ANSWERS TO REVIEW QUESTIONS
prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem
Previous daf Nedarim 29
(a) Rav Hamnuna questions Ula, who holds 'Kedushah Pak'ah Bichdi'. He asks
whether if a man betroths a woman for today but not for tomorrow - the
Kidushin will also fall away automatically tomorrow (when in reality, we all
know that it will not)?
(b) According to those who interpret 'Korban' in our Mishnah as Konem,
Rabeinu Yonah reconciles Rav Hamnuna's Kashya with the Mishnah in ha'Noder
min ha'Yerek 'she'At Nehenis Li Ad ha'Pesach Im Teilchi le'Veis Avich Ad
ha'Chag ... ' where it is clear that Konamos do fall away automatically - by
restricting the latter to a Konem P'rati, but not to a Konem K'lali, which
has the Din of Hekdesh (according to Rebbi Meir, as we explained earlier).
(c) Rava answers Rav Hamnuna's Kashya on Ula by differentiating between the
case in our Mishnah, which is Kedushas Damim (and which can fall away
automatically) - and Kidushei Ishah, which is Kedushas ha'Guf (and cannot).
(a) The Tana of the Beraisa says that in a case where someone declares an ox
to be an Olah for thirty days and then a Shelamim - the animal is indeed an
Olah for thirty days, and then it becomes a Shelamim.
(b) Abaye, drawing from this Beraisa - proves that even Kedushas ha'Guf can
fall away automatically, querying Rava's previous answer (and certainly Rav
(c) This does not mean however that if a man betroths a woman for today but
not for tomorrow, the Kidushin will fall away automatically tomorrow -
because, unlike Hekdesh, which has a branch called Kedushas Damim (which can
certainly fall away), there is no Kedushas Damim by Kidushei Ishah, and even
Abaye agrees that it cannot fall away.
(d) The Rashba proves this - from Rav Hamnuna's Kashya 'u'Mah Ilu Amar
le'Ishah ha'Yom At Ishti ... ', clearly taking it for granted that the
Kidushin will not fall away according to anybody.
(a) Rava repudiates Abaye's Kashya - by establishing the Beraisa of Olah and
Shelamim, where the Noder said 'li'Demei' (turning it into Kedushas Damim).
(b) The Tana must then be speaking about a Ba'al Mum - because it is
forbidden to declare an unblemished animal (that is fit to go on the
Mizbei'ach) Kedushas Damim.
(c) Some say that this answer will only conform with Rava, who holds that
'Kedushas Damim Pak'ah Bichdi', but not with bar Pada. Others explain that
even bar Pada will explain the Beraisa by Kedushas Damim, and it speaks when
he actually redeemed the animal. The Chidush of the Beraisa is - that
otherwise, we might have thought that since, at the time he declared the
animal a Shelamim in thirty days time, it was not fit to become a Shelamim
(seeing as it was already an Olah - whose Kedushah does not fall away
automatically), it will not become a Shelamim even after he has redeemed it,
(d) The Kedushas Shelamim in fact, takes effect - because, seeing as the
Kedushas Olah can be redeemed, the Kedushas Shelamim takes effect, hovering
in the air as it were, waiting for the Kedushas Olah to be removed.
(a) The Seifa of the Beraisa, where he reversed the order (placing the
Kedushas Shelamim first and Kedushas Olah in thirty days time) - rules that
there too, the Kedushas Shelamim takes effect immediately, and the Kedushas
Olah after thirty days.
(b) Abaye then asks on Rava from the Seifa - because, according to him, why
is the Seifa needed at all? If in the Reisha, where he changed from a more
stringent Kedushah (an Olah which is Kodshei Kodshim) to a lesser one (a
Shelamim, which is only Kodshim Kalim), the second Kedushah nevertheless
takes effect, how much more so in the Seifa, where he changed from a lesser
Kedushah to a more stringent one.
(c) According to Abaye - we need the Seifa (which speaks in a case of
Kedushas Damim) to teach us that the Reisha speaks by Kedushah ha'Guf.
