ANSWERS TO REVIEW QUESTIONS
prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem
Previous daf Sanhedrin 31
(a) Initially, we establish the Neherdai, who even accept a discrepancy in
the testimony of the two witnesses concerning a black Manah and a white
Manah - like Rebbi Yehoshua ben Korcha
(b) However, we reject that, on the grounds - that even Rebbi Yehoshua ben
Korchah only accepts two independent witnesses as long as they do not
contradict each other (which they do here).
(c) So we establish the Neherdai like Rebbi Shimon ben Elazar, who says in a
Beraisa - that if one out of pair of witnesses testifies that Reuven lent
Shimon a Manah, and the other, that he lent him two, their testimony ...
1. ... is void - according to Beis Shamai.
(d) Whereas in the same case, only where one *pair of witnesses* says one
Manah, and the other pair says two - he maintains that Beis Shamai agree
with Beis Hillel (that 'Yesh bi'Chelal Masayim Manah).
2. ... is Kasher - and we accept the testimony of the lesser one, according
to Beis Hillel, because two Manah incorporates one (i.e. since they both
agree on one Manah).
(a) In a case where one witness testified that Reuven owes Shimon a barrel
of wine, and the other one, that he owes him a barrel of oil - Rebbi Ami
ruled obligated Reuven to pay barrel of wine out of the barrel of oil
(meaning the lesser of the two).
(b) Even after establishing it like Rebbi Shimon ben Elazar, we ask - that
even Rebbi Shimon ben Elazar accepts the testimony of the lesser witness,
only because two Manah incorporates one, which is not the case here.
(c) To answer this Kashya - we establish the case (not by a barrel of wine
and a barrel of oil, as we thought until now, but) by the value of a barrel
of wine and of a barrel of oil.
(d) Rebbi combined the testimonies of one witness who testified that Reuven
lent Shimon a Manah in the upper-attic, and the other witness, who testified
that he lent him a Manah in the lower-attic - because he held like Rebbi
Yeshoshua ben Korchah (who combines witnesses even when they refer to two
(a) We quote the Pasuk "Holech Rachil Megaleh Sod" with regard to the Din in
our Mishnah - forbidding the judges to divulge their individual opinions, on
which we previously quoted the Pasuk in Kedoshim "Lo Seichel Rachil
(b) Rebbi Ami expelled a certain Talmid from the Beis-Hamedrash, coupled
with the announcement 'Dein Galya Raza!' - for divulging something that had
been said in the Beis-Hamedrash ...
(c) ... twenty-two years earlier.
(a) When the Tana of our Mishnah says 'Kol Z'man she'Meivi Re'ayah, Soser es
ha'Din', he means - that even after losing his case, he can still bring
fresh evidence to overturn the Beis-Din's previous ruling.
(b) According to the Tana Kama, if Beis-Din order a litigant to bring all
his proofs within thirty days, then he must do so. Raban Shimon ben Gamliel
however, maintains - that seeing as it is not always possible to lay his
hands on the testimony so fast, proofs that he presents later are also
(c) The Tana Kama and Raban Shimon ben Gamliel repeat their Machlokes in a
case - where one litigant, after declaring that he has no more witnesses or
proofs, turns up in Beis-Din with fresh witnesses or proofs.
(d) The Tana say in a case where one of the litigants, realizing that he is
about to lose his case, suddenly produces two witnesses, or pulls out
documentary evidence from his belt - that they are not acceptable.
(a) Rabah bar Rav Huna rules like Raban Shimon ben Gamliel - in the first
case in our Mishnah (where Beis-Din ordered him to bring all his proofs
within thirty days) ...
(b) ... and he adds that the Halachah is not like the Chachamim - to teach
us that even if Bedieved, Beis-Din ruled like the Chachamim, they must
rescind that ruling.
