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Shevuos 2

SHEVUOS 2 - The first Daf of Shevuos has been dedicated l'Iluy Nishmas Esther (bas Moshe) Farber of Riverdale, NY, who passed away a short while ago (13 Shevat 5763). A descendant of the Chasam Sofer, Esther was a courageous woman, clinging strongly to her heritage despite personal tragedies, who affected the lives of many students and friends.


QUESTIONS: The Mishnah teaches that the "Se'ir ha'Na'aseh bi'Fnim" of Yom Kipur, and the day of Yom Kipur itself, provide temporary atonement for a person who sinned with "Tum'as Mikdash v'Kodashav" -- by eating Kodshim while he was Tamei, or by entering the Mikdash while he was Tamei -- in a case where the person realized that he was Tamei but later forgot about the Tum'ah at the time that he ate the Kodshim or entered the Mikdash. If Yom Kipur comes before he remembers, then the Se'ir ha'Na'aseh bi'Fnim and Yom Kipur provide him with temporary atonement until he realizes his sin. If he realizes his sin after Yom Kipur passes, then he must bring a Korban Oleh v'Yored.

The Mishnah then teaches that the Se'ir Musaf (the Se'ir ha'Na'aseh b'Chutz) of Yom Kipur, together with the day of Yom Kipur, provides atonement for a person who became Tamei without realizing it and then entered the Mikdash, and later it was brought to his attention that he was Tamei when he entered the Mikdash.

In the third case, in which the person was not aware of the Tum'ah before the sin nor after the sin, Rebbi Yehudah says that the Se'irei Musaf of the festivals and Rosh Chodesh atone for his sin. Rebbi Shimon argues that only the Se'irei Musaf of the festivals atone for his sin, while the Se'irei Musaf of Rosh Chodesh provide a different atonement -- for one who sinned by eating Kodshim that was Tamei while he was Tahor.

RASHI (DH Se'ir ha'Na'aseh b'Chutz) explains that when the Mishnah says that the Se'ir and Yom Kipur atone for his sin, it means that the day itself provides Kaparah.

There are a number of questions on Rashi's comments here.

(a) Why does Rashi wait until this point in the Mishnah to explain that Yom Kipur itself provides part of the Kaparah? He should have explained this earlier, when the Mishnah first mentions Yom Kipur and says that the day of Yom Kipur provides atonement together with the Se'ir ha'Na'aseh bi'Fnim?

(b) Why is it that whenever Rebbi Shimon, later in the Mishnah, mentions the Kaparah of the Se'ir ha'Na'aseh bi'Fnim, he omits the fact that Yom Kipur also provides part of the Kaparah?

(c) Rebbi Meir, who holds that all of the Musaf offerings provide the same Kaparah, asks Rebbi Shimon, who holds that all of the Musaf offerings provide different Kaparos, how can a Korban that was designated for a festival, became lost, and then was found be brought on Rosh Chodesh, or on Yom Kipur. Why does Rebbi Meir ask his question only on Rebbi Shimon? He should have asked this question on Rebbi Yehudah as well! While it is true that Rebbi Yehudah maintains that the Kaparah of the Musafim of festivals and of Rosh Chodesh are the same, he agrees with Rebbi Shimon that the Kaparah of the Musaf of Yom Kipur is different from the other two, and yet presumably he agrees that the Musaf of Yom Kipur may be offered on a festival if it is lost and then found before the festival! (See MAHARSHA.)

ANSWER: The CHASAM SOFER suggests an approach which answers all three questions. His approach is as follows. What is the reason that some Musaf offerings provide a different Kaparah than the others? Is it due to the fact that the day itself plays a role in the Kaparah, and therefore a day which has more qualities of atonement can enhance the effect of the Korban so that it provides a greater form of Kaparah? Or is it because of the Gezeiras ha'Kasuv that a Korban Chatas separated for a particular festival provides a particular Kaparah (that is, Hashem wants the various Kaparos to be spread out during various times of the year, and therefore the Kaparah of the Musaf changes based on the time of the year that it is brought)?

We may prove that one of these possibilities is the correct one from the fact that the festivals and Rosh Chodesh provide different Kaparos, according to Rebbi Shimon. The only day which we find playing a part in atonement is Yom Kipur. The festival (one of the three Regalim) never plays a part in Kaparah. Obviously, Rebbi Shimon must be siding with our second approach, according to which the different Kaparos are dependant on the time of year in which the Musaf is brought, and the quality of the particular day does not play a role in the Kaparah.

