POINT BY POINT SUMMARY
Prepared by Rabbi P. Feldman
of Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Yerushalayim
Rosh Kollel: Rabbi Mordecai Kornfeld
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Previous daf Sanhedrin 61
SANHEDRIN 61 (6 Kislev) - Dedicated in honor of the Yahrzeit of Eliezer ben
Reb Shraga Feivel Marmorstein by his nephew, whom he raised like his own
child after the war, Mr. David Kornfeld.
1) PLANNING FOR ONE "AVODAH" WHILE PERFORMING ANOTHER
(a) Question (Rava bar Rav Chanan): Why don't we say that
Hishtachava'ah teaches the general rule (that one is
liable for showing honor to idolatry, even if it is not
2) LIABILITY FOR SERVING IDOLS WITH OTHER "AVODOS"
1. "Zove'ach...." would teach that intent is projected
from one Avodah to another (if a person did an
Avodah in order to (later) pour the blood or burn
the Chelev to idolatry, we consider the first Avodah
itself to be for the sake of idolatry).
(b) We understand according to R. Yochanan - we learn
projection of intent from Pigul, "Zove'ach..." is needed
to teach projection of intent, it must teach the general
rule, not Hishtachava'ah;
i. (R. Yochanan): If a person slaughtered an
animal in order to pour the blood or burn the
Chelev to idolatry, the animal is forbidden;
ii. (Reish Lakish): It is permitted.
(c) Question: But according to Reish Lakish, we need
"Zove'ach..." to teach projection of intent!
1. Question (Rav Papa): R. Yochanan also needs a verse
to teach projection of intent!
(d) Answer (Rav Acha brei d'Rav Ika): Reish Lakish only
permitted the animal, he holds that the person is liable
(even without "Zove'ach");
i. He only forbade the animal, he did not say that
the person (who slaughtered) is liable;
ii. Perhaps the verse comes to obligate the person!
1. This is like one who bows to a mountain - the
mountain is permitted, he is killed.
(a) Question (Rav Acha mi'Difti): Rava bar Rav Chanan
suggested that Hishtachava'ah should teach that one is
liable even for Avodah that is not Avodas Penim - if so,
what would "Eichah Ya'avdu...Es Eloheihem" come to
exclude? (In truth, "Eichah Ya'avdu" is our source to
exempt Avodah that is not Avodas Penim (unless it is the
normal Avodah of the idolatry).)
1. Suggestion: Perhaps it excludes excreting in front
of an idolatry whose normal Avodah is Zevichah.
(b) Answer (Abaye): It would exclude excreting in front of
2. Rejection: Hishtachava'ah is honorable, we would
only learn such Avodah (there is no need to exclude
Avodah of disgrace)!
1. One might have thought, since the normal Avodah of
Markulis is disgraceful, one is liable for any
disgraceful Avodah - the verse would teach, this is
(c) Question: R. Elazar taught, if one slaughters an animal
to Markulis, he is liable (even though its normal Avodah
is disgraceful) - "V'Lo Yizbechu Od...la'Se'irim".
1. We do not need it to teach about its normal Avodah,
which we learn from "Eichah Ya'avdu...", therefore,
it teaches about something other than its normal
(d) Answer: Hishtachava'ah teaches about when he seeks to
please the idolatry, "V'Lo Yizbechu Od" forbids Avodah
even to anger the idolatry.
2. Summation of question: Hishtachava'ah already
teaches about honorable Avodah that is not its
(e) Contradiction (Rav Hamnuna): Our Mishnah teaches 'One who
*serves* idolatry (is Chayav Misah)' - he is not liable
for just *saying* that he will serve;
1. A later Mishnah teaches 'One who *says* 'I will
serve idolatry', or 'Let us go serve idolatry' is
(f) Answer #1 (Rabah): Our Mishnah is when he does not accept
it to be his god until he serves it.
(g) Answer #2 (Rav Yosef): The Tana'im of these Mishnayos
argue with each other.
1. (Beraisa - R. Meir): If one says 'Come and worship
me', he is liable;
(h) Retraction (Rav Yosef): I erred - R. Yehudah admits that
he is liable for speaking.
2. R. Yehudah exempts.
3. (One opinion in Tosfos explains that the enticer is
always liable, the discussion is when the enticee is
liable. The other opinion explains that the enticer
is liable only when the enticee is liable.)
i. All agree that he is liable if he served him -
"Lo Sa'aseh Lecha Pesel";
ii. They argue about whether or not he is liable
just for speaking - R. Meir obligates, he says
that speech is significant; R. Yehudah exempts,
he says that it is insignificant.
1. (Beraisa - R. Yehudah): He is not liable (for
enticing) until he says 'I will serve', or 'I will
go and serve idolatry', or 'Let us go and serve'.
2. Question: What do R. Meir and R. Yehudah argue
3. Answer: They argue whether or not enticing to serve
oneself is enticement, when others agree to serve
i. R. Meir says that others agree to serve him,
they sincerely agree.
ii. R. Yehudah says that they do not intend to
serve him - they reason, 'He is just a person,
3) SERVING IDOLS OUT OF LOVE OR FEAR
(i) Answer #3 (Rav Yosef): The later Mishnah is when an
individual is enticed - he will not reconsider, therefore
the enticer is liable immediately;
iii. They mock him by 'agreeing' to serve him.
