ANSWERS TO REVIEW QUESTIONS
prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem
Previous daf Bava Metzia 3
(a) If Reuven and Shimon deposit money by Levi, one of them deposits one
Manah, the other, two, and each one then claims that the two is his, the
Tana Kama in the Mishnah in ha'Mafkid rules that each one takes a Manah and
the third Manah is put away until Eliyahu comes. Rebbi Yossi says - that the
entire three hundred is put away until Eliyahu comes.
(b) What makes us think that the author of our Mishnah cannot be Rebbi Yossi
is - that, according to him, we ought to put the Talis away too.
(c) This is not a problem according to the Rabbanan, who, when all's said
and done, require the third Manah (over which they are arguing), to be put
away - because they only say that in the case of ha'Mafkid, where there is
definitely a swindler, whereas in our case, where it is possible that both
in the case of Metzi'ah and in the case of purchase, the Talis belongs to
both of them, as we explained earlier, they consider more feasible to say
(a) According to Rebbi Yossi however, who holds that all three Manah are put
away until Eliyahu comes (and not divided), even though one Manah definitely
belongs to Reuven and one Manah, to Shimon, then here, where the Talis might
belong either to one or to the other, it should certainly be put away (and
not divided). We nevertheless reconcile Rebbi Yossi with our Mishnah - by
confining Rebbi Yossi's ruling to where there is definitely a swindler
(similar to the S'vara of the Rabbanan), but not to where both claimants
might be telling the truth.
(b) Alternatively, we try to answer that the K'nas is applicable in the case
of the Pikadon, it is not applicable in the case of Metzi'ah, because there
is nothing with which to force the hand of the one who is lying. But we
refute this answer - by referring to the case of purchase, where the Tana
says 'Yachloku', even though it would be possible to force the swindler's
hand with the money that he already paid to the seller.
(c) The problem with the case of 'Chenvani al Pinkaso', where according to
both the Rabbanan and Rebbi Yossi, both the worker and the storekeeper claim
their dues from the Balabos (according to one, with a Shevu'ah, according to
the other, without one) is - why, bearing in mind that one of them is
definitely a swindler, we do not say 'Yehei Munach ad she'Yavo Eliyahu'?
(d) In fact, they both agree that in there, we cannot say 'Yehei Munach ad
she'Yavo Eliyahu' - because the storekeeper can argue that he does not
accept the Shevu'ah of the worker, and that he paid him at the behest of the
Balabos; and the worker can argue that it is he the Balabos, who owes him
money, and not the storekeeper. In short, the Balabos has to pay the penalty
for trusting the storekeeper to pay the worker's wages without stipulating
or bringing witnesses.
(a) In a case where Shimon denies the Manah that Reuven claims from him, but
witnesses testify that he owes him fifty Zuz - Rebbi Chiya in a Beraisa,
rules that Shimon pays fifty Zuz, and swears on the other fifty.
(b) The reasoning behind this ruling is - that Hoda'as Eidim (what the
witnesses force him to admit) should not be worse than Hoda'as Piv (what he
admits of his own volition - for which he has to swear a Shevu'ah d'Oraysa).
(c) And he proves it from our Mishnah - where 'Anan Sahadi' (we are
witnesses, a Chazakah that is similar to the testimony of two witnesses)
that what each one is holding is his, and we see that both have to swear on
the other half (the half that they are holding and on which there is no
(a) Initially, we think that the defendant's own admission is more reason to
obligate him to swear than witnesses, because of Rabah. According to
Rabah, we would hesitate to obligate a 'Modeh be'Miktzas' (someone who
admits to half the claim) from a Shevu'ah - because he is a 'Meishiv
Aveidah' (a Mashal to 'Migu', since he could have denied the claim
completely, similar to someone who volunteers to return a lost article, who
is Patur from a Shevu'ah because he could have denied finding it in the
(b) The Torah does not, in fact, consider this a 'Migu' - because the truth
is that a borrower (according to those who transfer "Ki Hu Zeh" to a loan,
as we learned in the last Perek of Bava Kama) would not have the gall to
deny entirely, the claim of someone who did him a favor and lent him money.
