(Permission is granted to print and redistribute this material
as long as this header and the footer at the end are included.)


Prepared by Rabbi P. Feldman
of Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Yerushalayim
Rosh Kollel: Rabbi Mordecai Kornfeld

Ask A Question on the daf

Previous daf

Shevuos 31

Shevuos 31 - sponsored by Uri Wolfson with warm Mazel Tov wishes to Carey (Kalman) and Tammy Wolchok on the occasion of their wedding (on 22 Adar I 5763). May they merit to build together a Bayis Ne'eman b'Yisrael!

1) FALSE MATTERS (cont.)

(a) (Continuation of Beraisa): We learn the following laws from "Mi'Devar Sheker Tirchak":
1. If a Talmid in front of the judge sees why the poor person is innocent and the rich person is liable, he may not keep quiet;
2. If a Talmid sees that the judge is erring, he may not wait until a wrong verdict is given and then show what the verdict should be, in order that people will say the verdict in his name;
3. If a Rebbi told his Talmid 'You know that I would not lie for a fortune - Reuven owes me money, and I only have one witness against him', the Talmid may not join with him.
4. Objection: "Lo Sa'aneh b'Re'echa Ed Shaker" teaches this, not "Mi'Devar Sheker Tirchak"!
5. Correction: Rather, even if the Rebbi only asks 'Stand with my witness to make Reuven think that I have two witnesses (so he will admit)', it is forbidden.
6. If Shimon owes Levi 100, Levi may not claim 200 in order that Shimon will (deny half and) have to swear, enabling Levi to force Shimon to swear (through Gilgul) about another matter;
7. If Shimon owes Levi 100 and Levi claimed 200, Shimon may not deny the entire claim in Beis Din and admit to Levi outside of Beis Din, to exempt himself from the oath of partial admission (lest Levi force Shimon to swear through Gilgul about another matter);
8. If Reuven owes money to three partners and denies it, one may not claim the entire amount and bring the others as witnesses (in order to share the money with them).
9. If Shimon is dressed in rags, and Levi (his opo) is wearing very expensive clothing, Levi must supply Shimon with clothing like he is wearing, or must also dress in rags.
i. Rabah bar Rav Huna would tell litigants to remove their linen shoes before hearing the case.
10. A judge may not hear one party before the other party comes.
11. A party may not justify its claim to the judge before the other party comes.
i. Rav Kahana explains that the last two prohibitions are learned from "Lo Sisa Shema Shav (do not listen to a vain report; this may also be read 'Lo Sasi', do not give a vain report).
(b) (Rav): "Lo Tov Asah b'Soch Amav" - this is one who pleads on behalf of another through Harsha'ah (authorization); (Tosfos - this is when he accepts Harsha'ah because he is more likely to win in Beis Din, but if he accepts it because the litigant is unable to come to Beis Din, he does a Mitzvah.)
(c) (Shmuel): This is one who buys a contested field (confident that he will win in Beis Din, because he is powerful).
(a) (Mishnah): Shevu'as ha'Edus only applies to people fitting to testify.
(b) Question: What does this come to exclude?
(c) Answer #1 (Rav Papa): It excludes a king (he cannot testify, because it is below his honor to stand).
(d) Answer #2 (Rav Acha bar Yakov): It excludes a dice-player (mid'Rabanan, we consider gambling winnings like theft, because the loser did not firmly resolve to forfeit his money if he loses).
1. Rav Acha excludes even someone disqualified mid'Rabanan, all the more so a king who is disqualified mid'Oraisa;
2. Rav Papa excludes a king, who is disqualified mid'Oraisa, but he would say that a dice-player, who is only disqualified mid'Rabanan, is liable for Shevu'as ha'Edus.
(e) (Mishnah - R. Meir): (When he swears himself) he is liable in or outside of Beis Din...(Chachamim say, whether he swears himself or the oath is imposed on him, he is only liable if he denies in Beis Din).
(f) Question: On what do they argue?
(g) Answer #1 (Rabanan): R. Meir holds 'Dun Minah u'Minah' (when a matter is learned from another matter, we copy (learn) the entire framework of the source); Chachamim hold 'Dun Minah v'Uki b'Asra' (when we learn a law, we apply it to the framework of the matter being learned).
1. R. Meir learns, just as Shevu'as ha'Pikadon applies when he swears himself, also Shevu'as ha'Edus;
i. Also, just as Shevu'as ha'Pikadon applies in or outside of Beis Din, also Shevu'as ha'Edus.
2. Chachamim also learn, just as Shevu'as ha'Pikadon applies when he swears himself, also Shevu'as ha'Edus;
i. However, they apply this to the framework of Shevu'as ha'Edus (the Torah discusses an oath imposed on a witness, and this is only in Beis Din).

