THOUGHTS ON THE DAILY DAF
brought to you by Kollel Iyun Hadaf of Har Nof
Rosh Kollel: Rav Mordecai Kornfeld
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1) A HUSBAND WHO FORGOT ABOUT THE ACT OF HIS WIFE WHO IS A "SOTAH"
QUESTION: The Gemara proves that the word "v'Ne'elam" does not always
indicate prior knowledge of something. The Gemara proves this from the word
"v'Ne'elam" as it appears with regard to Sotah (Bamidbar 5:13) and with
regard to Torah (Iyov 28:21). When the verse describes a Sotah, it says that
her act was "Ne'elam" from her husband. If this means that her husband once
knew, and then forgot, what she did, then how can the Sotah water test her
honesty? The Gemara says that the Mei Sotah tests the woman's honesty only
when her husband is free of sin! If the husband himself is not free of sin,
then the waters are not effective at all.
2) "YEDI'AS BEIS RABO"
How would the knowledge of the husband be considered in the category of not
being free of sin? In what way is he considered not "Menukeh me'Avon," free
of sin? The Derashah that the husband must be free of sin is usually
understood to mean that if the husband lived with his wife after she became
a Sotah (which he is not allowed to do, as derived from the verse
"v'Nitme'ah" (Bamidbar 5:29)), then the Mei Sotah will not work. In the case
of our Gemara, though, how do we know that the husband lived with his wife
and forgot what she did?
(a) TOSFOS (DH v'Ne'elam) and others explain that the state of "Menukeh
me'Avon" is not limited to sins involving forbidden relations. Even if the
husband did not have forbidden relations but did something which he should
not have done with regard to his relationship with his wife, he is not
considered "Menukeh me'Avon." Therefore, if the husband knows that his wife
sinned in private, and he does not divorce her immediately, then he is not
"Menukeh me'Avon." Alternatively, when the husband does not know for sure
that his wife committed adultery, but he does know that his wife secluded
herself with someone else, and then he forgot that fact, he is not
considered "Menukeh me'Avon." Since the fact that his wife secluded herself
was not important enough in his eyes to remember. this displays a lack of
regard for the sin of a Sotah.
The RITVA suggests a similar explanation, adding that this Halachah -- that
the Mei Sotah is not effective when the husband does not show proper regard
for the prohibition of Sotah -- is learned from another verse, as the Sifri
(Naso #7) says, "v'Ne'elam me'Eini Ishah" (Bamidbar 5:13). The Gemara is
asking that even if the husband *is* "Menukeh me'Avon," meaning that he did
not live with his wife during the period that he forgot about the sin,
nevertheless the Mei Sotah should not be effective because her husband did
not show proper respect to the Isur of Sotah. Consequently, the implication
of the verse -- that if the husband *is* "Menukeh me'Avon" the Mei Sotah
will be effective -- would be incorrect.
(b) However, RASHI (DH Ein ha'Ish) does not seem to take this approach. He
seems to be saying that if the husband forgets about his wife's sin, then
the Mei Sotah will not be effective because he lived with her. Why,
according to Rashi, is the Gemara assuming that he lived with her during the
period that he forgot about her sin? The TOSFOS HA'ROSH explains that if
"v'Ne'elam" tells us that the husband forgot something, there must be a
reason why it is important to know that the husband forgot; it must be a
significant fact. There is, however, no significance to his forgetting
unless he did a sin during that period (i.e. he lived with her). In this
sense, the Ha'alamah of Sotah will be comparable to the Ha'alamah of Yedi'as
ha'Tum'ah in our Mishnah. That is why the Gemara asks that if there was a
Ha'alamah -- i.e. the husband forgot his wife's sin and because of that had
relations with his wife -- then the Mei Sotah should not be effective.
QUESTIONS: Rebbi derives from the word "v'Ne'elam" (Vayikra 5:2) the
requirement that there be an initial Ha'alamah (forgetting of prior
knowledge) in order for the person to be Chayav to bring a Korban for Tum'as
Mikdash v'Kodashav. "V'Ne'elam" implies that he already knew previously
about his Tum'ah. When the verse says "v'Hu Yada" (Vayikra 5:3) those words
imply a second Yedi'ah. From this we learn that one is Chayav to bring a
Korban only when he had a Yedi'ah at the beginning (before he sinned) and at
the end (after he sinned).
The Gemara challenges Rebbi's assumption that "v'Ne'elam" implies a previous
knowledge. The verse uses the word "v'Ne'elam" with regard to a husband's
knowledge of the actions of his wife who is a Sotah, and with regard to
knowledge of the Torah, and yet in those two cases there was no prior
knowledge. Abaye answers that when Rebbi says that there was prior knowledge
he means that the sinner knew about the sin of Tum'as Mikdash v'Kodashav
through "Yedi'as Beis Rabo," what he learned as a child in school, and that
knowledge is sufficient to qualify as prior knowledge to obligate him to
bring a Korban.
