POINT BY POINT SUMMARY
Prepared by Rabbi P. Feldman
of Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Yerushalayim
Rosh Kollel: Rabbi Mordecai Kornfeld
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Previous daf Shevuos 32
1) CONDITIONS OF LIABILITY
(a) (Gemara - Shmuel): If the claimant was running after
witnesses; and they said, 'Why chase us? We swear, we do
not know testimony for you!', they are exempt;
2) WHICH WITNESSES ARE LIABLE FOR DENYING?
1. One is liable only if the claimant asked him to
(b) Question: What is the Chidush? A Mishnah teaches this!
1. (Mishnah): The claimant sent his slave to ask the
witnesses to testify, or the defendant made them
swear - they are exempt,
(c) Answer: The case when he runs after them is a Chidush;
2. One is liable only if the claimant asked him to
1. One might have thought, this is like asking them to
testify - Shmuel teaches, this is not so.
(d) Question: This also is learned from our Mishnah!
1. (Mishnah): Shevu'as ha'Edus: Reuven *told* the
witnesses 'Come testify for me'; they swore...
(e) Answer: No, (without Shmuel) one could say that telling
them is not essential, they are liable even if he did not
ask them to testify.
2. Inference: Had he not told them, they would be
(f) Support: We must say thusly regarding Shevu'as
1. (Mishnah): Shevu'as ha'Pikadon: Shimon *told* Levi
'Give me the deposit you are holding for me'...
(g) Objection: If you say that 'told' in our Mishnah is
essential, we can say that the Tana also taught it in
that Mishnah for parallel structure;
i. We cannot say that this is only if he told him
- "V'Chichesh ba'Amiso", any denial (i.e. even
if there was no claim).
ii. Rather, we must say that 'told' in that Mishnah
is not essential - the same applies to our
1. But the Tana would not teach it in both Mishnayos if
it is not essential in either!
(h) Answer: Perhaps the Tana teaches the normal case (he does
not swear until he hears a claim).
(i) Support (for Shmuel -- Beraisa): If the claimant was
approaching witnesses; and they said, 'Why pursue us? We
swear, we do not know testimony for you!', they are
1. By a similar case of swearing to deny a deposit, he
(j) (Mishnah): If Reuven made them swear five times...
(k) Question: What is the source that they are only liable
for denial in Beis Din?
(l) Answer (Abaye): "Im Lo Yagid v'Nasa Avono" - this only
applies where their testimony would have obligated the
defendant to pay, i.e. in Beis Din.
(m) Question (Rav Papa): If so, we should say that also the
oath must be in Beis Din!
(n) Answer (Abaye - Beraisa): "L'Achas" - this teaches that
they are liable for every oath;
1. This must be outside of Beis Din, for in Beis Din,
they are only liable once!
i. (Mishnah): If Reuven made them swear five times
in Beis Din, they are liable only once.
2. We must say, only the denial is in Beis Din, but the
oath can be outside of Beis Din.
ii. R. Shimon: This is because once they swear that
they do not know, they can no longer testify.
(a) (Mishnah): If both witnesses simultaneously denied
knowing, they are liable.
3) LIABILITY OF A LONE WITNESS
(b) Question: It is impossible that that two events (their
denials) occur simultaneously!
(c) Answer #1 (Rav Chisda): The Mishnah is R. Yosi ha'Galili,
who says that it is possible for that two events to occur
(d) Answer #2 (R. Yochanan): The Mishnah can even be
Chachamim; the case is, they denied within Toch Kedai
Dibur of each other;
1. Anything said Toch Kedai Dibur is considered
connected to the previous statement.
(e) Question (Rav Acha mi'Difti): Toch Kedai Dibur is the
time needed to greet one's Rebbi, i.e. to say three or
1. One cannot say 'We swear that we do not know
testimony for you' in this time (in Hebrew, this is
(f) Answer (Ravina): It suffices that each witness *begin*
swearing Toch Kedai Dibur of the previous witness.
(a) (Mishnah): If one witness denied after the other, the
first is liable, the latter is exempt.
(b) Suggestion: Our Mishnah is not like R. Elazar b'Rebbi
1. (Beraisa): If there is only one witness, he is
exempt for Shevu'as ha'Edus;
(c) Rejection: Abaye holds that all agree that one witness
does not obligate money (as we shall see from the
explanation of the following).
2. R. Elazar b'Rebbi Shimon says, he is liable.
(Therefore, in our Mishnah, even after the first
witness denied, the second would be liable.)
3. Suggestion: Chachamim hold that one witness only
obligates the defendant to swear, R. Elazar holds
that he obligates paying money (Rashi; Rashba -
since he is fitting to join with another witness to
obligate money, we consider that he comes to
1. (Abaye): Chachamim and R. Elazar b'Rebbi Shimon
agree about one witness (who denied knowing
testimony) about a Sotah (all these cases will be
explained later), and about (two) witnesses about a
Sotah, they argue about witnesses about a Sotah;
(d) Answer: Rather, all agree that one witness only obligates
the defendant to swear;
2. They agree about one witness, and when (the
defendant) is suspected to swear falsely (and is
therefore disqualified from swearing).
