ANSWERS TO REVIEW QUESTIONS
prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem
Previous daf Kesuvos 81
KESUVOS 81 - dedicated by S. Teichman, l'Zecher Nishmas his father, Reb
Avrohom ben Reb Shmuel Teichman.
(a) Rava queries the previous ruling (that the Yavam who inherits the
Yevamah's Kesuvah, is obligated to bury her) - on the grounds that, due to
the fact that he only receives the Manah, Masayim, and not the Nechsei Tzon
Barzel, the Yavam can argue that he is inheriting his brother, and not the
(b) When Abaye counters 'de'Ba'in Alav mi'Sh'nei Tzedadim' - he means to say
that Beis-Din can reply 'Either you bury her or you pay her Kesuvah (like he
would have been obligated to do, had she died after they were married).
(c) Rava explains that his Kashya was really based on the principle 'Lo
Nitnah Kesuvah li'Gevos me'Chayim' - which we learn from the Sh'tar Kesuvah,
where it is written that only when she is fit to marry (after her husband's
death) can she claim her Kesuvah (but not in the lifetime of her husband).
(d) We answer Rava's Kashya by establishing the principle 'Lo Nitnah Kesuvah
li'Gevos me'Chayim' according to Beis Shamai (because they are the one's who
Darshan from the wording of Kesuvah - from which we learn this principle, as
we just explained) - and Beis Shamai also happen to hold 'Sh'tar ha'Omed
li'Gevos ke'Gavuy Dami' (a substantiated document is considered as if it had
already been claimed), in which case, the Kesuvah is in the Chazakah of the
Yevamah, in which case it is from her that the Yavam inherits it, not from
(a) According to Beis Shamai, if the husband of a Sotah dies before his wife
has had a chance to drink the Mei Sotah, the Sotah claims her Kesuvah and
*does not need to drink* - because the Torah writes in Naso "ve'Heivi ha'Ish
es Ishto", which he cannot do once he is dead.
(b) In view of this D'rashah (with which Beis Hillel cannot help but agree),
we amend Beis Hillel, who say 'O Shosos O Notlos Kesuvah' - to read 'Mitoch
she'Lo Shosos, Lo Notlos Kesuvah'.
(c) Beis Hillel's reason is based on the principle 'ha'Motzi me'Chaveiro
Alav ha'Re'ayah'. Beis Shamai - holds 'Sh'tar ha'Omed li'Gevos ke'Gavuy
Dami', as we explained above, in which case the woman is considered a
Muchzak in the Kesuvah, not a Motzi.
(d) Abaye learned earlier that we force the Yavam from two directions.
Despite the fact that she is not free to marry anyone other than the Yavam,
we adhere to the Lashon of the Kesuvah, which explicitly states
'ke'she'Tinas'i *le'Acher* Titli Mah she'Kasuv Lechi' - because the Yavam is
also called 'Acher'.
(a) When Rebbi Aba (alias Rav) asked Sumchus what a Yavam (after Yibum)
should do to enable him to sell his brother's property, assuming the Yavam
1. ... a Kohen - he replied that he should make a party and take the
opportunity to persuade her to allow him to sell.
(b) In the latter case, it makes no difference whether he pays her the
Kesuvah and sells what he wants before taking her back, or whether he takes
her straight back, and writes her a fresh Kesuvah stipulating that whatever
he has bought or will buy is all Meshubad towards her Kesuvah (see Tosfos DH
2. ... a Yisrael - he replied that he should divorce her and take her back.
(c) Despite the fact that the Yevamah will anyway be able to claim from the
fields that he sells (as we shall see later on Daf 95b.) she can
nevertheless stop him from selling them, using the argument that she does
not want the trouble of going to Beis-Din (to extract the property from the
(d) Rava asked Abaye from this Beraisa on what he said earlier (that
according to Beis Hillel, the Kesuvah of a Yevamah can be claimed in the
lifetime of the Yavam) - because according to him, why did the Tana not
permit him to designate some property towards her Kesuvah and sell the rest?
(a) Rava did not ask the same Kashya from the Tana of our Mishnah (which
forbids a Yavam to tell the Yevamah that her Kesuvah is lying on the
table) - because there, Abaye could have answered simply that the Tana was
merely offering the Yavam a piece of advice (to avoid having to write her
another Kesuvah. See Tosfos DH 'Ela'); whereas in the case of Rebbi Aba,
where the Yavam is advised to divorce the Yevamah, it would surely make more
sense to avoid the stigma by designating a field for the Kesuvah.
