ANSWERS TO REVIEW QUESTIONS
prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem
Previous daf Yevamos 102
(a) Rava extrapolates from the Pasuk in Shoftim "Som Tasim Alecha Melech ...
*mi'Kerev Achecha* Tasim *Alecha* Melech" - that it is only "Alecha" that a
Ger is Pasul to judge (since the double Lashon "Som Tasim" comes to
incorporate all kinds of rulership, not just that of kingship), but when it
comes to judging a Ger, a Ger is eligible.
(b) This speaks by Dinei Nefashos (see Tosfos DH 'Ger'). As far as Dinei
Mamonos is concerned - a Ger is eligible to judge even a Yisrael (see Tsfos
(c) A Ger whose mother is a Yisre'eilis, is eligible to judge even a
Yisrael - with the exception of Chalitzah, where the Dayanim must be born
Yisre'eilim, whose father and mother were Yisre'eilim too.
(a) Rabah and Rav Yosef argue over what Rav Kahana Amar Rav said. According
to Rabah, he said that if Eliyahu would come and say 'Choltzin be'Man'al
Shom'in Lo; Ein Choltzin be'Sandal, Ein Shom'in Lo'. The reason for the
second half of this statement is - because that is the accepted Minhag.
(b) Rav Yosef disagrees with the first half of Rabah's statement. According
to him, even if Eliyahu were to forbid the use of a Man'al for Chalitzah, we
would listen to him.
(c) With regard to using a Man'al for Chalitzah before Eliyahu comes,
according to ...
1. ... Rabah - it is *forbidden Lechatchilah*.
(d) Rav Yosef explains that the Tana of our Mishnah, which states 'Chaltzah
be'Man'al, Chalitzasah Kesheirah' (implying Bedieved, but not
Lechatchilah) - really permits a Man'al Lechatchilah too. However, because
the Seifa rules 'be'Anpalya, Chalitzasah Pesulah' (even Bedieved), he says
'Chalitzasah Kesheirah' in the Reisha.
2. ... Rav Yosef - it *is* permitted.
(a) When, upon arriving in Netzivin, Rebbi Yossi asked that old man whether
1. ... he knew Rebbi Yehudah ben Beseira well - he replied that, not only
did he know him well, but that he (Rebbi Yehudah ben Beseira) often dined at
(b) Rebbi Yossi retorted that - if that was so, why did Rebbi Meir permit it
2. ... as a Dayan at a Chalitzah ceremony, he would use a Man'al or not - he
replied 'Since when does one use a Man'al for Chalitzah?'
(c) Rebbi Ya'akov even quotes Rebbi Meir - as permitting a Man'al
(d) The text in our Gemara (in parenthesis) 've'ha'Torah Amrah "Na'alo",
've'Lo Man'alo' cannot be correct - because a 'Na'al' simply means a shoe,
incorporating a Man'al as well as a Sandal.
(a) Based on the Pasuk "ve'Chaltzah Na'alo *me'Al* Raglo", we initially
suggest (to explain those who hold 'Ein Choltzin be'Man'al') - that since
the removal of a Man'al entails untying the straps that wind round the
leather of the shoe to keep it in place, it is considered 'me'Al de'me'Al'
(on top of what is on top of the leg, which is Pasul, as we shall see
later). Note: a Sandal, which is hard, does not have such straps, seeing as
they would serve no purpose).
(b) We reject this reason however - on the grounds that, if the source for
invalidating a Man'al Lechatchilah is a Pasuk, then it should be Pasul even
Bedieved, whereas a Man'al is Kasher Bedieved.
(c) We finally ascribe the prohibition to a Man'al Merupat - a torn shoe,
which one might come to (mistakenly) use, because it cleaves to the leg and
remains there, which is not the case by a Sandal, which, due to its
hardness, tends to fall off, in which case there is no reason to decree.
(d) Rebbi Chiya used to use a Sandal that required extensive lacing to keep
it in place for Chalitzah. Rav commented - that had he not seen his uncle
using such a shoe, *he* would have used one that does not need laces, but
that sits tightly on the foot without them.
(a) A Sandal which is tied with a large knot (that requires one lace on top
to prevent it from slipping off the foot) - should be tied before the
Chalitzah, for the Yevamah to untie before removing the shoe.
(b) According to Rav Yehudah Amar Rav, the minimum of foot from which the
Yevamah needs to remove the shoe in order to become Muteres le'Shuk is - the
majority of the heel.
(c) We imply from the Beraisa which invalidates a shoe whose straps come
undone by themselves, or *which the Yavam removed from his foot* - that it
is only because *the Yavam* removed it, that the Chalitzah is Pasul; but
that, had *the Yevamah* removed it, it would be a valid Chalitzah.
(d) Rav Yehudah Amar Rav reconciles his statement with this Beraisa, which
implies that most of the *foot* is required - by equating the foot with the
heel, because it carries most of the weight of the person.
(a) The Beraisa (invalidating a shoe whose straps came undone by themselves)
serves as a proof for the ruling of Rebbi Yanai - who says that the woman is
also obligated to untie the straps, as well as to remove the shoe from the
(b) The two sides of ...
1. ... Rebbi Yanai's She'eilah whether it will suffice to tear or to burn
the shoe off the Yavam's foot are - whether the Torah wants the Yevamah to
reveal the Yavam's foot (which she has done), or whether it
wants her to actively pull the shoe off the foot (which she has not).
(c) People did used to go with two shoes one on top of the other, it seems -
because the Rabbanan saw Rav Yehudah going out wearing five pairs of light
2. ... Rebbi Nechemyah's She'eilah from Rabah whether it will suffice to
remove one of the two shoes which the Yavam is wearing on his foot (meaning
to pull the inner shoe from the Yavam's foot, without removing the outer
one) are - whether the Torah wants her to remove the shoe (which she has
done), or to reveal his foot, which she has not.
