THOUGHTS ON THE DAILY DAF
brought to you by Kollel Iyun Hadaf of Har Nof
Rosh Kollel: Rav Mordecai Kornfeld
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MENACHOS 83 (3 Teves) - the Dafyomi material for today has been dedicated to
the memory of Hagaon Rav Yisroel Zev Gustman Ztz"L (author of "Kuntresei
Shiurim") and his wife, Rebbetzin Sarah Gustman (daughter of Hagaon Rav Meir
Bassin, a Dayan in Vilna) in honor of the Yahrzeit of the Rebbetzin.
Sponsored by a number of Rav Gustman's Talmidim (Y. Wachtel, M. Starr, S.
Ribner, M. Kornfeld).
1) THE "KEDUSHAH" OF THE UNBORN CALF OF A "KORBAN ASHAM"
OPINIONS: The Gemara discusses the Halachos that we learn from each word of
the verse, "This is the law regarding the Olah, the Minchah, the Chatas, the
Asham, the offerings on the days of the Milu'im, and the offering of the
Shelamim" (Vayikra 7:37). The Gemara says that from the word "Asham" in the
verse we learn that just as the unborn calf (see BARTENURA to Nidah 3:1) and
the placenta of an Asham have no Kedushah (since an Asham cannot have
offspring or a placenta, since it is always a male animal), so, too, the
unborn calf and placenta of other types of Korbanos have no Kedushah. The
Gemara explains that this opinion holds that the offspring of a Korban is
Kodesh only when it comes into existence -- that is, when it is born.
Moreover, this opinion maintains that we may learn a case that is possible
(the status of offspring of a female Korban) from a case that is not
possible (an Asham, which is male and therefore has no offspring).
The Gemara's conclusion is not clear. Does the unborn calf of a Korban have
no Kedushah at all?
(a) RASHI (Kesav Yad, and DH Mah Asham) explains that the unborn calf of a
Korban has no Kedushah whatsoever when it is in the animal's womb. This is
also the opinion of RABEINU GERSHOM.
(b) RASHI in Zevachim (98a, DH Mah Asham) explains that the Gemara is
excluding the Eimurin of the unborn animal from being brought to the
Mizbe'ach. Rashi's words imply that there is some element of Kedushah to the
flesh of the unborn calf.
TOSFOS in Zevachim (98a, DH Af Kol) questions Rashi's view from the Gemara
in Temurah (11a). The Gemara says that if one slaughters a Chatas and finds
a four-month-old fetal calf inside of it, the unborn calf may be eaten by
anyone, in any place, and without any time limit. The Gemara explicitly
states that the opinion that maintains that the offspring of a Korban is
Kadosh only when it comes into existence (at birth) agrees with this
Halachah. If the unborn animal had some Kedushah of a Chatas before it was
born, then it should not be permitted to eat it like an ordinary piece of
The TZON KODSHIM in Zevachim explains Rashi's view by pointing out that
there are two different cases of a pregnant Korban. The Gemara in Temurah
(25b) says that when the animal was pregnant before it was designated as a
Korban, the unborn animal inside of it also has the Kedushah of the Korban.
When the Gemara records a Machlokes regarding a pregnant Korban, it is
discussing a case in which the animal was designated as a Korban and
afterwards it became pregnant. In the latter case, Rashi in Zevachim (98a)
agrees that the fetus may be eaten as ordinary meat, as the Gemara in
Temurah (11a) states. Rashi learns that the verse of "Asham" is teaching
that even when the animal became pregnant *before* it was designated as a
Korban, and everyone agrees that it is treated as Kadosh in some way, the
Eimurin of the fetus may not be placed on the Mizbe'ach.
However, Tosfos questions his own reasoning. Why does the Gemara not derive
from an *Olah* that the fetus of a Korban has no Kedushah? Why does it
specifically derive this Halachah from an Asham? According to Rashi, the
answer to this question is that the Gemara prefers to derive this Halachah
from Asham to other Korbanos, since other Korbanos are similar to an Asham
in that their Eimurin are offered on the Mizbe'ach and some of the meat is
eaten. An Olah is different from all other Korbanos in that the entire
animal is burned on the Mizbe'ach. Therefore, the Gemara prefers to learn a
Halachah regarding the offering of other Korbanos from Asham, and not from
Olah. According to Tosfos, who says that the Gemara is teaching that the
unborn calf may be eaten as an ordinary piece of meat, the Gemara is
deriving a Halachah about Chulin (ordinary meat) and not a Halachah about
offering a Korban, and, consequently, there is no reason to learn this
Halachah from Asham more than from Olah. (See TAHARAS HA'KODESH who gives an
answer to this question according to Tosfos.) (Y. Montrose)
2) "SHTEI HALECHEM" BROUGHT FROM "YASHAN"
OPINIONS: The Mishnah says that all Menachos may be brought from either
grain of Eretz Yisrael or Chutz la'Aretz, and from either Chadash or Yashan
grain, except for the Korban ha'Omer and the Shtei ha'Lechem, which must be
brought only from grain of Eretz Yisrael and from Chadash. The Gemara infers
from the Mishnah that if the Korban ha'Omer and Shtei ha'Lechem were brought
from Yashan, then they are Pasul. The Gemara says that the Mishnah is
arguing with the Tana of a Beraisa who states that if the Omer and Shtei
ha'Lechem were brought from Yashan, they are still valid, even though the
Mitzvah to bring them from Chadash was not fulfilled.
