ANSWERS TO REVIEW QUESTIONS
prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem
Previous dafShabbos 3
(a) The Tana does not count those cases which are Patur and Mutar.
Consequently, we cannot ask why he does not count the four cases where the
Ani or the Ba'al ha'Bayis did not even do an Isur, only the cases which are
Patur but Asur.
The Torah writes "*me*'Am ha'Aretz, *ba'Asosah*", from which Chazal derive
(b) When Shmuel referred to the three cases as being the only ones where
Patur means Patur u'Mutar, he was referring to cases where an act was
performed, to teach us that nevertheless, the person who performed them did
(c) The Tana refers only to those cases where the Ani or the Ba'al ha'Bayis
made the Akirah and not the Hanachah (but not vice-versa), as we discussed
already in the Mishnah, because it is possible for him to complete the
Melachah. It does not refer to those cases where he makes the Hanachah only
(because there, he can never come to complete the Melachah).
1. One is not Chayav if one does only part of the Melachah.
If two people perform a Melachah (when one could have done it on his own,
they are both Patur.
(a) Rav Asked Rebbi whether, if someone started walking with the load
already on his back or in his hand, it is called an Akirah - or whether it
is only called an Akirah when one actually picks up the object from its
(b) Rebbi answered that it is indeed called an Akirah and that if he walked
out with the object on his back, he would be Chayav.
(c) It is not the same as someone whose hand is stretched inside a house
(like the hand of the Ani in our Mishnah), and who then carries something
which a second person placed into it, out into the street. *He* is Patur,
since the hand is not placed in the domain where it is situated - the hand
is in the air, and not on the ground of the house. In that case, its
location is the same as that of the body to which it is attached.
(d) Rebbi Chiya scolded his nephew Rav for asking Rebbi a Sha'aleh to do
with Shabbos, when he was learning a different Masechta.
(a) Abaye learns that a person's hand does not follow his body when it is
in the Reshus ha'Rabim, from the fact that when the Ba'al ha'Bayis takes
the object from the extended hand of the Ani, he is not Chayav.
And he learns that it does not follow the body in the Reshus ha'Yachid,
from the fact that the Ani is not Chayav when he takes from the extended
hand of the Ba'al ha'Bayis.
(b) Abaye asks whether Chazal did not decree, that if someone extends his
hand holding an object into another domain, his hand should not have the
Din of a Karmelis, which would mean that he would be obligated to keep his
hand there the entire Shabbos, since it is forbidden to move an object
(making a Hanachah included) from a Karmelis into any other domain on
(c) 'Karmel' is a type of forest, which is neither a public thoroughfare,
nor a private domain.
(d) The air below ten Tefachim in a Reshus ha'Rabim, has the Din of a
Reshus ha'Rabim. Therefore the Rabbanan penalized him for attempting to
transfer from it to a Reshus ha'Yachid. Whereas above ten Tefachim, it has
the Din of a Makom Petur (through which it is permitted to transfer);
consequently, Chazal did not penalize him.
(a) Is it not strange to penalize someone who stretches out his hand with
an object *after* nightfall, when he is likely to drop it from fatigue some
hours later (and be Chayav Kareis or at least a Chatas), and not to
penalize him when he stretched it out *before* nightfall, when he can in
any event, not become Chayav, even if he does let go of the object? Surely,
if anything, the other way round would appear more logical?
(b) It would therefore appear, the Gemara contends, that Chazal are not
concerned with the person who has sinned transgressing further (as if to
say, their decrees will remain in force, and if he goes on to sin, he has
only himself to blame). Consequently, someone who placed bread in the oven,
is forbidden to remove it (as this constitutes an Isur de'Rabbanan, as we
shall see), in order to spare himself from the Chiyuv Chatas.
(c) The Rabbanan forbade one to remove baked bread from the side of the
oven, to which it is sticking. It is not a Melachah, but a Chochmah.
(a) The reason that Chazal did not decree by Shogeg is not in order to
prevent him from sinning, but because there is no real Isur - only a
penalty, which is not applicable if the transgressor did not intend to sin,
whereas removing bread from the oven is a firm Isur de'Rabbanan, which the
Rabbanan may well not have waived.
And even if they were strict in decreeing the man's hand a Karmelis (when
he stretched it put on purpose), that may be only because he has the option
of not dropping the object and of not sinning. Whereas in the case of Rav
Bibi bar Abaye, where he is bound to be Chayav, if he leaves the bread in
the oven, perhaps they waived their decree to prevent him from becoming
(b) Both Beraisos could be speaking when he stretched out his hand
be'Shogeg; the one Beraisa however, holds that they decreed Shogeg because
of Meizid, whereas the other holds that they did not.
(c) Both Beraisos agree that Chazal did not penalize him be'Shogeg, from
withdrawing his hand back to the courtyard where he is standing - and the
Beraisa which forbids him to withdraw his hand from the courtyard over
which it is now extended, is speaking when he wants to drop the object over
a *third* courtyard.
(d) This is forbidden because, even though he is not achieving what he
initially set out to do (and is why we might have thought that it should be
permitted), he *is* however achieving his original intention of
transferring the object from one location to another. Consequently, Chazal
permitted him to withdraw the object to the courtyard where he is now
standing (where he will have achieved nothing at all) but not to any other