ANSWERS TO REVIEW QUESTIONS
prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem
Previous daf Nedarim 47
NEDARIM 47 (4 Elul) - dedicated l'Iluy Nishmas Chaim Yissachar (ben Yaakov)
Smulewitz on his Yahrzeit, by his daughter and son in law Jeri & Eli Turkel
of Raanana, Israel.
(a) Avimi asked whether, if the owner of a house forbids his friend to have
Hana'ah from it, it will remain forbidden even after it is no longer his.
Assuming that he cannot - it is not because he did not say so. He would be
forbidden to benefit from it even if he said so specifically.
(b) This case is worse than someone who forbids his friend's property on
himself (despite the fact that, in both cases, the property is not his
own) - inasmuch as a person can forbid something that is not yet in the
world, just like he can forbid anyone's property on himself, but he cannot
forbid his own property that is not yet in the world on his friend, just
like he cannot forbid friend's property on his friend.
(c) Rava proves from a Mishnah in Bava Kama 'ha'Omer li'Veno, Konem she'I
Atah Neheneh Li ... be'Chayav u've'Moso, Lo Yirshenah', that his Neder is
indeed effective - Rava disagrees with the Sugya above (42b.) where we
differentiated between where the Noder specified 'be'Chayav u've'Moso' or
(d) The Halachah is like the previous Sugya which does make this
(a) 'Lo Yirshenu' in the Mishnah in Bava Kama means that he is forbidden to
benefit from the property, and must not be taken literally - because of the
Seifa, which continues 've'Yitein le'Banav O le'Echav ... ', which only
makes sense if he actually inherited the property.
(b) We have no problem with the Tana there, who says 'Lovin, u'Ba'alei Chov
Ba'in ve'Nifra'in Mimenu', because it speaks when they take it of their own
accord, in which case it is a case of 'Mavri'ach Ari', which is permitted.
(c) 'Nosnan le'Vanav O le'Echav' cannot be taken literally. In fact - all
the son does is to point out to them that his father declared the property
forbidden to him, that he doesn't know what to do with it, and that they are
welcome to help themselves to it.
(d) When telling them this, he is obligated to add - that the property
concerned was the property of his father.
(a) The Mishnah will later say that in a case where someone says 'Konem
Peiros ha'Eilu Alai, Konem Hein al Pi, Konem Hein le'Fi' - Asur
(b) Rami bar Chama asks 'Konem Peiros ha'Eilu *Al P'loni* Mahu
be'Chilufeihen' - whether the above applies exclusively to where the Noder
forbids the fruit on *himself* (even though the Chilufin and the Gidulin are
not yet in the world), seeing as he could also have forbidden somebody
else's fruit on himself, but not when he forbids his fruit on someone else,
since he could not have forbidden somebody else's fruit on him; or whether
there is not difference.
(c) Assuming that the Chalipin are permitted - that will certainly not mean
that the Mudar is permitted to exchange or sell the fruit Lechatchilah,
seeing as it Asur be'Hana'ah, only that if he did sell it (Bedieved), the
proceeds are permitted.
(d) The She'eilah is by no means confined to Konamos - but extends to all
Isurei Hana'ah, as we shall see at the end of the Sugya.
(a) The difference between Avodah-Zarah and Shevi'is and all other Isurei
Hana'ah as regards Chalipin is - that the former retain their status, even
after they have been exchanged for something else, whereas in the case of
the latter, the Isur is trasferred to the second article, and the original
(b) In spite of this - we ask whether they will remain forbidden to the one
who made the exchange (only), because of a Rabbinical decree.
(c) The basis of the She'eilah is - whether the reason for the Mishnah
'Konem Peiros ha'Eilu Alai, Konem Hein al Pi, Kinem Hein le'Fi, Asur
be'Chilufeihen ve'Giduleihen' is because the Noder forbade the fruit on
himself (in which case the ability to do so is restricted to himself, as we
explained earlier), or whether it is due to a Rabbinical decree, in which
case it cuts across the board.
(d) Rami bar Chama confined his She'eilah specifically with regard to the
Mudar, and not with regard to the Noder himself (in which case the She'eilah
would be whether the 'Chalipin will be Asur even if someone else made the
exchange [e.g. if Re'uven forbade Shimon's fruit on himself, and Shimon
exchanged the fruit]) - because he considers it obvious that as far as the
Noder is concerned, it is obvious that the Chalipin will be Asur, seeing as
he said 'Peiros *Eilu*', rendering them like Hekdesh.