What was it that the person learned when he was a child? He learned that a
Sheretz is Metamei, and that a person who is Tamei may not eat Kodshim or
enter the Mikdash. TOSFOS (DH Yedi'ah) and other Rishonim explain that
according to Rebbi, the prior knowledge of these Halachos qualify as a
Yedi'ah b'Techilah, even if he *never forgot* them. The person who went into
the Mikdash knew the Halachos but was not aware that he himself was Tamei or
that he was entering the Mikdash (or eating Kodshim). Rebbi holds that a
person is Chayav to bring a Korban Oleh v'Yored in such a case since a prior
knowledge of the Halachos suffices, and there is no need to have knowledge
of the specific circumstances of his own sin; he only needs to know the
Halachos that apply.
This is how the Gemara answers the question. "V'Ne'elam" implies a vague
knowledge, and not a prior, clear knowledge. In the case of Sotah, there is
a vague knowledge but not a clear knowledge (TOSFOS DH Yedi'as).
The CHIDUSHEI HA'RAN explains the Gemara's answer differently. The Chidushei
ha'Ran suggests that the fact that the sinner must have Yedi'as Beis Rabo is
learned from the words "v'Ne'elam mi'Menu *v'Hu Tamei*." These words imply
that the sinner was not aware that he touched the Sheretz, but he was aware
of the Halachos of Tum'ah because he learned them in his youth.
RASHI explains the Gemara's answer differently. Rashi here (DH Yedi'as Beis
Rabo; the word "she'Hirgish" in Rashi should be amended to "v'Hirgish," or
omitted altogether, as in all of the old manuscripts of Rashi's text) here
and later (14b, DH O Dilma) explains that according to Rebbi, Yedi'as Beis
Rabo is enough to obligate the person if he once learned the Halachos of not
eating Kodshim and not entering the Mikdash while Tamei, and he knows what
makes a person Tamei. At the time that he touched the Sheretz, though, he
did not note that he became Tamei, even though he was aware that he touched
a Sheretz. It seems that Rashi means to say that it is indeed necessary for
the person to know that he touched the Sheretz in order for him to be Chayav
to bring a Korban Oleh v'Yored. Accordingly, when the Gemara says that
Yedi'as Beis Rabo is Mechayev him, it means that the person indeed learned
that a Sheretz is Metamei but at the time that he touched the Sheretz he
forgot that Halachah; consequently, although he was aware that he touched a
Sheretz, he was not aware that he became Tamei. (See TOSFOS 14b, DH O Dilma,
TOSFOS HA'ROSH here, CHASAM SOFER, and Acharonim.)
There are a number of difficulties with Rashi's explanation.
(a) First, from where does Rashi see that a person is Chayav to bring a
Korban only if he is aware that he touched a Sheretz? From the words of
Rashi (in DH Yedi'as), we might infer that this is learned from the words in
the verse, "v'Hu Yada," which imply that the person was aware of something
at the time that he sinned. However, from the Beraisa earlier (4b) it seems
that Rebbi understands "v'Hu Yada" to refer to Yedi'ah b'Sof, where the
sinner became aware of his sin after he sinned. It is *not* referring to the
moment at which he touched the Sheretz (see Insights there). What, then, is
Rashi's source that the sinner must be aware that he touched the Sheretz at
the time that he touched it? If the Gemara was not bothered by the Derashah
of the words "v'Hu Yada" until now, then why does Rashi find it necessary to
give a new explanation for that Derashah according to the conclusion of our
Gemara? (See the CHASAM SOFER's discussion of this at length, end of 4b.)
(b) In addition, according to Rashi, the person did not even have a Yedi'as
Beis Rabo at the time that he touched the Sheretz. How, then, can we infer
from the word "v'Ne'elam" -- which, like the words "v'Hu Yada," is
describing what the person was aware of at the time that he touched the
Sheretz -- that the person must have Yedi'as Beis Rabo? At the time that the
person touched the Sheretz, he no longer had a knowledge of what he learned
when he was a child! It seems that the Gemara was resorting to its previous
explanation, that "v'Ne'elam" implies a prior knowledge. However, if this is
true, then even according to the Gemara's conclusion, how has the Gemara
answered the verses which use the word "v'Ne'elam" with regard to a Sotah
and with regard to the Torah?
(c) Third, Rav Papa asks Abaye how is it possible to ever have a person who
has no Yedi'ah b'Techilah if it suffices to have learned the Halachos as a
child (for, presumably, every Jew learned the Halachos)? The Gemara answers
that such a person exists in the case of a child who was captured and raised
by Nochrim and was never able to learn the Halachos of Tum'as Mikdash.