1. R. Elazar holds that something which *enables* one
to get money is considered like money (had the
witness testified, presumably the defendant would
have paid, he would not swear falsely);
(e) (Abaye): Chachamim and R. Elazar b'Rebbi Shimon agree
about one witness about a Sotah, and about witnesses
about a Sotah, they argue about witnesses about a Sotah;
they agree about one witness, and when (the defendant) is
disqualified from swearing.
2. Chachamim say, something which enables one to get
money is not like money.
1. They agree that one witness about a Sotah is liable,
if he saw that she sinned in seclusion, for the
Torah believes him like two witnesses (his testimony
would have exempted the husband from her Kesuvah);
i. "V'Ed Ein Bah" - but if even one witness
testifies (that she had relations), he is
2. They agree that (two) witnesses about a Sotah are
exempt, witnesses who saw the husband warn her -
their testimony only *enables* that something else
(seclusion) can *enable* him to profit (if she will
refuse to drink, or will die).
3. They argue about witnesses about a Sotah, witnesses
who saw seclusion (their testimony would *enable*
him to profit if she would refuse to drink or die);
(f) (Rav Papa): Chachamim and R. Elazar agree that one
witness that a man died (he is believed to permit the
widow to remarry, and to collect her Kesuvah) is liable
(we will explain the case), they agree that (in a
different case) he is exempt.
i. R. Elazar holds that this is like (testimony
about) money, they are liable; Chachamim say,
it is not like money, they are exempt.
4. They agree that one witness (is liable) when the
other party is disqualified from swearing.
i. Question: Who is disqualified?
5. They agree that one witness (is liable) in a case
such as the following.
ii. Answer #1: (Only) the borrower (the defendant);
had the witnesses testified, the lender would
have sworn instead and collected.
iii. Rejection: This only *enables* money, perhaps
the lender would not want to swear (so
Chachamim would argue)!
iv. Answer #2: Rather, both parties are
v. When both are disqualified, the obligation to
swear reverts to the defendant; since he cannot
swear, he must pay.
6. One witness testified in front of R. Ami that Reuven
grabbed an ingot from Shimon; Reuven said 'Yes, I
grabbed it - it is mine!'
7. Question (R. Ami): What is the law? We cannot
obligate Reuven based on one witness, nor can we
totally exempt him!
8. Suggestion: He should swear to contradict the
9. Version #1 (Rashi) Rejection: He cannot contradict
it, for he admits that he took it, nor is he
believed to say 'Shimon was holding *my* ingot'.
i. He is unable to swear (in this case), just as a
thief (is never believed to swear).
10. Version #2 (Tosfos) Rejection: Since he admits that
he took it, and we assume that it was Shimon's (for
Shimon was holding it), Reuven is like a thief (who
is not believed to swear).
11. Answer (R. Aba): He is obligated to swear, but he
cannot, therefore he must pay.
1. He is exempt if he told her that her husband died,
but when she brought him to Beis Din to testify, he
swore that he does not know;
(g) Inference: Rav Papa holds that a witness who swears that
he does not know testimony about land is liable (Kesuvos
are only collected from land).
i. (Mishnah): A woman who says that her husband
died (even if she only heard from someone else)
is believed to remarry or (if it is a situation
of Yibum) to do Yibum. (Since she would have
been believed to say 'I heard that my husband
died', when she asked him to testify, his
testimony would not have helped her; therefore
he is exempt, even though now that he denied,
she is not believed and cannot remarry or
collect her Kesuvah.)
2. He is liable if he did not tell her that her husband
died and swore in Beis Din that he does not know.
(h) Rejection: Perhaps he only teaches about when she was
holding Metaltelim from which to collect it.
(i) (Mishnah): If one denied and the other admitted (the
denier is liable, the one who admitted is exempt).
(j) Question: We already learned that if the second witness
denied longer than Toch Kedai Dibur after the first, he
is exempt, all the more so if he admits that he knows!
(k) Answer: The Mishnah teaches, even if both denied, and
Toch Kedai Dibur one retracted and admitted that he
1. This teaches that anything said Toch Kedai Dibur is
considered connected to the previous statement (it
is as if he admitted before he finished denying).
(l) (Mishnah): If there were two pairs of witnesses, and one
pair denied after the other (both pairs are liable).
2. We understand according to Rav Chisda, who explained
that the Mishnah is R. Yosi ha'Galili;
i. The first clause teaches that it is possible
for that two events to occur simultaneously,
the latter teaches that anything said Toch
Kedai Dibur is connected to the previous
3. Question: R. Yochanan said that the Mishnah can be
like Chachamim, (in the first clause) they denied
within Toch Kedai Dibur of each other;
i. There are two clauses teaching that anything
said Toch Kedai Dibur is connected to the
4. Answer: One might have thought, two denials Toch
Kedai Dibur of each other are like one, but an
admission Toch Kedai Dibur of a denial is like a new
matter - the Mishnah teaches, this is not so.
(m) Question: We understand why the second pair is liable,
the first pair already denied, so the denial of the
second pair stops the claimant from collecting;
1. But when the first pair denied, this did not stop
the claimant from collecting, the second pair could
(n) Answer (Ravina): The case is, when the first pair denied,
the second pair were invalid witnesses, because they were
related (Rashi - to each other; R. Chananel - to a party
of the case) through their wives, who were Gosesos (close
1. One might have thought, since most Gosesos die, the
second pair is standing to become valid and the
first pair is exempt - the Mishnah teaches, this is