(b) We prove this answer from the Seifa, where the Tana states the same
Halachah with regard to a husband and his wife - and where we know from Bava
Basra that, with the exception of one of three fields (that he specified in
her Kesuvah), he is permitted to sell his property (due to the fact that he
stipulated in the Kesuvah that whatever he bought or would buy in the
future, was designated towards her Kesuvah).
(c) Abaye repudiates Rava's Kashya from Rebbi Aba's Beraisa - on the grounds
that designating a specific field for the Yevamah's Kesuvah will evoke her
suspicions that he wants to divorce her, causing her to hate him; whereas
divorcing her with the express intention of taking her back, will not,
because she will realize that he is doing this only because he wants to sell
the rest of the property.
(a) That man from Pumbedisa prepared to throw a Get to his Yevamah - to
prevent his older brother (who had first rights) from performing Yibum with
her (and from thereby inheriting all of his deceased brother's property).
(b) His older brother appeased him - by promising him half of their deceased
brother's inheritance, and even went so far as to make a Kinyan to that
(c) The Beraisa states - that a Yavam is forbidden to sell his deceased
brother's property, even if it is worth a *hundred* Manah, and the
Yevamah's Kesuvah is worth only *one*.
(d) Based on this Beraisa - Rav Yosef ruled that if a Yavam did sell any of
his brother's property, the sale is invalid, and that consequently, the
older brother's gift to his younger brother of half the deceased brother's
property was invalid.
(a) We learned in a Mishnah (on Daf 78a.) that if a woman inherited property
after her betrothal, Beis Shamai permit her to sell it, but Beis Hillel do
not. In the event that she sold it however - Beis Hillel concede that her
sale is valid.
(b) If so, Abaye asked Rav Yosef - how can he deduce from the Beraisa which
forbids a Yavam to sell his deceased brother's property, that if he did sell
it, the sale must be invalid?
(c) When Rav Chanina bar Papi sent his approval of Rav Yosef's ruling -
Abaye pointed out that his approval had not come with a proof.
(a) Rav Minyumi Brei de'Rav Nichumi sent a message that he agreed with
Abaye - adding that, should Rav Yosef have any further proof for his
opinion, they should let him know.
(b) Rav Yosef took up the challenge and discovered a Beraisa. The Beraisa
says that despite the fact that he is brother's heir, a Yavam who is also
his brother's creditor - may not assume full ownership of the property, but
must buy with it land (for his wife's Kesuvah) from which he eats the
(c) Abaye refutes Rav Yosef's proof from there - on the grounds that the
Tana is only presenting the Yavam with a sound piece of advice, to ensure
that he retains his inheritance, rather than squander the money and lose it
(d) When Rav Yosef proved his point from the Lashon of the Beraisa 'Motzi'in
mi'Yavam', implying that we do so even against his will, they sent word to
Rav Minyumi Brei de'Rav Tivyumi. He quoted Rav Yosef bar Minyumi who quoted
Rav Nachman - who said that the word 'Motzi'in' was inserted erroneously and
should be erased.
(a) We try to establish the basis of Rav Nachman's ruling to erase
'Motzi'in' from the above Beraisa. We rule out the suggestion that it is
because Metaltelin *are not Meshubad towards a Kesuvah* - because the author
might be Rebbi Meir, in whose opinion *they are*.
(b) Establishing the Beraisa like Rebbi Meir would help Rav Yosef, despite
the fact that the Halachah is not Rebbi Meir anyway - because whereas the
Chachamim may well argue with him regarding Metaltelin, we do not find that
they also argue with the statement 'Motzi'in', which is the point Rav Yosef
(c) We rule out the suggestion that he erases 'Motzi'in' because he can say
to the Yevamah 'You are *my brother's* creditor, not *mine*, because of a
statement of Rebbi Nasan in a Beraisa - who learns from the Pasuk "ve'Nasan
la'Asher Asham Lo", that if Reuven owes Shimon money and Shimon owes Levi,
Levi has the right to claim directly Reuven, as if he was *his* debtor. In
our case too, using the same argument, the Yavam becomes the Yevamah's
(d) Rav Nachman erased 'Motzi'in' from the Beraisa - on the grounds that,
seeing as Kesuvah is only mi'de'Rabbanan, we do not find a Tana who applies
two stringrencies with regard to it. Consequently, we will establish the
Beraisa either like Rebbi Meir or like Rebbi Nasan, but not like both.