ANSWERS TO REVIEW QUESTIONS
prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem
Previous dafPesachim 22
(a) We are not afraid that a Jew who sees his fellow-Jew sending a gentile a
thigh with the sciatic-nerve still attached, will assume that the sender
will have removed the sciatic nerve, will purchase the thigh from the
gentile, and eat it, sciatic nerve and all - because the location of the
sciatic-nerve is clearly visible, so that he will know ar once whether the
sciatic-nerve has been removed or not.
(b) Rebbi Avahu learns that when the Torah permits benefiting from Neveilah,
it includes the Chelev and the sciatic-nerve.
(c) This answer is not valid according to those who hold 'Ein be'Gidin
be'Nosen Ta'am' - because in their opinion, Gid ha'Nasheh has no taste and
can therefore not be labelled 'Neveilah'. In that case, it would not be
permitted together with Neveilah.
(d) The Tana who holds 'Ein be'Gidin be'Nosen Ta'am' - is Rebbi Shimon, and
Rebbi Shimon does indeed forbids deriving benefit from Gid ha'Nasheh.
(a) According to Rebbi Yehudah, someone who eats the sciatic nerve of a non-
Kasher animal receives *two* sets of Malkos - one for eating Neveilah
(because he holds 'Yesh be'Gidin be'Nosen Ta'am') and the other for eating
(b) Rebbi Shimon exempts him from Malkos altogether, even for eating Gid
ha'Nasheh - because one is only Chayav for eating the Gid ha'Nasheh of an
animal whose flesh is permitted, but not of one that is forbidden.
(a) The Mishnah in Avodah-Zarah permits the excess blood of the Sin-offering
to be sold to gardeners as fertilizer, indicating that, on principle, blood
is Mutar be'Hana'ah (in spite of the Pasuk "Kol Nefesh Mikem Lo Sochlu Dam")
- because blood is compared to water ("Al ha'Aretz Tishpechenu ka'Mayim"),
which is permitted.
(b) we know that, when the Torah writes in Re'ei "Al ha'Aretz Tishpechenu
ka'Mayim", it is comparing blood to regular water (from which one *may*
derive benefit) and not to the water of *Nisuch ha'Mayim* (on Succos - from
which one may *not*) - because it uses a Lashon of Shefichah, and not of
(c) We also know that it is not comparing blood to water that was poured out
to Avodah-Zarah - since that too, is referred to as *Nisuch* (and not
(d) According to Chizkiyah (in whose opinion "Lo Sochlu" does not imply Isur
Hana'ah), the Torah needs to compare blood to water - to teach us the Din of
Rebbi Chiya bar Aba Amar Rebbi Yochanan, who says that the blood of Kodshim
is not Machshir (because it is not poured out - but is needed for
sprinkling), as we explained earlier 16a.
(a) One may not give a piece of Ever min ha'Chai to a gentile - because,
seeing as he, like a Jew, is forbidden to eat it, one would transgress
'Lifnei Iver Lo Siten Michshol'.
(b) We know that Ever min ha'Chai is Mutar be'Hana'ah - from the fact that
Rebbi Nasan forbids giving it to a gentile, implying that one may give it to
one's dog - which is also considered Hana'ah.
(c) Eiver min ha'Chai is not Asur be'Hana'ah, according to Rebbi Avahu, in
spite of the Pasuk "ve'Lo Sochal ha'Nefesh Im ha'Basar" - because the Torah
elsewhere compares it to blood, which is Mutar be'Hana'ah.
(d) Chizkiyah argues that it is not *Ever min ha'Chai* which is being
compared to *blood* (in the way that Rebbi Avahu explains), but *blood* that
is being compared to *Ever min ha'Chai* - to teach us that Dam min ha'Chai,
like Eiver min ha'Chai, is Asur. This refers to the blood of blood-letting
(some of which is life-blood).
(a) We learn from the Pasuk ...
1. ... "ve'Lo Ye'achel es Besaro" - that if one *Shechted* an ox which was
due to be *stoned*, its flesh may nevertheless not be eaten.
(b) According to both Rebbi Avahu and Chizkiyah, seeing as the Torah writes
"Lo Ye'achel", why is it necessary to write "u'Ba'al ha'Shor Naki" to teach
us the Isur Hana'ah?
2. ... "u'Ba'al ha'Shor Naki" - that it is also Asur be'Hana'ah.
(c) They answer that "u'Ba'al ha'Shor Naki" - comes to teach us not that the
*flesh* is Asur be'Hana'ah, but that the *skin* is.
(d) If not for this Pasuk, we would have permitted deriving benefit from the
skin of a Shor ha'Niskal - since the Torah wrote "ve'Lo Ye'achel es
*Besaro*", implying that the *skin* is permitted.
(a) Those Tana'im who learn something else from "u'Ba'al ha'Shor Naki" (i.e.
either that if the goring ox is a Tam, the owner is not obligated to pay
half of the Kofer; or that if an ox gores a pregnant woman, and she loses
the fetus, the owner of the ox is not obligated to pay), learn the
prohibition of deriving benefit from the skin of an ox that has to be
stoned, from "*es* Besaro"- 'es ha'tofel li'Besaro' (to include the skin).
Rebbi Akiva explains "*es* Hashem Elokecha Tira" - to include Talmidei-
Chachamim, whom one is obligated to fear just as one fears Hashem.
(b) The previous Tana does not Darshen "*es* Besaro" - because he follows
the opinion of Shimon ha'Amsuni, who desisted from Darshening every 'Es' in
(c) Initially, Shimon ha'Amsuni began Darshening the 'Eses', until he
arrived at the Pasuk in Eikev "es Hashem Elokecha Tira", because in his
opinion, there is no-one whom one can be obligated to fear (i.e. stand in
awe) in the same way as one fears Hashem.
(d) Shimon Ha'amsuni argued that, just as initially (when he was convinced
that that was the right thing to do), he received reward for all the
Derashos that he made, so too, would he now receive for having desisted.
(a) We learn from "va'Araltem Orlaso ... *Arelim*" - that one is forbidden
to derive any benefit from Orlah.
(b) Otherwise, in spite of the Pasuk "Lo Ye'achel" - we would have permitted
the deriving of benefit from Orlah, because the Torah writes "Lachem".
(c) The Torah writes "Lachem" by Orlah - either to incorporate a public tree
(which is planted in the public-domain - see Tosfos DH 'Natua') in the Din
of Orlah (according to the Tana Kama of the Beraisa), or to preclude it
(according to Rebbi Yehudah).
(d) The Tana Kama understands that "u'Neta'tem" implies each individual;
consequently, "Lachem" comes to *in*clude a public tree. Whereas according
to Rebbi Yehudah, "u'Neta'tem" implies even public trees, in which case
"Lachem", which also comes to include public trees, is an inclusion after an
inclusion, which, according to Chazal, comes to *ex*clude.