1. Our Mishnah is when more than one person is enticed
- they are likely to reconsider, the enticer is not
liable until they serve.
(j) Support (Rav Yosef for himself): "Lo Soveh Lo v'Lo Sishma
Elav" - if he wants and listens, he is liable.
(k) Support (Rav Yosef for himself): "Lo Soveh Lo v'Lo Sishma
Elav" - if he (an individual) wants and listens, he is
(l) Objection (Abaye): We do not make this distinction
between an individual and a group that is enticed!
1. (Beraisa): "Ki Yesisecha Achicha Ven Imecha" - this
applies to an individual or a multitude that is
(m) Answer #4 (Abaye): Our Mishnah is when a person entices
himself - he is likely to reconsider, he is not liable
until he serves;
2. The Torah distinguished their punishments - it is
stringent on the body of an individual (he is
stoned), it is lenient on his money (it passes to
i. The Torah is lenient is on the bodies of a
multitude (Ir ha'Nidachas - they are choked),
it is stringent on their money (it is
3. Inference: These are the only differences!
1. The later Mishnah is when others entice him - he
will not reconsider, therefore the enticer is liable
(n) Support (Abaye, for himself): "Lo Soveh Lo v'Lo Sishma
*Elav*" - if he consents to someone else enticing him, he
2. Our Mishnah is when more than one person is enticed
- they are likely to reconsider, the enticer is not
liable until they serve.
(o) Answer #5 (Rava): Both Mishnayos are when others entice
1. If the enticer detailed what the idolatry eats,
drinks, rewards and punishes, the enticee is liable
once he agrees;
(p) Support (Rava, for himself): "Me'Elokei...ha'Kerovim
Elecha O ha'Rechokim";
2. If the enticer did not give these details, the
enticee is not liable until he serves.
1. Question: What difference is there between idolatry
nearby or far away?
(q) Answer #6 (Rav Ashi): The latter Mishnah discusses a
Yisrael Mumar (he will not reconsider, he is liable once
2. Answer: From the nearby idolatries you can infer
about the ones far away, i.e. an enticer normally
describes what a far away idolatry eats, drinks,
rewards and punishes,- the Torah tells you that it
is no different than the nearby idolatries, which
you recognize (that they do nothing).
(r) Answer #7 (Ravina): The latter Mishnah teaches a bigger
Chidush, not only is one liable for serving, he is liable
once he agrees to serve. (Indeed, from the latter Mishnah
we can infer the law of our Mishnah.)
(a) (Abaye): If one served idolatry on account of love or
fear of a person, he is liable, for in any event he
(b) (Rava): He is exempt, for he did not accept it to be his
(c) Support (Abaye, for himself - Mishnah): The same applies
to one who serves...
1. Suggestion: This means, whether he serves on account
of love or fear!
(d) Rejection (Rava): No, R. Yirmeyah explained, it means
whether he did its normal Avodah, or served it through
Avodas Penim, even if this is not its normal Avodah.
(e) Support (Abaye, for himself - Beraisa): "Lo Sishtachaveh
Lahem"(to idols), but you may bow to a person;
1. Suggestion: Perhaps you may bow to a person people
serve (like idolatry), such as Haman!
(f) Rejection (Rava): No - the Torah forbids bowing to
someone who resembles Haman in one respect, not in all
2. Rejection: "V'Lo So'ovdem".
3. (Abaye): People served Haman because they feared
Achashverosh, the Torah considers this idolatry!
1. One may not bow to a person who is served, such as
Haman - but this is only if people truly intend to
serve him, unlike Haman, who was served only out of
(g) Support (Abaye, for himself - Beraisa - Rebbi): A Kohen
Gadol anointed with the Shemen ha'Mishchah brings a
Korban if he served idolatry b'Shogeg
(h) Chachamim say, he is liable only for He'elam Davar (if he
erred in Halachah);
1. Both agree that when he is liable, he brings a
female goat, like a commoner.
2. They also agree that he does not bring an Asham
Taluy (when in doubt whether or not he
3. Question: What is the case of idolatry b'Shogeg?
i. If he thought he was bowing to a synagogue, and
it really was idolatry - he intended to serve
Hash-m (surely, he is exempt)!
4. Answer #1: Rather, he bowed to a statue in the
5. Rejection: If he accepted it to be his god, he was
Mezid (he does not bring a Korban); if he did not
accept it to be his god, he did not serve idolatry!
6. Answer #2: Rather, he served idolatry on account of
love or fear. (The Tana'im only argue about whether
or not an anointed Kohen must err in Halachah, all
agree that serving on account of love or fear is
7. Answer #3 (and rejection of Abaye's support - Rava):
No, he thought that idolatry is permitted.
8. Question: But that is He'elam Davar (which Chachamim
agree about - the argument is about b'Shogeg, this
must be a different case)!
9. Answer: He thought that idolatry is totally
permitted - He'elam Davar is only when he remembers
part of the law and forgets part.