ANSWERS TO REVIEW QUESTIONS
prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem
Previous daf Yevamos 24
YEVAMOS 24 - sponsored by Jeff Ram (Atlanta/Jerusalem), an avid Dafyomi
learner and loyal supporter of Kollel Iyun Hadaf. May he and his wife have
much Nachas from the young couple, David and Rachel, as well as all their
other children and grandchildren!
(a) We learn 'Mitzvah be'Gadol le'Yabeim' - from "ve'Hayah he'B'chor".
(b) If a younger brother performs Yibum with his Yevamah, he nevertheless
(c) We learn from the Pasuk ...
- ... "Asher Teiled" - that an Aylonis is Patur from Yibum.
- ... "ve'Lo Yimacheh Sh'mo mi'Yisrael" - that the wife of a eunuch does not require Yibum.
(a) We learn from the Pasuk "Yakum al Shem Achiv" - that, whichever Yavam
performs Yibum, inherits all the property of his deceased brother.
(b) The Torah does not mean that the son who is subsequently born should be
called by the same name as the deceased brother - because we learn from the
Gezeirah-Shavah "Yakum Al *Sheim* Achiv" (here) and "Al *Sheim* Acheihem
Yikar'u be'Nachalasam" (by Ephrayim and Menasheh) that the Pasuk is
referring to inheritance.
(c) Regarding this D'rashah - Rava tells us that this is the only place in
the Torah where the D'rashah (the Gezeirah-Shavah) is accepted and the
simple explanation ignored.
(d) According to the simple explanation, the Torah is saying that the baby
that is born to them should be called after his deceased uncle. If the
Torah was speaking to the Yavam, it should have written "Yakum al Shem
*Achicha*"; if it is speaking to the Beis-Din, it should have written "Yakum
al Shem *Achi Aviv*". In fact, the Torah is speaking to the Beis-Din, and
instructing them to tell the Yavam how he should name his first-born child.
(a) In spite of the fact that the Torah writes "Bechor", we know that it is
not confined specifically to the first-born - because otherwise, why would
it need to preclude Eishes Achiv she'Lo Hayah be'Olamo from Yibum (seeing as
he is obviously not the first-born).
(b) Nor can 'Eishes Achiv she'Lo Hayah be'Olamo' refer to a *maternal*
brother - because the Torah connects Yibum with inheritance (as we have
already learned), so it must be a *paternal* Bechor who performs Yibum, and
not a maternal one who does not.
(c) We learn from here - that it is the oldest paternal brother who has the
initial onus to perform Yibum.
(a) We know that the Torah does not write "Bechor" to tell us that when
there is a Bechor, the Mitzvah takes place with any of the brothers, and
when there is not, it doesn't - because the Torah writes "u'Meis Achad
Meihem", implying whichever of the brothers dies, even if it is the oldest,
and it goes on to say that the Bechor should perform Yibum.
(b) The Pasuk of "u'Meis Achad Meihem" cannot be speaking when the younger
brother died, and it is the Bechor who performs Yibum - because if that were
so, back comes the Kashya why would the Torah then need to preclude Eishes
Achiv she'Lo Hayah be'Olamo from Yibum.
(c) Nor can we say that - when there is no Bechor, then a younger brother
who performed Yibum may retain his Yevamah, but when there is, then it is
*only* the oldest brother who can perform Yibum - because the Torah writes
"Ki Yeishvu Achim Yachdav", placing *all* the brothers in the realm of
(a) When the Tana (quoted by Abaye Keshisha) says 'Mitzvah be'Gadol
le'Yabeim; Lo Ratzah, *Holchin Eitzel Achiv ha'Katan*; Lo Ratzah ... ' - he
means that the initial Chiyuv lies on the oldest, then the obligation passes
on to the one who is younger than him and so on. This proves that, even when
there is no Bechor, the initial obligation lies on the oldest brother.
In spite of the fact that there is no practical difference between a Bechor
and the oldest brother who is not a Bechor - the Torah nevertheless refers
to the oldest brother as "Bechor" to teach us that the Yavam only receives
the inheritance that is available from their father at the time of his
brother's death, but not what the father will only obtain later (like a
Bechor regarding his extra portion) - see also Hagahos ha'Gra.