(a) With regard to the second Machlokes between the Chachamim and Raban
Shimon ben Gamliel in our Mishnah, Rabah bar Rav Huna quoting Rebbi
Yochanan - issues the same dual ruling, but this time, in favor of the
(b) There too, we ask why Rabah bar Rav Huna finds it necessary to add 'Ein
Halachah ke'Raban Shimon ben Gamliel'. But this time we answer - that it is
in this case (of Re'ayah Acharonah) exclusively, that he rules not like
Raban Shimon ben Gamliel, to exclude the cases of 'Areiv' and 'Tzidon' (as
we learned in Bava Basra), which Rabah bar bar Chanah Amar Rebbi Yochanan
adds to the list.
(c) We could not give the same answer as we gave previously - because having
ruled like the Chachamim, it is obvious that this applies even Bedieved
(where we are hardly likely to follow the opinion of a Yachid).
(a) When Rav Nachman asked that child in court (see Tosfos DH 'Chayveih')
whether he had any witnesses or proofs - he replied in the negative.
(b) After Rav Nachman obligated him to pay - he left the courtroom in tears,
and people who saw him volunteered information of which the child had been
(c) Rav Nachman relented in spite of Rebbi Yochanan's previous ruling -
because it is common for a child not to be conversant in his father's
(a) That woman - had been given the Sh'tar that she claimed had been paid
(b) When Rav Nachman believed her, Rav suggested that this was because he
held like Rebbi - who holds 'Osiyos Niknos bi'Mesirah' (in which case he
believed the woman because she could have claimed that the Sh'tar was hers).
(c) Rav Nachman rejected Rava's suggestion, on the grounds that even
according to the Chachamim of Rebbi he would have believed her - with a
'Migu' that she could have burned it.
(d) According to the second Lashon, Rav Nachman did not believe her (like
the Chachamim of Rebbi). Nor did she have a 'Migu de'I Ba'i Kalsah' -
because a 'Migu' does not help against a Sh'tar that has been substantiated
(a) The Beraisa rules that if a Simpon (a receipt) is produced by ...
1. ... the debtor - it is Kasher, provided he verifies the signatures.
(b) The reason for this latter ruling is - because seeing as it is the
creditor who holds the Sh'tar, he would never have allowed a receipt to be
written on it, unless the debt really was paid.
2. ... a third party (unsigned) or if it appears after the signatures on the
Sh'tar-Chov itself - it is Kasher.
(c) So we see that a third party is believed to validate (or to invalidate)
a Sh'tar that he is holding (a Kashya on Rav Nachman's second Lashon).
(d) Rav Nachman has nothing to say - and we remain with a Kashya on him.
(a) When Rav Dimi Amar Rebbi Yochanan ...
1. ... permits a litigant to bring proofs or to withdraw 'ad she'Yistatem
Ta'anosav', he appears to mean - that he is believed only until he says 'Ein
Li Re'ayah ... ', like the Tana Kama.
(b) We try and solve the discrepancy by establishing the entire Beraisa
like - Raban Shimon ben Gamliel, and by explaining the Seifa ('ad she'Yomar
Kirvu P'loni u'Peloni') as the interpretation of the Reisha ('ad
2. ... then adds 've'Yomar Kirvu Ish P'loni u'Peloni ve'Ye'iduni', he
appears to mean - that he is only not believed if the witnesses were
available at the time that he said 'Ein Li Eidim', but that if he brought in
fresh witnesses later, they would be accepted, like Raban Shimon ben
(c) And we refute this suggestion, which would establish Rebbi Yochanan like
Raban Shimon ben Gamliel, by citing Rabah bar bar Chanah Amar Rebbi
Yochanan - who says 'Kol Makom she'Shanah Raban Shimon ben Gamliel
be'Mishnaseinu Halachah Kamoso, Chutz ... *ve'Re'ayah Acharonah'*.
(d) So we re-quote Rebbi Yochanan, this time presented by Rav Shmuel bar
Yehudah. Assuming that the litigant said 'Ein Li Eidim, in Li Re'ayah',
Rebbi Yochanan will nevertheless accept ...