(h) Rejection (Rav Papa): Chachamim also hold Dun Minah u'Minah; if they learned Shevu'as ha'Edus from Shevu'as ha'Pikadon, they would agree with R. Meir;
(i) Answer #2 (Rav Papa): (R. Meir learns as above;) Chachamim learn from a Kal va'Chomer.
1. One is liable even when the oath is imposed on him, all the more so if he swears himself!
2. The principle of 'Dayo' says that we cannot learn more than the source of the Kal va'Chomer: when the oath is imposed on him, he is only liable in Beis Din, also when he swears himself.
(j) Objection (Rabanan): Chachamim surely hold Dun Minah v'Uki b'Asra!
1. (Mishnah - R. Meir): Shevu'as ha'Pikadon (the oath of watchmen) applies to men and women, to strangers and relatives, to Kosher and invalid witnesses;
i. When he swears himself, it applies in or outside of Beis Din; if the oath is imposed on him, he is only liable if he denies in Beis Din.
2. Chachamim say, whether he swears himself or the oath is imposed on him, he is liable (even outside of Beis Din).
3. Question: What is Chachamim's source that one is liable if the oath is imposed on him?
4. Answer: They learn from Shevu'as ha'Edus - but they apply to it the law of Shevu'as ha'Pikadon (to be liable everywhere)!
(k) Answer (Rav Papa): Indeed, from there you can prove that Chachamim hold Dun Minah v'Uki b'Asra, but not from our Mishnah. (Tosfos - and from our Mishnah you can prove that R. Meir holds Dun Minah u'Minah.)
(a) (Mishnah): One is liable (for intentionally swearing falsely) when he knows the (punishment for the) oath;
(b) Question: What is the source of this?
(c) Answer (Beraisa): It does not say 'v'Ne'elam' by Shevu'as ha'Edus, only by the other Parshiyos of Oleh v'Yored, to teach that one is liable for intentional transgression just as for unintentional.
(d) (Mishnah): He is liable also if he does not know the oath, if he remembers the testimony.
(e) Question: What is the case of not knowing the oath, but remembering the testimony?
(f) Answer (Rav Yehudah): He knows that it is forbidden to swear falsely, but he does not remember if he is liable for this.
(g) (Mishnah): He is exempt if he was totally Shogeg.
(h) Suggestion: Our Mishnah proves that Rav Kahana or Rav Asi (who swore about what he thought Rav said, and was wrong (26A)) was guiltless. (And it is difficult, why was he worried?)
(i) Rejection: No - our Mishnah exempts regarding Shevu'as ha'Edus, by which it does not say 'v'Nelam', therefore he is exempt if he forgot;
1. Regarding oaths of Bituy, by which it says "V'Nelam", one might have thought that he is liable even when he mistakenly swore falsely - Rav had to tell him that this is not so.
(a) (Mishnah): Shevu'as ha'Edus: Reuven told the witnesses 'Come testify for me'; they *swore*, 'We do not know testimony for you';
1. Or, if they *said*, 'We do not know testimony for you', Reuven said 'I impose this on you in an oath', and they answered 'Amen'';
2. (If they were lying) they are liable.
(b) If Reuven made them swear five times outside of Beis Din, and they came to Beis Din and admitted that they know, they are exempt;
1. If they denied knowing, they are liable five times.
(c) If Reuven made them swear five times in Beis Din, they are liable only once.
(d) R. Shimon: This is because once they swear that they do not know, they can no longer testify.
(e) If both witnesses simultaneously denied knowing, they are liable; if one denied after the other, the first is liable, the latter is exempt;
(f) If one denied and the other admitted knowing, the denier is liable, the one who admitted is exempt.
(g) If there were two pairs of witnesses, and one pair denied after the other, both pairs are liable, for either pair could have testified.
Next daf


For further information on
subscriptions, archives and sponsorships,
contact Kollel Iyun Hadaf,