(a) Rav Papa explains the Seifa 'le'Achar Sheloshim Yom Olah, u'Me'achshav
Shelamim', according to bar Pada - as if it was two statements, 'Le'Achar
Sheloshim Yom Olah' (if he did not add 'u'Me'achshav Shelamim');
'u'Me'achshav Shelamim (ve'Lo Olah)'.
(b) The source for ...
1. ... the first Halachah 'Le'Achar Sheloshim Yom Olah' - is the case in
Kidushin of a man who betroths a woman now for after thirty days, where the
Kidushin is effective, even though the money has all been spent by then.
(c) We answer the Kashya on the first Limud (from Kidushin) 'Peshita' - that
even if he wants to retract from the Kedushas Olah before the thirty days
are up, he is unable to.
2. ... the second Halachah 'u'Me'achshav Shelamim (ve'Lo Olah)' is - 'Lo
Pak'ah Kedushah Bichdi'.
(a) In the case of Kidushin, the woman remains Mekudeshes even though, when
the thirty days expire, the money has all been spent, as we explained
earlier. Had the man betrothed the woman with a Sh'tar, and the Sh'tar tore
before the expiry-date - when would not be betrothed.
(b) We nevertheless ask 'Peshita', despite the fact that the Hekdesh took
place through mere words, which are no longer in existence at the end of the
thirty-day period (and therefore comparable to Kidushei Sh'tar) - because in
this regard we are already aware of the fact that Hekdesh is different
because of the principle 'Amiraso li'Gevo'ah ki'Mesiraso le'Hedyot' (a
declaration of words has the power of a Kinyan).
(c) We conclude that, even according to those who maintain that in the case
of Kidushin, the woman can retract during the thirty-day period, she will
not be able to do so in our case (of Hekdesh) - because the principle
'Amiraso li'Gevo'ah ki'Mesiraso le'Hedyot' is effective even in this regard
(a) The Tana switches cases in the Seifa, placing Shelamim before Olah - to
teach us that 'Lo Pak'ah Kedushah Bichdi' extends even to Kodshim Kalim.
(b) We can also learn from the sequence in the Seifa - that 'Lo Pak'ah
Kedushah Bichdi' applies, not only in a straight case of an Olah or a
Shelamim that one is Makdish for thirty days, but even if the current
Kedushah is a lesser one and there is a more stringent Kedushah waiting to
take effect (even though one may have thought that this is not considered
'Bichdi', but an extension of the initial Kedushah).
(c) We might even have gone so far as to say - that the Shelamim should not
take effect now, so as to leave room for the Olah to take effect in thirty
(d) And the Tana inverts the case, placing 'le'Achar Sheloshim Olah before
'u'me'Achshav Shelamim' - to teach us that, even then, the Shelamim takes
effect immediately, and the principle 'Lo Pak'ah Kedushah Bichdi' applies.
(a) The Noder cannot retract before the thirty day expiry-date, despite the
fact that he specified that the Hekdesh is to take place only in thirty days
time - because 'Amiraso li'Gevo'ah ki'Mesiraso le'Hedyot' does not just mean
that the Hekdesh takes place later, as per specification (as we believed
until now), but that it takes place from now as if he said 'Me'achshav'.
(b) This explanation has a practical application with regard to Tzedakah -
because now, someone who decicates a Sela to Tzedakah in thirty days time,
is not permitted to retract even before the thirty days have expired.
(c) According to the Rashba, the current Sugya goes only according to Bar
Pada, but not according to Abaye and Rava - in whose opinion 'Amiraso
li'Gevo'ah ki'Mesiraso le'Hedyot' means only from the specified date and not
Me'achshav (just as we leearned until now), in which cas, the Noder can
retract within the thirty days.
(d) The Rashba even suggests reconciling Rava with the Beraisa, even if the
Reisha and the Seifa speak about Kedushas Damim - because, even though the
Reisha constitutes a bigger Chidush than the Seifa, the Tana is making use
of the (not so popular) principle 'Zu, ve'Ein Tzarich Lomar Zu'.