According to Rashi, though, we can find a much simpler case of a person who
has no Yedi'ah b'Techilah: one who touched a Sheretz without realizing that
he touched it (even though he knows the Halachos)! (TOSFOS 14b, DH O Dilma,
cited by the GILYON HA'SHAS)
(a) Many Rishonim explain that Rashi does not mean to say that the person
forgot that a Sheretz makes him Tamei at the time that he touched it.
Rather, Rashi means that even at the time that he touched the Sheretz and he
realized that he touched the Sheretz, he knew that a Sheretz makes a person
Tamei. However, he did not take note of the fact that since he is touching a
Sheretz, he is now Tamei; he knew the Halachah only in theory, and he failed
to apply it in practice to his particular situation. (See RITVA and
According to this explanation, the Yedi'ah b'Techilah is the knowledge that
he touched the Sheretz. The knowledge of the Halachos (the Yedi'as Beis
Rabo) only serves to make that touching of the Sheretz qualify as a Yedi'ah
Thus, the argument between Rashi and the other Rishonim is that according to
the other Rishonim, the knowledge of the Halachos at the time that the
person touched the Sheretz qualifies as Yedi'ah b'Techilah even if he did
not know that he touched a Sheretz at the time that he touched it. Rashi
holds that the knowledge of the Halachos is not considered a Yedi'ah
b'Techilah unless that knowledge ought to have caused a Yedi'ah at the time
that the person touched the Sheretz. This occurs only if the person was
aware that he touched the Sheretz. The verse, though, clearly requires that
there be some knowledge at the time that he touches the Sheretz, according
to both Rashi and the other Rishonim.
(b) According to what we have explained, the answer of the Gemara to the
question from Sotah and Torah is the same according to Rashi and the other
Rishonim. Rashi will also explain that "v'Ne'elam" implies a vague Yedi'ah,
as Tosfos explains, or that Yedi'as Beis Rabo is not learned from
"v'Ne'elam" but from the words "v'Hu Tamei," as the Chidushei ha'Ran
(c) TOSFOS later (14b, DH O Dilma) and the RITVA here explain that according
to Rashi the Gemara indeed could have answered that an example of "Ein Bo
Yedi'ah b'Techilah" is when a person did not realize that he touched a
Sheretz. This answer also would have sufficed.
It seems that these Rishonim understood that even according to Rashi, Rav
Papa was not aware that the Yedi'as Beis Rabo must be accompanied with a
knowledge that the person touched a Sheretz. That is why he asked his
However, this answer is clearly lacking, since we do not find that the
Gemara explicitly disagrees with Rav Papa on this point. Where, then, did
Rashi find written in the Gemara that the person must know that he touched a
Sheretz? A number of Rishonim reject Rashi's explanation for this reason.
Perhaps we may suggest an answer to this question. The Mishnah says that
there are four different Yedi'os of Tum'ah, and it continues and tells us
which Korban atones when there is no Yedi'ah b'Techilah, this implies that
it is possible to have a situation in which the person has no prior
knowledge of any one of the four Yedi'os ha'Tum'ah mentioned in the Reisha
of the Mishnah.
In addition, we find in the Gemara later (14b) that Rebbi Yirmeyah asks that
if a person from Bavel who knows that there is a Beis ha'Mikdash, but does
not know where it is, enters the Beis ha'Mikdash while Tamei, is the
knowledge that there exists a Beis ha'Mikdash sufficient to be considered
Yedi'as Beis Rabo, or does he also have to know *where* the Beis ha'Mikdash
is located in order to be considered Yedi'as Beis Rabo? Rav Papa obviously
must hold that knowledge that there exists a Beis ha'Mikdash is sufficient,
for otherwise we would have an obvious case of "Ein Bo Yedi'ah
b'Techilah" -- the case of a person from Bavel who did not know where the
Beis ha'Mikdash is located, as Rebbi Yirmeyah discusses.
We may now suggest as follows. Rav Papa, in our Gemara, is asking how will
Rebbi find a case in which there is no Yedi'ah b'Techilah *of the Mikdash*?
That is, it is easy to find a case in which there is no Yedi'ah of Tum'ah at
first, since, according to Rashi, if the person was not aware that he
touched a Sheretz, then it is considered to be a lack of Yedi'as Tum'ah.
However, it can be considered a lack of Yedi'as *Mikdash* only if -- at the
time the person touched the Sheretz -- he was not aware that there was a
Beis ha'Mikdash in the world. (Similarly, it is not considered a lack of
Yedi'ah of Kodesh unless the person who touched the Sheretz was not aware
that there was any Kodshim in the world.)
This is why Rav Papa asks how can a person not know that there is a Mikdash?
