ANSWERS TO REVIEW QUESTIONS
prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem
Previous dafShabbos 69
(a) According to Munbaz, even if he is aware both of the sin, and of the
Chiyuv Chatas, he will be called a Shogeg as long as he does not know about
the Chiyuv Korban.
(b) The Rabbanan maintain that lack of knowledge of the Korban alone, does
not make one a Shogeg - and he will not be Chayav a Korban - unless he is
also unaware of the Chiyuv Kares.
(a) According to Rebbi Yochanan, the Rabbanan will obligate a Korban even
if the transgressor was unaware of the Chiyuv Kares (even though he was a
Meizid on the La'av. Whereas according to Resh Lakish, he must also be a
Shogeg on the La'av as well.
(b) Resh Lakish learns this from "Asher Lo Se'asenah ve'Ashem".
(c) Rebbi Yochanan quotes the opinion of Rebbi Shimon in a Beraisa, who
learns from , "Asher Lo Se'asenah" - that only someone who would have
desisted, had he known that he was sinning, is obligated to bring a Chatas
- but not an apostate (who would have proceeded to sin anyway). The Tana
Kama learns this from "me'Am ha'Aretz".
(a) The Tana saw fit to write that there are thirty-nine Melachos, to teach
us how many Chata'os someone who transgresses all the Melachos in one
He'elam, is Chayav to bring.
(b) The Mishnah must be speaking about Zadon Shabbos ve'Shigegas Melachos,
in order to be Chayav *thirty-nine* Chata'os; since we have already learnt
that for Shigegas Shabbos and Zadon Melachos, one is only Chayav *one*
(c) Resh Lakish explains Zadon Shabbos to pertain to the prohibition of
Techum Shabbos, which is not one of the thirty-nine Melachos, but is
nevertheless an Isur d'Oraysa - according to Rebbi Akiva.
(d) The Tana who is Mechayev a Chatas for the Shigegas Korban alone, is
(a) When Abaye says that *everyone agrees* that by a Shevu'as Bituy, one is
only Chayav if one Shogeg on the La'av, he is referring to Rebbi Yochanan,
who does not require Shigegas La'av, by cases of Chiyuv Kares.
(b) Abaye cannot be referring to Munbaz - to say that Munbaz will agree
that here, it will not suffice to be Shogeg on the Korban alone, unless he
is also a Shogeg on the La'av. Because why should that be necessary? Now
that, by cases of Kares, where the Korban is *not* a Chidush, Munbaz holds
that Shogag be'Korban is called a Shogeg, how much more so by Shevu'as
Bituy, where it *is* (since the Korban comes even when there is no Kares)?
(c) The Chidush of Abaye is that here, although the Korban is a Chidush, he
will not be called a Shogeg by being a Shagag be'Korban, until he becomes a
Shagag be La'av.
(d) The author of the Beraisa which obligates someone who was Shogag
be'Korban by Shevu'as Bituy, is Munbaz, who holds that Shigegas Korban is
called a Shogeg.
(a) A Shigegas Shevu'as Bituy in the future is straightforward: it speaks
when, at the time when he came to break the Shevu'ah, he forgot that he
made it. But a Shevu'as Bituy in the past, presents us with problem: what
is it that he forgot? If he forgot - at the time when he swore - that he
did *not* eat, but believed that he *did*, then he would not be Chayav,
because of the Pasuk in Vayikra "ha'Adam bi'Shevu'ah", from which we learn
that a person is only Chayav if he is aware of the facts when he makes the
(b) According to the Rabbanan, one is not Chayav a Korban for a Shevu'as
Bituy in the past, only in the future.
(c) The second Lashon contends that if the author of the Beraisa was
Munbaz, there would be no inherent Chidush in the Beraisa, since it is
obvious that, by Shevu'as Bituy, where the Korban is a Chidush, that,
according to Munbaz, Shagag be'Korban is called a Shogeg (as we discussed
earlier). But this is not a Kashya, because it is necessary to inform us
that Shevu'as Bituy is different than all other cases - even according to
Munbaz, inasmuch as, by all other cases, one is a Shogeg whether he was
Shagag be'Korban or Shagag be'La'av; whereas here, Shagag be'La'av is not
called a Shogeg (because of "ha'Adam bi'Shevu'ah"), *only* Shagag
(a) According to Abaye, we might have said that, according to Rebbi
Yochanan, the Shagag be'Chiyuv Misah (bi'Yedei Shamayim) will be sufficient
to render him a Shogeg (like Shagag be'Kares by those cases where there is
a Chiyuv Kares).
(b) Rav indeed says that 'Misah bi'Mekom Kares Omedes, ve'Chomesh bi'Mekom
Korban Ka'i', and one will be Chayav the extra fifth for Shagag be'Misah,
in the same way as one is Chayav a Korban when one is Shagag be'Kares.
(a) Someone who loses track of the days, could observe Shabbos either by
counting six days from the day he realizes his dilemna, and by observing
the seventh day as Shabbos; or he could count the day on which he
realized, and observe the following day as Shabbos. Either way, he would
then continue to observe every seventh day as Shabbos.
(b) The former suggestion (which is the conclusive one) is based on the
creation of the world, where Shabbos followed the six days of the creation,
the latter, the creation of Adam, who was created on Friday, and observed
the following day as Shabbos.
(c) Had the Tana held that Shabbos follows the day that he realized his
dilemna, he should have said 'Meshamer Yom Echad, u'Moneh Shishah' rather
than 'Meshamer Echad le'Shishah'.
(a) As far as Melachah as concerned, there is absolutely no difference
between his Shabbos and the other six days: He is permitted to do whatever
is necessary for his survival - even on his Shabbos, whereas what is *not*
necessary, is forbidden even on the other days of the week. (Regarding
walking beyond the Techum Shabbos - refer to Tosfos DH 'Oseh'.)
(b) The practical difference between the days, is regarding Kidush and
Havdalah, which he recites on his Shabbos, but not on the other six days.
(c) The Gemara rejects the contention that he does nothing at all on his
Shabbos, and a double quota of work on the previous day, on the grounds
that he cannot possibly do more than he needs to, to keep alive on any day,
since that day might be Shabbos.
(a) If he was able to recall how many days before he had entered the
dessert, he may treat that day as a regular week-day, since he knows with
certainty that he would not have entered the desert on a Shabbos.
Consequently, every subsequent seventh day is permitted.
(b) The Gemara initially assumed that just as we can take for granted that
he would not have entered the desert on Shabbos, likewise, we can take for
granted that he would not have entered it on Friday either. In that case,
he should be permitted to treat both every seventh and every eighth day as
(c) The Gemara rejects this contention however, because it may have
happened that a caravan left on Friday, and he took the opportunity and
booked a seat on it.
(a) "ve'Shamru B'nei Yisrael es ha'Shabbos" suggests one Shemirah for many
Shabbasos - implying that sometimes one is obligated to bring only one
Korban for the many Shabbasos that he transgressed. "ve'es Shabsosai
Tishmoru" suggests one Shemirah for many Shabbasos - implying that one is
Chayav one Korban for each and every Shabbos.
(b) Alternatively, the first Pasuk implies one Korban for each Shabbos, and
the second, one Korban for many Shabbasos.
Either way, these two Pesukim serve as the basis for the first and second
case in our Mishnah ('Kol ha'Shochei'ach Ikar Shabbos' etc. and 'Shigegas
Shabbos ve'Zadon Melachos' respectively).