(b) We cannot learn this from the previous words 'Mitzvah be'Gadol
le'Yabeim' - because that could be referring to the Bechor (and we are
speaking here specifically when there is no Bechor). Otherwise, we would
have brought the proof from the Mishnah in ha'Choletz 'Lo Ratzah, Chozrin
(c) We know that even if another brother other than the Bechor performs
Yibum, he still takes his deceased brother's property - because the Torah
writes "Yakum al Sheim Achiv", which he did.
(a) Someone who is suspected of having had relations with a Shifchah is
forbidden to marry her when she is set free, and the same applies to a
Nochris who converts - because he creates a bad name for himself, by
substantiating the Kol.
(b) Should he nevertheless marry her however - he is not obligated to
divorce her .
(c) On the other hand, someone who is suspected of adultery with a married
woman *is* obligated to divorce her, should he marry her after her divorce -
because in this case, it is the Torah that forbids the adulterer (as well as
the woman's husband), to live with her.
(a) Rebbi Nechemyah declares the conversion of a man who converted in order
to marry a Jewess, or vice-versa, invalid.
Rebbi Elazar learns from the Pasuk "Hein Gor Yagur Efes mei'Osi; Mi Gar
Itach Alayich Yipol" - that it is only those Nochrim who converted when
Yisrael were on a low, who will join them in Olam ha'Ba.
(b) He also disqualifies conversions for reasons of wealth, prestige, terror
of wild animals, superstition or fear of retaliation. When he says 'ad
she'Yisgayru bi'Z'man ha'Zeh' - he means that their conversion is only
valid, if they converted when Yisrael were downtrodden, like they were in
(c) Our Mishnah implies that the conversion of a Nochri who converts for one
of these reasons is legal - because it forbids a man from marrying a woman
with whom he is suspected of having had an affair, should she subsequently
convert, insinuating that her conversion is nevertheless valid?
(d) Rav is quoted as ruling like the Rabbanan of Rebbi Nechemyah, who
validates all of the above conversions - in which case, the author of our
Mishnah will be the Rabbanan.
(a) According to Rav, our Mishnah (which requires the suspected adulterer to
divorce the woman, if he married her) speaks when there are witnesses that
he committed adultery with her. Rav Sheishes comments - that Rav must have
been asleep when he said this.
(b) He attempts to repudiate Rav's statement - from the Beraisa which
permits the suspected adulterer to remain with the woman, if she first
married someone else and was then divorced from him. But surely, if there
two witnesses, the woman would remain forbidden to the adulterer even if
someone else married her first? Consequently, the Tana must be speaking when
two witnesses did not witness what took place, and we can now infer that,
had someone else not married her, she would be forbidden, in spite of the
absence of two witnesses (contrary to Rav's opinion)?
(c) We reject this however, by pointing out that the Tana needs to add that
someone else married her first - to teach us that even though someone else
married her first, the adulterer is nevertheless forbidden to marry her
Lechatchilah (and not to insinuate that, had someone else not married her,
she would be forbidden).
(a) If the suspected adulterer subsequently married the woman after her
divorce, and had children from her, he would not be obligated to divorce
her - so as not to brand her children as Mamzeirim.
(b) This concession will not apply however, should two witnesses testify
that she was guilty of immorality.
(c) We now establish our Mishnah - when there were children born of their
illicit relationship, to conform with Rav's initial statement (that it
speaks when there were witnesses).
(d) What forced Rav to establish our Mishnah when children were born from
there and therefore when there were witnesses - is the Lashon 'Hotzi'uhah',
implying that Beis-Din forced her to separate from her husband, and not the
husband of his own volition (for then the Tana should have written
'Hotzi'ah'), and Beis-Din will only force a man to divorce his wife when
there are witnesses.
(a) Alternatively, Rav will establish the Beraisa that we quoted earlier
(from which we inferred that, if not for the fact that the woman had first
married someone else, the adulterer would be obligated to divorce her, even
though there were no witnesses) - like the individual opinion of Rebbi
(whereas *he* holds like the Rabbanan).
(b) Rebbi say that if a husband arrives home and finds a peddler leaving the
house, and his wife getting dressed - he is obligated to divorce her (see
Tosfos DH 'Amar'), because all the evidence is there.
(c) Similarly - if he finds the peddler leaving his house, and spittle on
the roof of the four-poster bed, or shoes facing inwards so that the
identity of the owner should remain hidden, he must divorce her, too.
(d) In the latter case, we cannot just check whose shoes they are - because
we are not speaking when there were actually shoes there, but a mark in the
dust where the inverted shoes had been.