ANSWERS TO REVIEW QUESTIONS
prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem
Previous daf Kidushin 65
KIDUSHIN 61-65 - Ari Kornfeld has generously sponsored the Dafyomi
publications for these Dafim for the benefit of Klal Yisrael.
(a) If a man claims that he betrothed a woman and she denies it, she is free
to marry his relatives. *He* is forbidden to marry hers however - due to the
principle 'Shavyah Anafshei Chatichah de'Isura' (by virtue of his admission,
he made her a piece of Isur, so to speak).
Having taught us ...
(b) The same will apply in the reverse case. However, where the woman denies
the man's claims, but counters that he betrothed her daughter, the Tana
permits him to marry the daughter's relatives (who are not also close
relatives of her mother), and vice-versa - because the Torah does not grant
a mother the right to testify re. her daughter's status) like it does, a
(c) He is not required to give her a Get either (because if he was, he would
no longer be permitted to marry her relatives).
(d) In the reverse case, where the man claimed that he betrothed the
daughter, and the mother counters that it was her whom he betrothed and not
her daughter - then the man is forbidden to marry the daughter's relatives,
and the woman, his relatives (and that is all).
1. ... that the man is not believed to forbid his relatives on the woman he
claims he betrothed, the Tana nevertheless finds it necessary to repeat this
Halachah in the case of the woman - because we would otherwise have thought
that, in the Reisha, *she* is not forbidden to *his* relatives only because,
seeing as he does not have much to lose by claiming that he betrothed her,
we suspect him of lying. She on the other hand, who becomes forbidden to the
whole world, would not make such a claim, unless it was not true.
Consequently, if not for the Seifa, we would have forbidden him on her
2. ... these two cases, the Tana finds it necessary to repeat this Halachah
in the case of the daughter - to teach us that not even the Chachamim
believed the mother re. her daughter (like the Torah believed the father).
3. ... these three cases, the Tana teaches us the final case ('Kidashti es
Bitech, ve'Hi Omeres Lo Kidashta Ela Osi') - only because of the others
(since it would otherwise be the only case omitted by the Tana), even though
it does not come to teach us anything.
(a) With reference to the second case (of 'Hi Omeres Kidashtani ... '),
Shmuel says that we ask him to give her a Get (to enable her to marry). The
problem with Rav, who says that we force him to do so is - that seeing as by
doing so, he will become forbidden to all her relatives, it is illogical for
Chazal to issue such a decree.
(b) Consequently, when Rav said 'Kofin', he was really complementing
Shmuel's statement. In the event that he gave the Get of his own accord,
Rav added, then we force him to give her a Kesuvah.
(c) When Rav's Talmidim quoted him as saying 'Kofin u'Mevakshin' - the meant
that 'Mevaksin', but if he gave her a Get without being asked, then 'Kofin'
(to pay her Kesuvah [because the fact that he gave her a Get without being
asked indicates that he really did betroth her]).
(a) Rav Yehudah made a statement 'ha'Mekadesh be'Eid Echad, Ein Chosheshin
le'Kidushav'. Rav Nachman Amar Shmuel adds 'va'Afilu Sh'neihem Modim' -
because of the 'Gezeirah-Shavah' "Davar" "Davar" from Mamon, which teaches
us that Kidushin are only valid when there are two witnesses.
(b) The alternative interpretation of Rav Yehudah's statement is - that the
Kidushin is invalid only if they themselves deny it, but should they concur
with the witnesses testimony, then he is believed.
(c) When they asked Rav Yehudah which of the two he had in mind - he
wavered, answering once like this and once like that (because he himself,
was not certain).
(a) Rava attempts to refute Rav Nachman's ruling from our Mishnah, where the
Tana forbids the woman's relatives on the man (and vice-versa). What makes
him think that the Tana must be speaking about Kidushin that took place
with one witness is - that if there were two, why would she be permitted to
his relatives? And if there were none, why would he be forbidden to her
relatives? So the Reisha of the Mishnah must be speaking when there is one
witness with whom the man concurs and the woman doesn't.
(b) We reject this proof however, on the grounds that the Tana coould
equally well be speaking when according to the man, there were really two
witnesses. Nevertheless, there is room for doubt whether he did betroth her
or not - because the Tana speaks when the witnesses had gone away and could
not be contacted.
(c) According to Beis-Shamai in the Mishnah in Iduyos, if a man who divorced
his wife, stays with her overnight in a hotel, she does not require a second
Get. According to Beis Hillel - she does.
(d) What makes us think that the Tana must be speaking when there is one
witness (a Kashya on Rav Nachman Amar Shmuel) - is the fact that, if there
were two witnesses, why would Beis Shamai not require a Get, and if there
were none, why would Beis require one?
(a) The Tana says there in the Seifa, that if they were divorced from the
Eirusin - even Beis Hillel will concede that no Get is necessary.
(b) Based on this Seifa, we refute the Kashya on Rav Nachman Amar Shmuel -
because, if there was one witness (and his testimony was acceptable), what
difference would it make whether they were divorced after the marriage or
after the betrothal?
