ANSWERS TO REVIEW QUESTIONS
prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem
Previous daf Kidushin 12
(a) We just saw how Beis Shamai require a Dinar by the Kinyan of an Amah
Ivriyah (in order to make Gera'on Kesef possible). The reason that they
require a Dinar and not just a little more than a P'rutah is - because
having precluded the sale-price of a P'rutah, the Torah looks for something
more substantial, settling for a Dinar, as we explained earlier.
(b) In fact, they learn Kidushei Ishah (not just from Amah Ivriyah, but) -
from the Kidushin of Yi'ud which is conditional to the sale of every Amah
(c) Rava offers a fourth explanation in Beis Shamai - ascribing their
opinion to a Takanas Chachamim, to raise the dignity of Jewish women.
(a) 'u'Beis Hillel Omrim bi'P'rutah'. We refute Rav Yosef's contention that
the P'rutah is independent and has no minimum value - on the basis of our
Mishnah, which prices the P'rutah as one an eighth of an Italian Isar.
(b) We know that the link to the Italian Isar is constant, and is not merely
informing us the value of the P'rutah in the time of Moshe - because when
Rav Dimi arrived from Eretz Yisrael, he quoted Rav Simai, who gave the price
of the P'rutah as one eighth of an Italian Isar.
(c) When Ravin arrived from Eretz Yisrael, he quoted Rebbi Dustai, Rebbi
Yanai and Rebbi Oshaya, who evaluated the P'rutah at (what initially appears
to be) a higher price than Rav Dimi. The minimum value of a P'rutah
according to them - is one sixth of an Italian Isar.
(a) Rav Yosef tried to prove his original contention from a Beraisa, which
states that there are more than two thousand P'rutos in two Sela'im - with
regard to someone who has sinned and is obligated to bring an Asham, which
costs a minimum of two Sela'im (to teach us the price of a sin - even when
it is be'Shogeg).
Given that there are twenty-four Isrim in a Dinar , we arrive at this
figure - by virtue of the fact that there are eight P'rutos in an Isar,
twenty-four Isrim in a Dinar and four Dinrim in a Sela (eight, in two
Sela'im); and 24x8x8 = 1536.
(b) He proves his point from there - because if there are more than two
thousand P'rutos in two Sela'im, then a P'rutah will be equivalent to
approximately a tenth of an Italian Isar.
(c) That old man refuted Rav Yosef's proof by amending the Beraisa - from
'Yeser me'Alpayim' to 'Karov le'Alpayim'.
(d) Despite the fact that really, there are only 1536 P'rutos in two
Sela'im - the Tana referred to it as close to two thousand, since the figure
exceeded the half-way mark between one and two thousand.
(a) Abaye asked Rav Dimi whether he and Ravin simply followed the to
opinions in the Beraisa. The value of a P'rutah according to ...
1. ... the Tana Kama of the Beraisa is - an eighth of an Italian Isar.
(b) Rav Dimi replied that both he and Ravin followed the opinion of the Tana
Kama (and in fact, they did not argue). The basis of their two opinions
(whether there are eight P'rutos in an Italian Isar or six) - depends purely
upon the current value of the Isar. *He* is speaking when there are
twenty-four Isrin to the Dinar (8x24-192), and Ravin, when there are
thirty-two Isrin to the Dinar (6x32=192).
2. ... Raban Shimon ben Gamliel is - a sixth of an Italian Isar.
(c) Rav Dimi connects his and Ravin's opinions to that of the Tana Kama,
rather than that of Raban Shimon ben Gamliel - because it tallies with our
(a) Shmuel said that if a man betroths a woman with a date, she is
Mekudeshes (even if a Kur of dates costs a Dinar - and there are thousands
of dates in a Kur]) - because we suspect that perhaps in Madai (or anywhere
else in the world) the date is worth a P'rutah.
(b) Shmuel reconciles this with Beis Hillel, who requires the object of
Kidushin to be worth a P'rutah - by establishing Beis Hillel when she is
Vaday Mekudeshes, whereas he is referring to Safek (who will require a Get
before she is permitted to marry anybody else.
(c) In the case where a man betrothed a woman with a wad of cloths, Rav
Shimi bar Chiya needed to have the cloths evaluated - to ensure that she was
Vaday Mekudeshes (because Safek Mekudeshes she was either way).
(a) In another episode, Rav Chisda was evaluating a black marble stone with
which a man had betrothed a woman. He did not consider Shmuel's opinion
(that the woman was Safek Mekudeshes anyway) - because he did not agree with
him. According to him, we only contend with the place where the Kidushin
(b) When the man's mother claimed that the stone was definitely worth a
P'rutah on the day that he had betrothed the woman with it, Rav Chisda
replied - that in the event that the stone was not currently worth a
P'rutah, she did not have the authority to forbid the woman on the second
(c) We know that Rav Chisda disagreed with Shmuel, and that he was not
examining the stone in order to ascertain whether the woman was Vaday
Mekudeshes or Safek - because it so happened that the second man to betroth
her was the first man's brother. Now if Rav Chisda concurred with Shmuel,
she would have been Safek Mekudeshes in any case, in which case she would
have required a Get from the first man, and Rav Chisda would not have been
to intimate to the mother that the woman was permitted to her second son.