(a) Although the above She'eilah concerns where the Noder forbade the fruit
on the Mudar, its source already lies in our Mishnah 'Konem Peiros ha'Eilu
Alai, Konem Hein al Pi, Kinem Hein le'Fi Asur ... u've'Giduleihen' (which
concerns only the Noder himself) - inasmuch as we can ask whether 'Eilu' is
specific (meaning that his having said 'Eilu' indicates that he intended to
include the Gidulin and the Chalipin), or whether it is not necessary
(because it does not depend on his intention, but on the Takanah of Chazal,
who forbade them anyway.
(b) The Tana could have asked the same She'eilah with regard to the Noder
himself when he did not say 'Eilu' (which is the same She'eilah as the case
as the Mudar using it, when the Noder said 'Eilu' - only the Tana preferred
to ask the She'eilah when he said 'Eilu' and with regard to the Mudar.
(a) The Mishnah in Kidushin, which states that if someone forbids his wife
Hana'ah with a Konem, 'Lovah u'Ba'alei Chov Ba'in ve'Nifra'in' - must be
speaking when he declared the Neder whilst they were still betrothed
(because after the marriage, when he is Meshubad to her, his Neder would not
(b) The author of this Mishnah could be Chanan - because even though he said
in Kesuvos that someone who sustains his friend's wife in his absence
'Hini'ach Ma'osav al Keren ha'Tz'vi' (and he cannot reclaim his expenses) -
that is only if he provided for her in the form of Mezonos (as a stand-in
for her husband), but not in the current case, where he did so in the form
of a loan.
(a) We attempt to resolve Rami bar Chama's She'eilah from the Mishnah in
Kidushin - inasmuch as she has benefited from the Chalipin of her husband's
property, which remains Meshubad to her (even though she is forbidden to
benefit from it).
(b) According to some, the proof is from the fact that she is permitted to
borrow on the basis of the creditors subsequent claiming from her husband
(because there is no prohibition on the part of the creditors). We prefer to
explain however - that the proof is from the fact that Chazal permitted the
creditors to claim from her husband's property (seeing as they are claiming
*her* debt, thereby causing her to sin).
(c) Initially, it seems, we could have brought the same proof from the Seifa
of our Mishnah, which states (in the case of a father who was Madir his son
Hana'ah from his property) 'Loveh u'Ba'alei Chov Ba'in ve'Nifra'in'. We
nevertheless found it necessary to bring the proof from the Mishnah in
Kidushin - because the proof there is from the case of a woman, who cannot
acquire property independent of her husband, which is closer to being a case
of exchanging with her husband's property; whereas in the case of the son,
who is able to acquire property of his own, it appears less like exchanging
with his father's property.
(d) Rava refutes the proof because, he says 'Dilma Lechatchilah Hu de'Lo,
ve'I Avid, Avid' - meaning that this can be compared to a case of Bedieved,
because when the woman borrowed the money or the food, it was not directly
in exchange for her husband's property, seeing as he did not yet receive
anything in exchange. It is only later that he claims payment from the
husband, making it a case of Bedieved.
(a) The Mishnah in Kidushin states 'ha'Mekadesh be'Orlah, Einah Mekudeshes'.
The Tana go on to say however - that if he sold the Orlah and betrothed a
woman with the proceeds, the betrothal is valid.
(b) We attempt to prove from there that one is permitted to benefit from
Chalipei Isurei Hana'ah even Lechatchilah - because otherwise, it ought not
to be valid Bedi'eved either, and a second betrothal should be required (to
turn the Safek Kidushin into a Vaday).
(c) We refute this proof too - on the same grounds as the previous one; that
the Hana'ah is Asur Lechatchilah, but Mutar Bedieved (though this is
unclear, because the initial She'eilah was only with regard to Bedieved, as
we explained above).
(d) The Rambam rules le'Chumra in the case of the Mudar or the Noder himself
who did not say 'Peiros Eilu' (like we usually do by Safek Isur). There
might well be good reason to rule leniently here however - on the basis of
what we learned earlier that the Isur 'Chilufeihen (ke'Giduleihen') here is
only mi'de'Rabbanan, and we have a principle 'S'feika de'Rabbanan Lekula'.