THOUGHTS ON THE DAILY DAF
brought to you by Kollel Iyun Hadaf of Har Nof
Rosh Kollel: Rav Mordecai Kornfeld
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YEVAMOS 86-95 - Ari Kornfeld has generously sponsored the Dafyomi
publications for these Dafim for the benefit of Klal Yisrael.
1) THE REASON FOR THE PROHIBITION OF SEPARATING TERUMOS AND MA'ASEROS ON
QUESTION: The Gemara says that it is prohibited mid'Rabanan to separate
Terumos and Ma'aseros on Shabbos because doing so involves "Tiltul Muktzah,"
handling Muktzah (because Tevel is Muktzah).
Why does the Gemara say that the reason is because of Tiltul? The Gemara in
Beitzah (37a) implies that the reason is because of a Gezeirah to prevent
one from conducting business transactions (Mekach u'Memkar), because when
one is Makdish an item to Hekdesh, one thereby transfers its ownership to
Hekdesh. Separating Terumos and Ma'aseros is also prohibited for that
reason. RASHI in Beitzah (9a, DH Ochel v'Holech) gives another reason to
prohibit it; he says that the act of separating Terumos makes the produce
edible, and thus it is prohibited because it appears like one is fixing an
item (Metaken). Why, then, does the Gemara here say that it is prohibited
because of Tiltul? (REBBI AKIVA EIGER in GILYON HA'SHAS)
ANSWER: The TOSFOS YOM HA'KIPURIM (Yoma 83b) says that both prohibitions
exist. The Isur of Metaken is necessary for a case when one does not need to
pick up or handle the Tevel (such as when the fruit is already separated
into two piles, and one merely has to designate one of the piles as the
Terumah fruits), in which case there is no Tiltul.
Why, though, does the Gemara mention the smaller problem of Tiltul, if
Metaken is all-encompassing and applies in every case?
The Gemara is saying that although the Isur d'Rabanan of Tiltul is a very
strong Isur which is on par with an Isur d'Oraisa (as the TOSFOS YESHANIM
says in Beitzah 3b), nevertheless it is only a d'Rabanan, and thus it cannot
be what the Torah is referring to in the verse "Lema'an Tilmad l'Yir'ah." It
goes without saying that the Isurim of Metaken and Mekach u'Memkar are
certainly not what the Torah is referring to. The point the Gemara is making
is that we should not think that Tiltul, which is Asur mi'Divrei Kabalah --
it is learned from verses in the Nevi'aim, (Shabbos 123b) -- is considered
an Isur d'Oraisa. (M. Kornfeld -- see Insights to Yoma 83b.)
2) CAN A SINGLE WITNESS EXEMPT A WOMAN FROM YIBUM
QUESTION: The Gemara discusses whether the testimony of a single witness is
accepted to permit a woman to marry in cases other than that of the Mishnah
(87b). The second version of the Gemara asserts that a single witness is
certainly believed to say that the woman's husband died in order to allow
her to do Yibum when her husband had no children. This is because a single
witness is believed *more* than a woman is believed, and we know that a
woman alone is believed to say that her husband died without children and
thereby permit herself to do Yibum (114b). The question is only if a single
witness is believed to testify that a woman does *not* have to do Yibum (by
testifying that her Yavam died, or that her husband died before his children
died), even though there is a Chazakah that she is obligated to do Yibum. In
such a case, the woman is not believed, as the Mishnah later says.
The Gemara inquires whether the single witness should be believed because
his testimony is "Avida Ligluyei" (will eventually become known), or whether
he is not believed because the woman does not carefully attempt to verify
the facts because she wants to exempt herself from Yibum, since she hates
Why does the Gemara ask specifically about the Halachah in this case -- when
the single witness testifies against the Chazakah and says that the woman is
*not* obligated to do Yibum? The same can be asked about a case where he
testifies against a Chazakah that she is exempt from Yibum, testifying that
she *is* obligated to do Yibum (such as by testifying that her husband died
after his children died)! (TOSFOS DH Ki)
(a) TOSFOS first answers that the two questions are indeed identical, and
the Gemara mentions the question of a witness permitting her to marry by
exempting her from Yibum because it happens to be that this was the question
that was posed due to an incident than occurred at the time.
(b) The RAMBAN and other Rishonim suggest that the Gemara chose the case of
exempting her from Yibum in order to teach the point that even though
exempting her from Yibum involves only a question of an Isur Lav (the Isur
of Yevamah la'Shuk) and not an Isur Kares, and, in addition, even though the
testimony of the single witness that the Yavam died is something that is
"Avida Ligluyei" (will become known later) -- nevertheless it is not clear
that the witness should be believed, because the woman might not check it
out so carefully.
(c) TOSFOS and the RA'AVAD (cited by the Ramban) suggest another
explanation. They say that although we find that a woman is not believed,
without the testimony of witnesses, to permit herself to the Yavam (by
saying that her child died before her husband died), it is not because she
does not check it out. The love for a Yavam does not overcome the woman's
common sense to persuade her to testify that her husband is dead without
checking it out. Why, then, is she not believed? She is not believed because
the reason to be lenient of "Mishum Iguna" does not apply, since there will
be no "Igun" if she does not end up becoming permitted to the Yavam. If so,
when there is a single witness testifying that she is permitted to the
Yavam, the testimony of the witness *combined with* the fact that a woman
checks the story out for herself provide enough reason to be lenient (even
when there is no "Igun") and to allow her to theYavam.
On the other hand, when the woman testifies that she is *not* obligated to
do Yibum, then not only is there no reason to be lenient because of "Iguna"
(since she will not be left unable to marry; she can marry the Yavam), but
we also suspect that she will not properly verify that she is really exempt.
Since we suspect her of hating the Yavam, she will fail to investigate
whether she is really exempt from Yibum, for her hate *can* overcome her
common sense. The emotion of hate tends to be more powerful than the emotion
Therefore, even when a single witness testifies on her behalf, his testimony
cannot be accepted because we do not have the added factor that the woman
checks out the facts for herself carefully. That is why the Gemara questions
only what the Halachah is with regard to *exempting* her from Yibum.