1. ... witnesses - provided they came from overseas, on their own
2. ... documentary evidence - provided the leather sack containing them is
produced by a third party (since in both cases, it is feasible that the
litigant was previously unaware of their existence).
(a) The 'Makom ha'Va'ad' is - the place where the Talmidei-Chachamim meet to
discuss Halachah (which is where the Beis-Din sit [Rashi end of Perek]). The
advantage of having one's case judged there is - that a tough litigant will
be subdued in the presence of so many Talmidei-Chachamim, and will obey the
court ruling without fuss.
(b) Rebbi Elazar objected to Rav Dimi quoting Rabbi Yochanan that one
litigant can force the other (who is causing trouble) to take their case to
the Makom ha'Va'ad - because it makes no sense to force one litigant to
spend a Manah in travel expenses, in order to retrieve the Manah that he
lent the debtor.
(c) Rav Safra agreed with Rebbi Elazar. They both ruled - that one litigant
could force the other to judge in their home town.
(d) Should ...
1. ... Beis-Din encounter difficulties with regard to the Halachah - they
then send them to the Makom ha'Va'ad in writing for a solution.
2. ... the litigant request their reason for having obligated him, in
writing - then they conform with his request.
(a) In a case of a Yavam and a Yevamah - it is the Yevamah who goes to the
town of the Yavam (and not vice-versa).
(b) Rebbi Ami adds 'Afilu mi'Teverya le'Tzipori' - meaning that this is the
Din even though the town of the Yevamah is more prominent than that of the
Yavam (like Teverya vis-a-vis Tzipori).
(c) Rav Kahana extrapolate this from the Pasuk "ve'Kar'u Lo Ziknei Iyro" -
which he Darshens "Lo", 've'Lo Lah'.
(d) Ameimar justified to Rav Ashi his statement 'Hilchesa, Kofin Oso ve'Dan
be'Makom ha'Va'ad', in spite of Rebbi Elazar, who just ruled 'Kofin Oso
ve'Dan be'Iyro' - by establishing his own ruling by the creditor, whereas
Rebbi Elazar speaks about the debtor.
(e) And Ameimar bases his ruling - on the principle 'Eved Loveh le'Ish
(a) When they referred to Mar Ukva the Dayan as 'li'de'Ziv Leih ke'Bar
Bisya', they may have meant that his face shone like that of Moshe Rabeinu,
who was brought up by Bisyah, the daughter of Par'oh. They might also have
meant to say (not 'ke'Bar Bisya', but) - 'ke'bar Beiseih', meaning like
Moshe about whom the Torah writes "be'Chol Beisi Ne'eman Hu".
(b) Mar Ukva's face might have shone as a result of his wisdom. According to
Seifer Hagadah, the shine was a form of halo in he shape of a Menorah. This
in turn, was the result of the episode where he once became ill from longing
for a married woman with whom he had fallen in love. Now it once happened
that she needed to borrow money from him, and as a result, she landed at his
mercy. And it was after he took control of himself and let her go in peace
that he recovered. That was when the halo appeared.
(a) The gist of Mar Ukva's complaint against his brother Yirmiyah was -
either that he had castrated him or that he had somehow caused him harm
monetarily (see also Rabeinu Chananel).
***** Hadran Alach 'Zeh Borer' *****
(b) The problem with the Beis-Din's wording was - that 'Imru Lo' suggested
that the Beis-Din of Bavel (where Mar Ukva lived) should judge the case,
whereas 'Hisi'uhu ve'Yir'eh Paneinu bi'Teverya' was a clear call for the
litigants to travel to Eretz Yisrael.
(c) In fact, it was necessary to call Mar Ukva and his brother to come to
them - because the claim involved Diynei K'nasos, which can only be enforced
in Eretz Yisrael.
(d) Yet they first asked the Beis-Din in Bavel to deal with the case - (in
the hope that Yirmiyah would accept their ruling [Rabeinu Chananel]), in
deference to Mar Ukva.