We may now answer our questions as follows.

(a) When the Mishnah states that the Se'ir ha'Na'aseh bi'Fnim atones with Yom Kipur, the intention is clear: Yom Kipur itself plays a role in the Kaparah. However, when the Mishnah teaches that the Se'ir Musaf of Yom Kipur atones with Yom Kipur, we might have thought that the Mishnah does not really mean that Yom Kipur plays a role in the Kaparah, since we find that other Musafim -- those of the Regalim and Rosh Chodesh -- are also Mechaper even though those days do *not* play a part in the Kaparah. This is why Rashi emphasizes here that Yom Kipur *does* play a role in the Kaparah.

Apparently, Rebbi Yehudah disagrees with Rebbi Shimon and maintains that the reason why the different Musafim provide different Kaparos is because of the qualities of the day. The qualities of the day of Yom Kipur enhance the Musaf of Yom Kipur. This is why Rebbi Yehudah argues that the Musafim of both Rosh Chodesh and the Regalim provide an identical Kaparah -- because the day does not contribute to the Musaf's Kaparah in those cases.

(b) This answers the second question as well. Rebbi Shimon conspicuously omits the fact hat Yom Kipur provides part of the atonement. This is because he maintains that the difference in the Kaparah of the Musafim is not related to the ability of the day to provide atonement.

(c) We may now understand why Rebbi Meir asks this question specifically on the view of Rebbi Shimon. According to Rebbi Shimon, the difference between the Musafim is that the Musaf designated for one part of the year provides a different atonement than the Musaf designated for another part of the year. Therefore, it follows logically that a Korban separated for one day cannot be offered on a different day. In contrast, according to Rebbi Yehudah, all of the Musafim provide the same measure of atonement. It is the ability of Yom Kipur to atone that enhances its Musaf so that it can provide a different Kaparah than the other Musafim. Consequently, the Musaf of Yom Kipur should be able to be offered as the Musaf for the Regel or Rosh Chodesh, since the Kaparah that the Musaf itself provides is the same regardless of when it is offered.

Perhaps this will also explain why the Mishnah does not mention that Yom Kipur atones together with the Se'ir ha'Mishtale'ach (see Hagahos of RAV ELAZAR MOSHE HA'LEVI HOROWITZ). Perhaps Rebbi Yehudah infers that the ability of the day of Yom Kipur to atone plays a part in the atonement for sins of Tum'as Mikdash v'Kodashav from the fact that the Musaf of Yom Kipur provides a different atonement than the other Musafim, as the Chasam Sofer explains. For this reason, Rebbi Yehudah concluded that the Se'ir ha'Na'aseh bi'Fnim which is also Mechaper on Tum'as Mikdash v'Kodashav must also be accompanied by the atonement provided by the day itself. Tum'as Mikdash v'Kodashav is the most difficult sin for a Korban to be Mechaper for (since it involves the desecration of the Mikdash and Korbanos themselves), as is evidenced from the fact that so many different Musafim are brought to atone for this category of sin, as the Tosefta (1:2) points out (see MELECHES BETZALEL). Accordingly, there is no source to say that all of the other sins for which the Se'ir ha'Mishtale'ach atones also need Yom Kipur for their Kaparah.


QUESTION: Rebbi Shimon maintains that although the Musafim for Yom Kipur, the Regalim, and Rosh Chodesh atone for different forms of Tum'as Mikdash v'Kodashav, nevertheless a Korban Musaf separated for one of those days may be brought on another of those days, since all of their Kaparos are in the same general category, that of Tum'as Mikdash v'Kodashav.

