months before giving the Adrachta to the claimant.
What is the conclusion (see Tosfos Rid)?

(c) On what grounds do we refute the original contention, in spite of the episode with Ravina, who made Mar Acha (whose debtor was in Mechuza) wait twelve months for his Adrachta, until the caravans returned from Mechuza and he could inform him upon his return?

(a) Ravina rules that a Sheli'ach Beis-Din who informs Beis-Din that one of the litigants refuses to come to court is believed like two witnesses. But this only pertains to a Shamta (an oral Cherem), not to a Pesicha (a written one).
Why not?

(b) He also rules that Beis-Din will even issue a litigant who is due back in town with a summons to a Din Torah, through a woman or neighbors who happen to be going that way.
Why will this not apply to a case where ...

  1. ... the litigant is currently at home (i.e. in the same town as Beis-Din)?
  2. ... the litigant is due to pass the entrance to Beis-Din on his way home?
  3. ... he is not due to return that day?
Answers to questions

Next daf


For further information on
subscriptions, archives and sponsorships,
contact Kollel Iyun Hadaf,