If Yedi'as Beis Rabo is not sufficient, then it does not suffice to know
that there is a Mikdash; a person also must know exactly where the Mikdash
is (as the Gemara says on 14b). According to Rebbi, though, who holds that
Yedi'as Beis Rabo suffices, the very knowledge that a Beis ha'Mikdash exists
would be considered a Yedi'ah. How can we have a case in which there is no
Yedi'ah of Mikdash (or Kodesh) at the time that the person touches the
Sheretz? Abaye answers that indeed the only case where there is no Yedi'ah
of Mikdash, is where the person is a Tinok she'Nishba who, due to his
circumstances, had no knowledge that there was a Beis ha'Mikdash.
3) TWO "YETZI'OS" WHICH ARE FOUR
QUESTION: The Gemara explains what the Mishnah (2a) means when it says that
there are "two Yetzi'os of Shabbos which are four." The Gemara first
suggests that the four Yetzi'os refer to the Avos Melachos of Hotza'ah, but
not to the Toldos Melachos. The Gemara rejects this suggestion, because only
Hotza'ah is considered an Av Melachah, and there are only *two* cases of
Hotza'ah. Hachnasah is not considered an Av Melachah.
Rav Papa therefore concludes that our Mishnah is counting all of the cases
of carrying from one domain to another for which one is Chayav to bring a
Korban Chatas on Shabbos, whether it is an Av or a Toldah. This includes
The Gemara asks how the Mishnah can be referring to Hachnasah when it uses
the word "Yetzi'os," which implies *Hotza'ah*? Rav Ashi answers that the
word "Yetzi'os" can refer to Hachnasah as well as Hotza'ah, and he proves
this from the Mishnah in Shabbos which lists the Avos Melachos. The
concluding words of the Mishnah are, "ha'Motzi me'Reshus li'Reshus." Rav
Ashi says that it is clear that the Mishnah is referring to Hachnasah as
well, even though it refers to it as Hotza'ah ("ha'Motzi").
RASHI (DH Mi Lo Askinan) asks how Rav Ashi knows that the words "ha'Motzi
me'Reshus li'Reshus" include Hotza'ah. Rashi writes that those words must
include Hachnasah, since one is Chayav for doing Hachnasah as well, and
therefore it must be included in the words of that Mishnah.
Rashi's comment is very difficult to understand. Even though one is Chayav
for Hachnasah, that does not make it an Av Melachah! Rashi himself writes
(5a, DH Toldos) that Hachnasah is considered a Toldah since it is not
written explicitly in the verse, as the Gemara there teaches. Since the
Mishnah which says "ha'Motzi me'Reshus li'Reshus" is listing only the Avos
Melachos of Shabbos, why must it include Hachnasah which is a Toldah?
ANSWER: The TOSFOS HA'ROSH explains that the reason the Gemara assumes that
"ha'Motzi me'Reshus li'Reshus" includes Hachnasah is because the Mishnah
does not say "ha'Motzi me'Reshus ha'Yachid li'Reshus ha'Rabim," as the
Gemara explains a few lines later. This seems to be the approach of the
other Rishonim as well. Rashi, however, did not find this approach
satisfactory, because the Gemara did not yet make this inference from the
words " me'Reshus li'Reshus" at this stage. He therefore explains the proof
from the Mishnah in Shabbos in a different manner.
How, though, will Rashi answer our question?
Rashi's explanation here is based on his opinion expressed elsewhere. Rashi
understands that the term "Av Melachah" does not always refer to an Av as
opposed to the Toldah, but rather it means "a category of Melachah which the
Torah prohibits on Shabbos" -- including both Avos and Toldos Melachos
(Rashi to Shabbos 68a, DH Av Melachah, see Rashi to Shabbos 18a, DH
she'To'anin). The Mishnah which lists the thirty-nine Avos Melachos is not
listing Avos as opposed to Toldos, but rather it is listing thirty-nine
*categories* of Melachah, each of which may include many Toldos. Therefore,
the words "ha'Motzi me'Reshus li'Reshus" represent a category which includes
all of the Melachos d'Oraisa of Hotza'ah, both the Avos and the Toldos, and
thus it may be assumed that this category includes Hachnasah as well. (See
also Insights to Chulin 14:5 and Shabbos 2:2.)
According to Rashi, we must conclude that the words "ha'Motzi me'Reshus
li'Reshus" also include walking four Amos in Reshus ha'Rabim, since the
Mishnah is using a term which can refer to any of the Toldos of Hotza'ah.
How is carrying for a distance of four Amos in Reshus ha'Rabim included in
this phrase? Apparently, Rashi understands the Melachah of carrying four
Amos in Reshus ha'Rabim the way the BA'AL HA'ME'OR explains it in Shabbos
(96b). The "place" of a person extends four Amos around him. If he carries
an object from where he is standing to a distance four Amos away from him,
it is considered as though he moved it from its present Reshus to a
different Reshus (see Insights to Shabbos 96:3).