THOUGHTS ON THE DAILY DAF
brought to you by Kollel Iyun Hadaf of Har Nof
Rosh Kollel: Rav Mordecai Kornfeld
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1) PUTTING THE "MULIM" BEFORE THE "ARELIM"
QUESTION: The Beraisa quotes the opinion of Acherim who say that if one
slaughters the Korban Pesach for Mulim (circumcised people) and Arelim
(uncircumcised people), it makes a difference which one he says first. If he
says "for Mulim" first, then it is Kosher. If he says "for Arelim" first,
then it is Pasul.
2) "PIV V'LIBO SHAVIN"
The Gemara gives three different ways to explain this Beraisa. Why does the
Gemara not suggest a simpler explanation: Acherim of the Beraisa is Rebbi
Meir (as the Gemara eventually concludes), and Rebbi Meir is the one who
always holds that we follow the first part of a person's statement ("Tefos
ANSWER: TOSFOS (DH Leima) explains that "Tefos Lashon Rishon" does not apply
here, because the two statements of "for Mulim" and "for Arelim" are not
mutually exclusive. It is possible for one to slaughter the Korban for a
number of people, some of whom are Mulim and some of whom are Arelim.
Therefore, even according to Rebbi Meir, the principle of "Tefos Lashon
Rishon" cannot be applied in this case.
This differs from a case where one make a Korban into a Temurah by stating
that half of it would be a Temuras Olah and half of it would be a Temuras
Shelamim, in which case Rebbi Meir does apply the principle of "Tefos Lashon
Rishon." In that case, the two statements do contradict each other, since as
a result of his first statement, the first half of the animal becomes an
Olah, and consequently the Kedushas Olah *spreads throughout* the entire
animal, leaving no room for any of it to become a Shelamim. It is as if
one's first statement was that the *whole* animal should be an Olah. In our
case, though, just because he thought that some Arelim will eat from the
Korban does not mean that the Korban becomes exclusively designated only for
the consumption of Arelim! Certainly, Mulim are still able to eat from it if
he had them in mind. Therefore, "Tefos Lashon Rishon" does not apply.
However, this answer does not seem to suffice to explain RASHI. Rashi says
that if a person slaughters a Korban having in mind to eat one k'Zayis after
of its allotted time (Chutz li'Zemano), and another k'Zayis outside of its
proper place (Chutz li'Mekomo), then "Tefos Lashon Rishon" applies and the
Korban is a Pigul. We see that according to Rashi, even when the two
Machshavos do not contradict each other, "Tefos Lashon Rishon" applies!
Apparently Rashi holds that even in a case where the Avodah was done with
Machshavah to eat one k'Zayis outside of its proper time, we say that the
first Machshavah "spreads throughout" the entire Avodah, and it is as if the
entire Avodah was done with Machshavah of Chutz li'Zemano. This is not the
case when one has Machshavah for Mulim and for Arelim, since many people can
eat from a single Korban, as mentioned above. In the case of the Beraisa of
our Gemara, there is no contradiction at all between the two Machshavos, so
"Tefos Lashon Rishon" cannot be applied.
QUESTION: Rabah, in explaining the Beraisa of Acherim (see previous
Insight), says that if a person has in mind to slaughter the Korban Pesach
for Mulim and for Arelim but he only manages to say "for Arelim" before the
Shechitah is completed, the Korban is Pasul, because Rebbi Meir holds that
one's speech does not have to be consistent with one's thoughts ("Lo Ba'inan
Piv v'Libo Shavin"). We follow one's words ("for Arelim"), even though he
was thinking something else ("for Arelim *and* for Mulim").
The Gemara quotes a Mishnah from Terumos (3:8) to disprove Rabah's assertion
that Rebbi Meir does not require "Piv v'Livo Shavin." The Mishnah states
that if a person wants to separate fruit as Terumah and he inadvertently
says that the fruit is Ma'aser, it is not going to be Terumah ("Lo Amar
Klum"), because his speech and his thoughts are not consistent. We see from
there that Rebbi Meir requires one's speech and thoughts to be consistent.
This Gemara poses a number of problems. When a person slaughters a Korban
for Arelim, the Gemara says that it is Pasul due to the Machshavah, the
thoughts, of the Shochet (see 60a, *Mechashvin* m'Avodah l'Avodah, and 61b,
*Machsheves* Ochlin and *Machsheves* Arelim b'Zerikah; even the Pasuk says
of Pigul "Lo Yechashev," Vayikra 7:18). If so, what difference does it make
if one said "for Arelim?" The status of the Korban depends only on one's
thoughts, regardless of what he expressed verbally! How does his speech
affect the Korban, if his thoughts were proper?
Similarly, with regard to Terumah we know that Terumah can be separated by
Machshavah alone (Gitin 31a, Shavuos 26b). If so, when a person intends in
his mind to say "these fruits are Terumah" and he accidentally says that
they are Ma'aser, we should disregard his speech and the fruits should be
Terumah! Why does the Mishnah in Terumos say that he has not said anything?
