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Shevuos 31

SHEVUOS 31 - sponsored by Uri Wolfson with warm Mazel Tov wishes to Carey (Kalman) and Tammy Wolchok on the occasion of their wedding (on 22 Adar I 5763). May they merit to build together a Bayis Ne'eman b'Yisrael!


(a) The Beraisa continues with its numerous interpretations of "mi'Devar Sheker Tirchak", and includes a case of a Din Merumeh.
What is a Din Merumeh?

(b) And how does the Tana apply the Pasuk to a Talmid sitting in front of his Rebbe?
In which case will the Talmid contravene this Asei by remaining silent?

(c) In order to fulfill the Mitzvah in question, what should a Talmid do if he perceives his Rebbe issuing an erroneous ruling? What should he not do?

(a) According to the original text, under what circumstances does the Beraisa forbid a Talmid to become a second witness to testify that his Rebbe had lent someone money?

(b) What problem do we have with that?

(c) So how do we amend the Beraisa?

(a) What would be the point of ...
  1. ... a creditor claiming two hundred Zuz from someone who owes him a Manah, knowing that the defendant will swear and only pay a hundred anyway?
  2. ... a debtor denying a claim in Beis-Din with the intention of admitting to it outside Beis-Din?
(b) Why are both of these forbidden?

(c) If three people lent one person money, may they split up, one of them appearing in Beis-Din as the creditor, the other two as witnesses, to obtain the money that is rightfully theirs?

(a) What do Beis-Din tell a litigant who arrives in a smart suit, if the other contestant appears in tatters? Why is that?

(b) What is the source of this Halachah?

(c) What would Rava bar Rav Huna say to litigants who arrived in court wearing expensive socks?

(a) The Beraisa incorporates the case of a Dayan hearing out a litigant or of the litigant stating his case to the Dayan, before his fellow litigant has arrived, in "mi'Devar Sheker Tirchak".
From where does Rav Kahana learn the latter?

(b) Rav applies the Pasuk in Yechezkel "va'Asher Lo Tov Asah" to someone who claims money by means of a Harsha'ah.
What is a 'Harsha'ah'?

(c) Why is it not right to do that?

(d) Shmuel interprets the Pasuk with regard to a sale.
What sort of sale?

(a) We learned in our Mishnah that Shevu'as ha'Eidus is confined to people who are fit to testify. According to Rav Papa, this precludes a king.
Why is a king disqualified from testifying?

(b) Whom does it preclude according to Rav Acha bar Ya'akov?

(c) If Rav Acha bar Ya'akov agrees with Rav Papa, why does Rav Papa not agree with Rav Acha bar Ya'akov?

(d) Assuming that a gambler is Pasul because he does not acquire the money legally, why is he not Pasul mi'd'Oraysa? Who is?

(a) We learned in our Mishnah, in connection with Shevu'as ha'Eidus, the Machlokes between Rebbi Meir ('bi'Fnei Beis-Din ve'she'Lo bi'Fenei Beis-Din') and the Chachamim ('ad she'Yachperu be'Veis-Din').
The Rabbanan explained to Rav Papa that the Machlokes is based on whether we say 'Don Minah u'Minah' or 'Don Minah ve'Ukeih be'Asrah'.
What does 'Don Minah u'Minah' mean?

(b) According to them, we learn Shevu'as ha'Eidus from Shevu'as ha'Pikadon (with a 'Gezeirah-Shavah' "Secheta" "Secheta".
What does Rebbi Meir now learn from Shevu'as ha'Pikadon?

(c) After learning Shevu'as ha'Eidus from Shevu'as ha'Pikadon 'mi'Pi Atzmo', what do the Chachamim then say?

(d) Rav Papa disagrees with the Rabbanan.
From where will the Chachamim learn 'mi'Pi Atzmo' according to him, if not from the 'Gezeirah-Shavah'?

(e) What do they hold in principle, regarding the She'eilah of 'Don Minah u'Minah' or 'Don Minah ve'Uki be'Asrah'?

Answers to questions



(a) In the Mishnah in Shevu'as ha'Pikadon, Rebbi Meir incorporates all cases (ba'Anashim u've'Nashim ... mi'Pi Atzmo and mi'Pi Acherim') in 'Shevu'as ha'Pikadon', provided the latter takes place in front of Beis-Din.
What do the Chachamim say?

(b) Bearing in mind that by Shevu'as ha'Pikadon, the Torah writes "Asher Yishava Alav la'Shaker" (implying 'al-Pi Atzmo'), the Rabbanan must learn 'mi'Pi Acherim from a 'Gezeirah-Shavah'.
How do we know that the Rabbanan do not learn it from a Kal 'va'Chomer' from 'mi'Pi Atzmo'?

(c) What is then the basis of their Machlokes with Rebbi Meir?

(d) What did Rav Papa reply, when the Rabbanan proved to him from here that the Chachamim's reasoning is based on the principle of 'Don Minah ve'Ukeih be'Asrah' and not on a 'Kal va'Chomer (as he maintained)?

9) We learned in our Mishnah that Shevu'as ha'Eidus is ...
1. ... Chayav a Korban for Z'don Shevu'ah. Considering that the other cases comprising Korban Oleh ve'Yored (Shevu'as Bituy and Tum'as Mikdash) are only Chayav for a Shogeg, how do we know that Shevu'as ha'Eidus is different?
2. ... not Chayav for a pure Shogeg (if at the time when the witnesses swore, they genuinely forgot that they had witnessed whatever it was that they were asked to testify on), then they are Patur. In that case, in Perek Shevu'as Shetayim, why did Rav need to inform Rav Kahana and Rav Asi that they whoever had misquoted him did not need to worry ... ? Why did they not know it themselves from our Mishnah?
(a) We have already discussed the issue of 'mi'Pi Atzmo u'mi'Pi Acherim'. What can we infer from our Mishnah in a case where, following the witnesses denial, the litigant makes an oath and they remain silent, or repeat that they know nothing about it?

(b) What will be the Din if the litigant makes the witnesses swear outside Beis-Din and they answer 'Amen', but then admit in front of Beis-Din?

(c) If the litigant makes the witnesses swear five Shevu'os outside Beis-Din, which they deny in front of Beis-Din, the Tana obligates them to bring five Korbanos. What does he say in a case where they deny the five Shevu'os that he makes them make, in front to Beis-Din? On what principle does Rebbi Shimon base this latter ruling?

(d) If both witnesses testify together, they are Chayav.
What does our Mishnah rule in a case where ...

  1. ... one denies and one admits?
  2. ... first one pair of witnesses deny knowledge of the testimony, and then a second pair do likewise?
(a) What does Shmuel say about a case where the witnesses face the litigant who has been running after them, and, before he has a chance to say anything, they swear that they know nothing? Why is that?

(b) What does the Mishnah later say about a litigant who sends his Eved to fetch the witnesses, and he makes them swear, or if the defendant does so on behalf of the claimant?

(c) In view of this Mishnah, what is Shmuel coming to teach us?

Answers to questions

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