Which opinion does the Halachah follow?
(a) The RAMBAM (Hilchos Temidin u'Musafin 8:2) writes that if the Shtei
ha'Lechem was not able to be brought from Chadash, then it could be brought
from Yashan, as the Beraisa says.
(b) The RA'AVAD comments that the Rambam's ruling is "the opposite"
("Halachah Zo b'Hefech"). What does the Ra'avad mean? The KESEF MISHNEH
explains that the Ra'avad's intention is to say that the Rambam should not
have ruled like the Beraisa when the Mishnah argues with the Beraisa. The
Ra'avad obviously maintains that the Halachah is like the Mishnah.
Why, though, does the Rambam rule like the Beraisa?
1. The Kesef Mishneh explains that the Rambam inferred from the fact that
the Gemara explains only the opinion of the Beraisa (and does not bother to
explain the opinion of the Mishnah) that the Gemara maintains that the
primary opinion is that of the Beraisa.
2. Alternatively, the Kesef Mishneh explains that the Rambam has a different
understanding of the argument between the Mishnah and the Beraisa. The
Mishnah maintains that only *l'Chatchilah* one should not bring the Omer and
Shtei ha'Lechem from Yashan. If one brought those Menachos from Yashan (or
if Yashan is the only type of grain available), then, b'Di'eved, they are
valid. The Beraisa maintains that there is a difference between the Omer and
Shtei ha'Lechem (and thus it does not group the two together). The Beraisa
first states that a Korban ha'Omer that is brought from Yashan is valid
b'Di'eved, like the opinion of the Mishnah. However, it then states that
when the Shtei ha'Lechem is brought from Yashan, it is valid, and one merely
does not fulfill the Mitzvah to bring it from Chadash. This means that
l'Chatchilah one may bring the Shtei ha'Lechem from Yashan, and there is
merely a special Mitzvah Min ha'Muvchar, the most preferred way of
performing the Mitzvah, to bring it from Chadash. The argument between the
Mishnah and the Beraisa is whether bringing the Shtei ha'Lechem from Chadash
is l'Chatchilah, as the Mishnah maintains, or whether it is only a Mitzvah
Min ha'Muvchar, as the Beraisa maintains. Accordingly, the Rambam is ruling
in accordance with the Mishnah. (It should be noted that RASHI Kesav Yad (DH
Afilu Min ha'Aliyah) and TOSFOS (DH Masnisin) explicitly argue with this
explanation of the Mishnah. They maintain that, according to the Mishnah,
Yashan is *not* valid even b'Di'eved.)
The KEREN ORAH has difficulty with the explanation of the Kesef Mishneh. If
the Rambam rules, like the Mishnah, that both the Omer and Shtei ha'Lechem
may be brought, b'Di'eved, from Yashan, then why does he write this Halachah
only with regard to the Shtei ha'Lechem and not with regard to the Omer?
The MAHARI KURKAS, who gives a similar explanation to that of the Kesef
Mishneh (but differs when he explains that the Beraisa holds that both the
Omer and Shtei ha'Lechem may be brought l'Chatchilah from Chadash, and it
does not differentiate between the two), answers this question. He explains
that because the verse says, "Minchah Chadashah" -- "a new Minchah" (Vayikra
23:16) regarding the Shtei ha'Lechem, we might have thought that there is
greater reason to say that "Chadash" ("Minchah *Chadashah*") is required for
the Shtei ha'Lechem. When the Rambam rules that the Shtei ha'Lechem is valid
b'Di'eved when brought from Yashan, it is obvious that the Korban ha'Omer --
for which the verse does not explicitly say "Chadash" -- is also valid when
brought from Yashan. (See Mahari Kurkas for a second answer.)
3. The MA'ASEH ROKE'ACH explains that there are actually three different
opinions. The Mishnah maintains that both the Omer and Shtei ha'Lechem are
Pasul even b'Di'eved. The Beraisa maintains that both are valid b'Di'eved.
The Gemara then cites a third Beraisa that quotes Rebbi Nasan and Rebbi
Akiva who maintain that Shtei ha'Lechem brought from Yashan is valid. Since
the two Beraisos maintain that Shtei ha'Lechem brought from Yashan is valid
b'Di'eved, the Rambam rules this way, against the Tana of our Mishnah.
However, we do not find two opinions that maintain that the *Omer* is valid
b'Di'eved when brought from Yashan, and, therefore, the Rambam rules only
that the Shtei ha'Lechem is valid b'Di'eved, but not the Omer.
A similar explanation is proposed by the Keren Orah. (See also Keren Orah
and YAD BINYAMIN regarding possible reasons for why the Shtei ha'Lechem, but
not the Omer, may be brought b'Di'eved from Yashan.) (Y. Montrose)