What difference does it make if the sins for which the Musafim atone are in the same general category? The Mishnah in Kerisus (27b) cited by the RAMBAM (Hilchos Shegagos 3:3) says that if a person separated a Korban Chatas as an atonement for his sin of eating Chelev yesterday, he may not bring that Korban as an atonement for another time that he ate Chelev, since the verse says, "Korbano... Al Chataso" (Vayikra 4:28), a Korban must be brought for the sin for which it was designated. It is very likely that between the time that the Musaf was separated for Yom Kipur and the time that it was brought (on the following Regel, such as Pesach), more people sinned with Tum'as Mikdash v'Kodashav. How, then, can we offer a Korban that was not designated for these sins, even if it was separated for a similar category of sin? (CHIDUSHEI RABEINU CHAIM HA'LEVI to Kerisus 27b)


(a) RABEINU CHAIM HA'LEVI points out that the words of the Rambam (in Hilchos Shegagos ibid., and in Hilchos Pesulei ha'Mukdashin 15:6) imply that although a person should not bring a Chatas that was separated for one sin of eating Chelev to atone for another sin of eating Chelev, nevertheless the Korban is valid b'Di'eved. On the other hand, if one designated a Korban for a sin of eating Chelev, he may not bring it for a sin of eating Dam, and if he does, it is *not* valid and does not atone for his sin.

Apparently, there are two different reasons why a Korban Chatas cannot be changed and brought for a different sin. The first is due to the intention of the person who separated it. Since he separated the Korban for a specific sin, it is improper to offer it to atone for a second sin. However, this will not invalidate the Korban if it is offered, b'Di'eved, for the second sin.

The second reason a Chatas may not be changed to a different sin is because the sin for which the Chatas is being offered becomes part and parcel of the essence of the Korban. The Korban becomes defined as a Korban Chatas *for that sin*. Just as a Korban Olah is different than a Korban Chatas, a Chatas separated for one type of sin is different than a Chatas separated for a different type of sin, and they are not interchangeable. This, however, applies only to the *category* of sin. The specific act of sin does *not* become part of the essence of the Korban.

We may now understand the words of Rebbi Shimon as follows. Although a Korban Yachid is separated for a specific sin, a Korban Tzibur is not separated for the purpose of achieving Kaparah for a sin at all. Rather, it is separated to be brought as the Korban of the festival, like all other Korbanos of the festival. The atonement that it provides is a secondary effect of the Korban. Therefore, it may be brought even l'Chatchilah for sins that were done at a later time.

However, even though the Korban was not separated in order to provide atonement for Tum'as Mikdash, nevertheless, since it does provide such an atonement, the atonement for that sin becomes part of the essence and description of the Korban. Therefore, if the sins for which the different Musafim atone are considered different categories of sin, then the category of sin for which the Korban was designated would become part of the essence and description of the Korban, and therefore a Korban Tzibur separated for one category of sin could not be brought for another category of sin. This is the intention of Rebbi Shimon when he says that all of the sins of Tum'as Mikdash v'Kodashav are one category of sin.

(The KEHILOS YAKOV #1, DH Od, provides a similar answer.)

(b) The KEHILOS YAKOV cites the SHITAH MEKUBETZES in Zevachim (6b, #3) in the name of TOSFOS RABEINU PERETZ, who discusses this point. The Shitah Mekubetzes explains that a Korban Chatas Tzibur differs from a Chatas Yachid because it is not separated for a particular sin. Rather, it is separated for the sins of the Tzibur in general, and for any sin in particular. Since it is not separated for a particular sin, it does not have the limitations of a Chatas which must be brought for the sin for which it was separated. (The Korban *was* separated, though, for a specific *category* of sin, and therefore it may not be brought to atone for a sin of a different category.)

QUESTION: The Gemara asks why, in the order of Masechtos, Shevuos is placed after Makos. The Gemara asks a similar question with regard to the placement of Makos after Sanhedrin, Nazir after Nedarim, and Sotah after Nazir.

There is a rule (see Bava Kama 102a) that "Ein Seder la'Mishnah," there is no set order for the Masechtos. For this reason, we do not apply the rule of "Machlokes v'Achar Kach Stam, Halachah k'Stam," when the two Mishnayos are in two different Masechtos, since we cannot determine which Mishnah preceded the other. Why, then, does our Gemara assert that there is an order between the Masechtos, and that there is a reason for why Shevuos follows Makos? (RI MI'GASH)


(a) The RI MI'GASH (cited by the Rashba) explains that although we cannot be certain of the order of the Masechtos, nevertheless if we can provide a reason for the sequence of the Masechtos as they are found in our texts, we should do so. (The Ri mi'Gash might mean to say that although Rebbi, who redacted the Mishnah, did not place the Masechtos in any particular sequence, a later authority might have made the sequence based on certain logical considerations.)