(c) So we establish the Mishnah in Iduyos when there were Eidei Yichud (but
no Eidei Bi'ah). Beis Shamai hold - that Eidei Yichud are not synonymous
with Eidei Bi'ah, whereas according to Beis Hillel, they are.
(d) Beis Hillel will concede that no Get is necessary if they were divorced
from the Eirusin - because, since there has not yet been Bi'ah, we no longer
assume that the Yichud is necesssarily synonymous with Bi'ah.
(a) Various Amora'im agree with Rav Nachman Amar Shmuel ('ha'Mekadesh be'Eid
Echad Ein Chosheshin le'Kidushav, va'Afilu Sh'neihem Modim'). In the first
Lashon, Rabah bar Rav Huna issues this ruling; in the second Lashon, he
quotes Rav. Both Leshonos conclude 'Bei Dina Rabah Amri ... ', which,
according to ...
1. ... the first Lashon - refers to Rav.
(b) The Tana of the Beraisa cites a case where two men arrive from overseas
accompanied by a woman and goods, and each man claims the woman to be his
wife, the other man, his slave and the goods, his. The woman claims - that
the goods are hers, and the two men, her slaves.
2. ... the second Lashon - refers to Rebbi.
(c) The Tana rules that she requires two Gitin, and may then claim her
Kesuvah from the goods (seeing as, one way or the other, she is entitled to
at least that).
(d) Rav Achdevu'i bar Ami tries to prove from here - that one witness is
effective (because otherwise, why would she require a Get)? And it must be
speaking when each man has the support of one witness and not two, because
if they had two witnesses, how would she be able to claim that they were her
slaves and the goods were hers (see Rashash)?
(a) We refute the current interpretation of the Beraisa however - on the
grounds that, if they each had only one witness, it would be a case of 'Eid
Echad be'Hakchasahah' (a clash of two contradictory witnesses) in which case
we disregard both of their testimonies (what's more, even if the woman alone
were to contradict one witness, his testimony would be acceptable only to
make her swear, and that is no applicable here).
(b) We conclude - that in fact, the woman is free to marry anyway (even if
each man were to have one witness). She requires a Get from each man
however, in order to claim her Kesuvah from the goods.
(c) And the Tana is coming to corroborate the opinion of Rebbi Meir, who
holds in Kesuvos that Metaltelin are Meshubad towards a woman's Kesuvah
(whereas according to the Chachamim, she may only claim Karka).
(d) The rest of the goods are placed in custody until Eliyahu comes?
(a) Rav Kahana (the contemporary of Rav Ashi) holds 'Ein Chosheshin
le'Kidushav', because he learns the 'Gezeirah-Shavah "Davar" "Davar" from
Mamon; Rav Papa, holds 'Chosheshin'. Rav Ashi asks on Rav Kahana that, if
that is the case, we ought to say that, just as (based on the Pasuk "Asher
Yomar Ki Hu Zeh") admission eliminates the need for witnesses ('Hoda'as
Ba'al-Din, ke'Me'ah Eidim Dami'), the same should apply by Kidushin, too.
(b) Rav Kahana refutes Rav Ashi's query however - on the grounds that
'Hoda'as Ba'al-Din' can only be effective when it does not cause a loss to
others, and this is not the case here, where both sets of relatives become
affected by their admission. Note that, in that case, there where there are
no close relatives, such as in the case of a Ger and a Giyores, one witness
ought to be believed.
(a) Mar Zutra and Rav Ada Saba divided the property of their father Rav Mari
bar Isar without witnesses. They came before Rav Ashi (not because they were
disputing the division - in fact, their mutual trust was absolute, but)
because they wanted to know whether the division was Halachically binding,
or whether it was considered no more than arbitrary.
(b) Rav Ashi replied 'Lo Ibru Sahadi Ela le'Shikra' (when it comes to money
matters, 'witnesses are only needed to counter whoever denies the
(a) Abaye rules that if one witness testifies that a person ate Cheilev
(be'Shogeg), and the accused remains silent, he is believed - to obligate
him to bring a Chatas.
1. He is believed - because his silence is considered to be admission
('Shesikah ke'Hoda'ah Damya', and it is as if he himself had volunteered the
(c) And he proves it from a Mishnah in K'riysus - where the Tana, in a case
where someone rejects the testimony of one witness who testifies that he ate
Cheilev, rules that he is believed.
2. We might otherwise have thought that he is not believed, due to the Pasuk
"O Hoda Eilav Chataso", from which we extrapolate 've'Lo she'Hodi'uhu
Acheirim' (meaning that he does not bring a Chatas when he is forced to
bring it through the testimony of two witnesses, whose claim he vehemently
(d) Abaye proves his ruling from there - by extrapolating that, had he
remained silent following the witness' testimony, he would have been
obligated to bring a Korban.
(a) Abaye rules that in a case where someone rejects the testimony of one
witness who testifies that his Tahoros became Tamei - he is believed.
(b) The ramifications of this ruling are - that he is permitted to eat his
Taharos be'Chezkas Taharah.
(c) And he proves it from a Mishnah in Taharos, where the Tana says - that
in a case where someone rejects the testimony of one witness who testifies
that his Taharos became Tamei - he is Tahor (see Maharsha and Rashash).