(a) The RASH (Terumos 3:8) and TOSFOS (Erchin 5a, DH Adam, in his second
answer) explain that Machshavah only works to make something Terumah when it
is not contradicted by a person's speech. If one's speech contradicts what
he has in his mind, then it overrides the Machshavah and the Machshavah is
This explains the case of Arelim, where his speech at the time of the
Shechitah was only for Arelim. Even though his Machshavah was different (for
Arelim and for Mulim), his speech during the Shechitah, which contradicted
his thoughts, overrides it.
This also explains the case when he thought to separate Terumah but instead
said Ma'aser. His speech contradicts and overrides his thoughts. (The KEREN
ORAH, Nedarim 2a, also gives this answer.)
(b) The Gemara in Shavuos (26b) explains that even things that can be done
through Machshavah will only work if a person intends for them to take
effect through Machshavah. But if he decides that he is going to speak them
out, then they do not take effect through Machshavah. The SHACH (YD 258)
understands this to mean that when a person decides that he is going to
verbally express what he intends, he does not want his thoughts to take
effect until the time at which he says it aloud. If so, in our Sugya, since
he wants to speak out "for Arelim and for Mulim," or "these fruits are
Terumah," his intention is that his thoughts *not* take effect until he
speaks it out. (TUREI EVEN, in Avnei Shoham to Chagigah 10a). Again, this
answers both of our questions at once.
(c) TOSFOS (Erchin 5a, DH Adam, in his first answer) explains that his
Machshavah *does* take effect here and the fruits do become Terumah. When
the Mishnah in Terumos says "Lo Amar Klum" ("he did not say anything"), it
means that his *speech* (that the fruits should be Ma'aser) was worthless,
but his Machshavah (that the fruits should be Terumah) still works!
However, that only answers the case of Terumah. What about the case of "for
Arelim and for Mulim?" If one's Machshavah works even when he has a
conflicting speech, then the Korban was slaughtered for both Arelim and
Mulim and therefore it should be Kosher! Why, then, is it Pasul?
Tosfos in our Sugya answers this question by positing that whenever the
Mishnah or Gemara says that one invalidates a Korban through Machshavah, it
means through Dibur. That is, there is no such thing as pure thought being
able to invalidate a Korban. Therefore, one's Machshavah here is worthless,
because Machshavah never works alone to make a Korban Pasul. Since all he
*said* was "for Arelim," the Korban is Pasul.
(d) RASHI (Gitin 31a and many other places in the Gemara) is consistent in
explaining that when the Gemara says that Terumah can be separated through
Machshavah, it means that Terumah can be separated without a *physical
action*, and that speech alone is sufficient. It does not mean that
*thought* alone can make fruits into Terumah (see also Rashi, Shavuos 26b,
DH Terumah; Tosfos Gitin 31a, DH v'Nechshav).
If so, since one must speak out that he is making fruit Terumah, and he
accidentally said Ma'aser, the Terumah is certainly not valid.
However the other question from our Gemara remains. Why do we not follow his
Machshavah that he intends the Korban to be for Mulim as well as for Arelim?
Rashi here (DH v'Hacha) explains, like Tosfos, that with regard to Kodshim a
Machshavah alone cannot invalidate a Korban.
Another question remains, though. The Mishnah in Terumos also says that if a
person intends to say l'Olah and he says l'Shelamim, he has not said
anything. That seems to be discussing Kodshim, which even Rashi (Shavuos
26b) agrees can be made Kodesh through Machshavah alone! Perhaps Rashi
understood that the Mishnah there is talking about making a *Temurah* of an
Olah or Shelamim, which can only be done through speech. (M. Kornfeld)
3) "HASRA'AS SAFEK" WHEN THE WITNESSES ARE IN DOUBT BUT THE TRANSGRESSOR IS
QUESTION: The Gemara suggests that the argument between Reish Lakish and
Rebbi Yochanan, concerning whether one is Chayav for slaughtering the Korban
Pesach when he has Chametz in his home and not nearby in the Azarah, is
based on whether Hasra'as Safek is considered a valid Hasra'ah or not.
RASHI (DH b'Hasra'as Safek) explains that if witnesses do not know whether
the person slaughtering the Korban Pesach has Chametz in his home or not,
then their Hasra'ah is only a Hasra'as Safek, and even if he does have
Chametz in his home, he does not get Malkus since we do not know about it.
What difference does it make that the witnesses do not know about the
Chametz? As long as the *person being warned* knows that he has Chametz and
he still transgresses even after receiving the warning, he cannot be called
"Shogeg." He has willfully committed a sin and he should get Malkus!
ANSWER: TOSFOS (DH Hasra'as Safek) explains that Rashi does not mean to say
that if the witnesses do not know, then it is a Hasra'as Safek and his
transgression is considered inadvertent. Rather, Rashi means that since the
person slaughtering the Pesach can say that he does not know whether he has
Chametz in his home, if the witnesses also do not know, then he cannot be
held accountable since he can always claim that he did not know at the time
of the Isur that he actually had Chametz in his home. But if the witnesses
know for sure that he has Chametz, when they tell him that he has Chametz in
his home and he slaughters the Korban anyhow, his act is a deliberate,
intentional sin, for which he will get Malkus. (Rav Mordechai Rabin points
out that the RITVA in Shavous (37a) gives a similar explanation for Rashi