(b) TOSFOS here and in a number of other places explains that the principle of "Ein Seder la'Mishnah" applies only to the rule of "Machlokes v'Achar Kach Stam, Halachah k'Stam." The Masechtos are certainly organized in a certain order. The reason for this is because when Rebbi first taught the Mishnayos to his students, he did so according to the order of tractates that the students preferred (see Avodah Zarah 19a). It was at that time that Rebbi decided the Halachah by teaching a Mishnah anonymously without citing the name of its author. However, after Rebbi composed all of the Mishnayos, he placed them in a specific order. This is why our Gemara assumes that Shevuos follows Makos. Nevertheless, Rebbi might have taught Shevuos before teaching Makos and he taught an anonymous Mishnah in Makos because he changed his mind regarding the Halachah and favored that opinion over the other opinion mentioned in the Mishnah in Shevuos. That is why we cannot determine whether the Mishnah expressing the Machlokes came first, or whether the Mishnah containing the "Stam" came first, based on the order of Masechtos.

What, though, was Rebbi's point in making a set order for the Masechtos? Why should he not leave it to future teachers to teach the Mishnayos to their students in the order that their students prefer? Perhaps the order of the Mishnayos was used simply as a mnemonic device in order to remember all of the Masechtos, which at that time were transmitted orally. However, each teacher should indeed teach his students in accordance with the order that they prefer. (Not all Rishonim agree that the Mishnayos were committed to writing only after the time of Rebbi. See RAMBAM in his introduction to the Mishnah, AGRA LA'YESHARIM, and RASHASH in Shevuos 4a, to Rashi DH u'Mishnah.)

(c) The other Rishonim cite the Ri mi'Gash as suggesting that when the Gemara in Bava Kama (102a) mentions that according to one opinion, "All of Nezikin is [following a specific order] like a single Masechta," it is not referring to only the three Bava's, but to all of the Masechtos of Seder Nezikin. Our Gemara might be following that opinion. (See RAMBAN who rejects this approach.)

This does not explain why the Gemara in Nazir and Sotah assumes that those Masechtos are in a specific order. We must add to the words of the Ri mi'Gash the explanation of the RITVA, who says that although not *all* Masechtos were placed in a specific order, some of them *were* placed in a specific order. (Even those who maintain that the Bava's do not follow a specific order might nevertheless agree that Shevuos follows Makos.)

According to this approach, if a Mishnah expressing a Machlokes is found in Makos and a Mishnah expressing a "Stam" is found in Shevuos, we will indeed rule like the Stam even though the two Mishnayos are in two different Masechtos.

(d) The Ri mi'Gash writes further that even if the Amora'im were uncertain of the exact order of the sequence of the Masechtos, they *did* know which Masechtos were adjacent to which Masechtos. (Therefore, our order of the Masechtos in each Seder might be the correct order, or the exact opposite order. This will answer the question of the Ramban on this approach of the Ri mi'Gash.)

(e) The RAMBAN answers that the Amora'im knew to which Seder each Masechta belongs, and they therefore were certain that Shevuos is part of Seder Nezikin. The only reason for it to be placed in Seder Nezikin is because it discusses matters which are related to Makos, since both Masechtos discuss Isurei Lav which are punishable with Malkus. What, then, is the Gemara's question why Shevuos follows Makos?

The Gemara is asking that Shevuos should have begun with a discussion of a Shevu'ah that one transgressed b'Mezid, which is punishable with Malkus, instead of discussing "Shevuos Shtayim she'Hem Arba" which, according to the Gemara's conclusion (4a), relates to a person who transgresses unintentionally and is obligated to bring a Korban (similar to the punishment of "Yedi'os ha'Tum'ah").

The Ramban cites proof to this from the Gemara in the beginning of Nazir, which begins by asking why Nazir is in Seder Nashim, rather than why it is in a specific order in Seder Nashim.

However, the Ramban seems to be ignoring the Gemara at the beginning of Sotah and Makos. The Gemara there asks why the Mishnah was placed after the preceding Masechta.

Apparently, the Ramban will learn that there, too, the Gemara is asking why the Masechta starts with a discussion that is not related to the previous Masechta rather than with a discussion from a later Perek that is more clearly linked with the preceding Masechta. For example, Malkus should have started with "Elu Hen ha'Lokin" (the third Perek), and Sotah should have started with the discussion of when the woman is permitted to her husband and when she is prohibited.

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