(a) Rav Chisda compared the current case to that of Yehudis, wife of Rebbi
Chiya, who was having exceptionally strong birth-pains - because she was
about to give birth to twins.
1. ... Yehudah and Chizkiyah were - Rebbi Chiya's twin sons.
(c) Rebbi Chiya's wife claimed that her mother told her - that her father
had already accepted Kidushin on her behalf (and that consequently, she was
forbidden to Rebbi Chiya). She mentioned this - in the hope of being
declared forbidden to Rebbi Chiya (in order to avoid having to be intimate
with him again and becoming pregnant).
2. ... Pazi and Tavi were - his twin daughters.
(d) Rebbi Chiya replied - that she did not have the authority to forbid
herself on her husband.
(a) The Rabbanan maintained that the woman's second son, whom Rav Chisda had
permitted to marry the woman, was forbidden to him - on the grounds that
there were witnesses in Idis who had been there when the first Kidushin took
place, and who knew that the stone was worth a P'rutah at the time.
(b) In reply, Rav Chisda cited Rebbi Chanina, in whose Beis-Din the
daughters of Shmuel admitted - that they had been captured, but who denied
having been raped. He believed them - on the grounds that there were no
witnesses (at least, not currently in Beis-Din) that they had indeed been
captured, in which case we apply the principle 'ha'Peh she'Asar, Hu ha'Peh
(c) When Rebbi Chanina was informed that there *were* witnesses who could be
called to testify that they had been captured, he retorted that it was not
possible to declare the daughters of Shmuel forbidden on the basis of
witnesses who were in the north (and not in Beis-Din).
(a) Abaye and Rava disagreed with Rav Chisda - on the grounds that one
cannot learn the Din of an Eishes Ish (which is a Safek d'Oraysa) to that of
a captive (i.e. the decree that a female captive was automatically raped)
which is no more than a Chumra de'Rabbanan).
(b) The Rabbanan kept away from the remaining members of that family, who
lived in Sura (not because they held like Shmuel, but - because they held
like Abaye and Rava.
(c) When someone publicly betrothed a woman with a twig of myrtle, Rav Yosef
ruled that he should ...
1. ... receive Malkos - for betrothing in public (in contravention of Rav's
(d) Rav would administer Makas Mardus for three breaches of moral conduct
connected with Kidushin: for betrothing with Bi'ah - for betrothing in the
public domain and for betrothing directly, without a Shiduch.
2. ... and give the woman a Get - because he held like Shmuel ('Shema Shaveh
(a) He would also administer Makas Mardus to someone who ...
1. ... negated a Get that he had sent his wife through a Sh'li'ach, or who
secretly informed two witnesses that the Get he was giving his wife was not
valid because he had been forced to write it - because in both cases, his
wife, not knowing that the Get had been nullified, would use what she
believed to be a Kasher Get to remarry (when in fact, she was still married
to her first husband) See also Tosfos Yevamos 32a. DH 'de'Masar'.
(b) According to the Neherda'i, Rav only administered Makas Mardus to
someone who betrothed a woman with Bi'ah and without a Shiduch. Others quote
them as saying - that Rav only administered Makas Mardus to someone who
betrothed a woman without a Shiduch (even if he betrothed her with Kidushei
Kesef or Sh'tar).
2. ... who treated a Sh'li'ach Beis-Din (sent by Beis-Din to invite him to a
Din Torah) with contempt, or who retained a Shamta de'Rabbanan (a form of
Niduy) - meaning that he was not concerned about the Shamta placed on him by
the Beis-Din, as indicated by his failure to go to Beis-Din within thirty
days and ask them to pardon him and rescind the Shamta.
3. ... slept over in the house of his father-in-law to be. Rav Sheishes gave
Malkos even to someone who just passed in front of her house - because there
had been rumors that he was having an affair with her.
(a) When the man who betrothed a woman with a mat made of myrtle branches
was informed that it was not worth a P'rutah, he replied - that she should
then be betrothed with the four Zuz that was hidden inside it.
(b) When the woman reacted to his words with silence, Rava commented - that
silence after having received the money is not tantamount to acceptance (as
it is before receiving it).
(c) Rava based his ruling on a Beraisa, where the Tana states that, in the
case of 'Kinsi Sela Zeh be'Pikadon ve'Chazar ve'Amar Lah Hiskadshi Li Bo,
be'Sha'as Matan Ma'os, Mekudeshes'. 'be'Sha'as Matan Ma'os' means - before
having received the money.
(d) In the case of 'le'Achar Matan Ma'os' by ...
1. ... 'Ratz'sah', the Tana rules - 'Mekudeshes'.
2. ... 'Lo Ratz'sah' - 'Einah Mekudeshes'.
(a) In the previous case, when the Tana says 'Lo Ratz'sah', he cannot
possibly mean that the woman refuses - because, if he did, then he would not
have ruled that she was Mekudeshes in the Reisha (in the case of 'be'Sha'as
(b) Consequently, it must mean - that the woman was silent, a clear proof
for Rava's ruling that silence after having accepted the money, is construed
as indifference, but not as consent.