REVIEW QUESTIONS ON GEMARA AND RASHI
prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem
Previous daf Kesuvos 59
(a) How will ...
(b) How can the latter Beraisa pertain to Mosar, when the Tana goes on to
state the amount that the woman is obligated to produce?
- ... Rav Ada bar Ahavah amend the Beraisa 'Tiknu Mezonos Tachas Ma'asehYadehah'?
- ... Rav and Shmuel amend the Beraisa 'Im Eino Nosen Lah Ma'ah Kesefle'Tzorchehah, Ma'aseh Yadehah she'Lah'?
(a) The Tana Kama in the Mishnah in Kidushin states that if a married woman
declares the work of her hands, a Konem, her husband *does not need to
nullify* her Neder.
(b) On what grounds does Rebbi Akiva maintains that he *does*?
(c) Shmuel rules like Rebbi Yochanan ben Nuri, who rules like Rebbi Akiva,
but for a different reason.
What is his reason?
(d) Shmuel also rules like Rebbi Yochanan ha'Sandlar in our Mishnah.
Considering that, on the previous Amud, Shmuel agreed with Rav (that, when
Rebbi Yochanan ha'Sandlar considers the Mosar of a woman whose husband
declared the work of her hands Hekdesh, he is referring to the Mosar after
her death), why do Shmuel's two rulings appear contradictory?
(a) We try to reconcile Shmuel's two rulings by establishing his ruling like
Rebbi Yochanan ben Nuri by Ha'adafah (Mosar).
Why in fact, does this not
really answer the question?
(b) Besides that, we object to this answer because, if that is so, Shmuel
should have said 'Halachah ke'Rebbi Yochanan ben Nuri le'Ha'adafah' (seeing
as even Shmuel will agree that Rebbi Yochanan ben Nuri himself does not
speak exclusively about Ha'adafah).
In which other two ways might he have
issued his ruling?
(c) Rav Yosef resolves the contradiction in Shmuel's rulings, by pointing
out that Konamos (which are the topic discussed by the Mishnah in Kidushin)
In what way are Konamos unique, that we should extend their
uniqueness to cover 'Davar she'Lo Bo le'Olam'?
(d) How does Abaye refute Rav Yosef's answer? Why might one be able to
forbid someone else's things on oneself exclusively, but not a Davar she'Lo
(a) So Rav Huna Brei de'Rav Yehoshua establishes the Mishnah in Kidushin
when she declares Hekdesh, not her Ma'aseh Yadayim, but her hands (with
regard to what they produce).
Answers to questions
What objection do we raise to that?
(b) We also object to the suggestion that she does not declare them Hekdesh
now, only after she is divorced, on the grounds that something that one does
not want to declare Hekdesh immediately, one cannot now declare Hekdesh for
How does Rebbi Yirmiyah differentiate between this case and
that of Rebbi Ila'a, who rules that if someone declares Hekdesh a field that
he is about to sell to his friend, but that the Hekdesh should only come
into effect after he has bought it back from his friend, the Hekdesh is
(c) What is the Din if someone declares Hekdesh a field that he just sold to
his friend for the Hekdesh to take effect the moment he buys it back?
(d) How does Rav Papa differentiate between that case and ours?
(a) So we try to compare our case to a case where a person declares Hekdesh
a field that he gave to his friend as collateral for a loan the moment he
redeems it. There the Hekdesh is valid.
On what grounds ...
(b) We finally establish Shmuel's ruling like Rebbi Yochanan ben Nuri on the
grounds that Konamos are different, like Rava.
- ... does Rav Shisha Brei de'Rav Idi differentiate between that case and ours?
- ... do we then differentiate between our case and that of a case similar to the previous one, only when the owner fixed the collateral for ten years time (in which case he cannot redeem it until then)?
What does Rava say about
(c) Which kind of Hekdesh is he referring to?
(d) Why is this not considered stealing from the creditor?
(a) Which other two cases have the power to remove the Shibud?
(b) If that is Rebbi Yochanan ben Nuri's reasoning, why did he say that the
Konam takes effect only after the woman is divorced? Why not immediately?
(a) What do the following Melachos have in common: grinding, baking, washing
clothes, cooking and feeding one's baby?
(b) Which other two Melachos belong in this list?
(c) From which three Melachos is she exempt in the event that she brings a
Shifchah Kena'anis into the marriage?
(d) If she brings in two Shefachos, she is also exempt from cooking and
feeding her baby.
What happens if she brings in ...
- ... three?
- ... four?
(a) According to Rebbi Eliezer, she is never exempt from manufacturing
woolen clothes (even if she brings in a hundred Shefachos).
Why is that?
(b) What does Rebbi Shimon ben Gamliel say about someone who makes a Neder
forbidding his wife from working?
(a) The word 'Tochenes' used by the Tana for 'grinding', appears to be
incorrect, because it is not the woman who actually grinds, but the water
which turns the wheel, which in turn, operates the mill.
So how do we
amend the Lashon 'Tochenes'?
(b) What does 'Mat'chenes comprise?
(c) What alternative explanation do we give which leaves the Lashon
(a) The author of our Mishnah cannot be the Tana quoted by Rebbi Chiya in a
Beraisa. What does that Tana give as the main objective of a woman that
will clash with some of the things mentioned by the Tana of our Mishnah (see
Tosfos DH 'Tani')?
(b) Rebbi Chiya lists this objective together with having children.
else does he add to the list in a second Beraisa?
(c) If a man wants to enhance his wife's looks, he should dress her in linen
clothes (though this, as well as other statements made in this Sugya, are
not necessarily true today).
What should he do for his daughter (besides
feeding her young birds) to make her look prettier?
(a) According to Beis Hillel in a Beraisa, if a woman made a Neder not to
feed her baby, we nevertheless force her to do so. What do Beis Shamai say?
(b) Once she is divorced however, Beis Hillel concede that her Neder stands
and must be kept.
Under which circumstances will Beis Hillel agree with
Beis Shamai even whilst they are married? What is then the Halachah?
(c) We try to establish the Beraisa when the woman made the Neder but her
husband upheld it.
How would that enable us to establish our Mishnah like
(a) We conclude however, that Beis Shamai cannot be the author of our
Mishnah, because if their bone of contention is really *who* is responsible
for a Neder that the wife made and the husband upheld, then they should have
argued in a straight case of Kesuvah.
Answers to questions
What would then have been their
Machlokes? What would be the case?
(b) On what other basis do we reject the possibility of establishing our
Mishnah like Beis Shamai?