(c) As a matter of fact he really now wants to admit to the entire claim, as
Rabah goes on to say - but cannot, because he doesn't have the means to pay,
so he makes a compromise and admits to half, with the intention of admitting
to the rest when he obtains the money to pay.
(d) Rabah needs to add that he now wants to admit to the entire claim -
because if he didn't, the Torah would not allow someone who is suspect in
money-matters to swear (because whoever is suspect in the one is suspect in
(a) What we initially set out to prove by citing Rabah is - that, if not for
the 'Kal va'Chomer', there would be more reason to obligate Hoda'as Piv to
swear than Hoda'as Eidim.
(b) We prove it from the fact - that according to Rabah, Hoda'as Eidim,
where the defendant denies the entire claim, ought to be disqualified from
swearing, since he is suspect in money-matters, even though Hoda'as Piv is
Chayav, as we just explained.
(a) So Rebbi Chiya learns that Hoda'as Eidim obligates a Shevu'ah with a
'Kal va'Chomer' from Hoda'as Piv - because if Piv, which cannot obligate
payment of Mamon, obligates a Shevu'ah, Eidim, which can, should certainly
obligate a Shevu'ah?
(b) The Halachah regarding a 'Ho'da'as Ba'al-Din' (someone who admits that
he owes money) is - 'ke'Me'ah Eidim Dami' (which means that he is believed
against any amount of witnesses, and he is therefore obligated to pay),
effectively negating the 'Kal va'Chomer'.
(c) If Rebbi Chiya cannot learn the 'Kal va'Chomer from Hoda'as Piv of
Mamon, he learns it from - the Ho'da'as Piv of K'nas, because, as we learn
from "Asher Yarshi'un Elohim", a person does not pay K'nas by his own
admission, only through the testimony of witnesses.
(a) We learn from the Pasuk "*ve'Hisvadah* Asher Chata ve'Heivi" - that Piv
obligates a person to bring a Korban, but not Eidim.
(b) This not a Pircha on Rebbi Chiya however - because he holds like Rebbi
Meir, who learns that Eidim too, obligate a Korban (whereas the D'rashah is
the opinion of the Rabanan).
(c) This Machlokes is based on a Mishnah in K'riysus, where the Chachamim
exempt someone from a Chatas if witnesses testify that he ate Cheilev
(be'Shogeg). Rebbi Meir obligates him - on the basis of the S'vara 'If
witnesses can bring a person to death, then they can surely bring him to a
(d) The Chachamim disagree with him on the grounds - of a 'Migu', because he
could have said that he ate it be'Meizid (and how can the witnesses know
that he didn't) see also Tosfos DH 'Mah').
(a) We cannot ask on the 'Kal va'Chomer from Asham, because Asham too, is a
Korban (and Rebbi Chiya holds like Rebbi Meir, as we just explained). We do
however, ask from the Chomesh that accompanies an Asham Gezeilos - because
one only has to pay it upon admission (which the Pasuk "O Hoda Eilav
Chataso" teaches us).
(b) We refute this Pircha too - by establishing Rebbi Chiya like Rebbi Meir,
who (in spite of the Pasuk) compares the Chomesh to the Asham, obligating
both through Hoda'as Eidim.
(a) We finally refute the previous version of the 'Kal va'Chomer' on the
grounds that 'Hakchashah and Hazamah apply to Eidim but not to Piv - due to
the principle 'Hoda'as Ba'al Din ke'Me'ah Eidim Dami' (which we just cited
earlier); and that is the edge that Piv has over Eidim.
(b) So we switch the 'Kal va'Chomer' from Piv to Eid Echad - who is not
believed to extract money, and who is subject to Hakchashah and Hazamah.
(c) The Pircha that we ask on this is - that whereas one witness obligates a
Shevu'ah on the money to which his testimony pertains, the testimony of two
witnesses (according to Rebbi Chiya) will obligate the Shevu'ah on the
remainder (so how can Rebbi Chiya possibly learn the Eidim from Eid Echad?