(a) Rav Yehudah Amar Rav permitted the Yevamin to perform Yibum with the
Yevamah who grew-up with them. We might otherwise have suspected - that
perhaps (in jest) she pulled off one of their shoes.
(b) A Chalitzah is not valid if either the Yavam or the Yevamah did not have
the intention of performing it.
(c) So we extend Rav Yehudah Amar Rav's concession - to a case where we
actually saw her pulling off one of the brother's shoe, yet he still permits
them to perform Yibum, on the assumption, that at least one of the two did
not have Kavanah to make Chalitzah.
(d) In the second Lashon, we are more stringent - inasmuch as Rav only
permits Yibum as long as we did see her pulling off one of their shoes, but
if she did, then the brothers will be forced to perform Chalitzah, and not
(a) Rav Yehudah Amar Rav learns from ...
1. ... the Pasuk "ve'An'alcha Tachash" - that a shoe that has been stitched
with linen (or any material that is not animal based) is Pasul.
(b) 'Sandal ha'Tafur be'Pishtan' - can either mean that a patch of linen is
sewn inside it, or that it is stitched with linen threads.
2. ... the extra "Na'al" in Ki Seitzei - that the shoe need not necessarily
be made of Tachash-skin, but that any animal skin is acceptable.
(c) If the laces are made of another material - the shoe is nevertheless
(d) A shoe that is made entirely of another material is not Kasher - because
of the Pasuk "ve'An'alcha Tachash".
(a) We compare "ve'Chaltzah Na'alo" to the Pasuk "ve'Chaltzu es ha'Avanim",
which means "and they shall *remove* the stones". Rav Kahana suggested that
it should be compared to the Pasuk "*Heichaltzu* me'Itchem" - which he takes
to mean 'to mobilize' (to join the army), and in our case, to put the shoe
on the Yavam's foot, rather than to take it off.
(b) Shmuel interprets ...
1. ... "Heichaltzu" - to mean 'to take away from their homes'.
(c) When Rav Kahana asked Shmuel from the Pasuk in Yeshayah "ve'Atzmosecha
Yachlitz", which Rava would later interpret to mean "He will strengthen the
bones" (giving the word a connotation of 'putting on' rather than 'taking
off' - he conceded that sometimes the word means to put on and sometimes, to
2. ... "*Yeichaletz* Ani be'Anyo" (Iyov) - to mean that, on account of the
poor man's poverty, the Din of Gehinom is removed from him.
3. ... "Choneh Mal'ach Hashem el Yere'av *va'Yechaltzeim*" - like in the
previous question: that Hashem will remove the Din of Gehinom from them.
(d) Rebbi Elazar said - that the Pasuk in Yeshayah constitutes the finest of
(a) We initially derive from "ve'Chaltzah Na'alo *me'Al* Raglo" that the
Pasuk is speaking about taking off the shoe and not about putting it on -
because if it did mean 'putting it on', then the Torah should have written
"ve'Chaltzah be'Raglo", and not "me'Al Raglo".
(b) We need "*me'Al* Raglo" (rather than "be'Raglo") however, to teach us -
that even if she pulls the shoe from the stump of his calf (and not
necessarily his foot), the Chalitzah is Kasher.
(c) We finally derive 'taking off' and not 'putting on'- from "*me*'Al",
because otherwise, the Torah should have written "be'Al Raglo".
(a) Based on the Pasuk "be'Tzonam u'vi'V'karam Yeleichu le'Vakesh es Hashem,
ve'Lo Yimtza'u, Chalatz Meihem" - that heretic mocked Yisrael, claiming that
Hashem had sent them away, and wanted nothing more to do with them.
(b) Raban Gamliel replied - that the Pasuk does not write "ve'Chalatz Lahem"
but "ve'Chalatz Meihem", implying that it was not Hashem who had sent them
away, but they who had sent Hashem away (which, like a Yevamah with whom the
brothers perform Chalitzah, has no validity).
(a) It is clear from our Mishnah that an Anpalya is not considered a shoe,
as it is from the Mishnah in Shekalim, where the Tana forbids the Kohen who
performed the Terumas ha'Lishkah 'to enter with socks and needless to say,
with shoes ... '. It is forbidden to enter the Azarah with ...
1. ... socks and similar clothes - which have hems, in case people later
accuse him of having stolen money from the boxes and carried it away hidden
in the hem of their clothes.
(b) Abaye initially reconciles this with the Beraisa, which equates socks
with shoes regarding wearing them on Yom Kipur - by establishing the Beraisa
when the socks contain soft padding, and which are therefore prohibited, not
because they are considered like shoes, but because they are comfortable
(and negate the spirit of Yom Kipur).
2. ... shoes - because of the general prohibition of entering the Beis
Hamikdash wearing shoes (as we learned in the Mishnah in B'rachos).
(c) Rava refutes this answer however, from Rabah bar Rav Huna, who used to
go out on Yom Kipur with a cloth tied round his foot (even though this made
his walking more comfortable). He ultimately resolves the above
contradiction - by establishing our Mishnah by a cloth sock (which is *not
considered a shoe*), and the Beraisa by a leather one (which *is*).
(a) The Tana of another Beraisa - permits walking in the house with socks.
If not for Rava's distinction, how would we resolve the contradiction
between the two Beraisos.
(b) The same Beraisa forbids walking in the house with Kurdekisin on Yom
Kipur. 'Kurdekisin' - are thin undershoes that are worn underneath regular
thick shoes, to protect the wearer's feet from getting wet.
(c) We prove Rava's distinction from yet another Beraisa which speaks
directly about Chalitzah. The Tana there specifically invalidates a leather
sock, and validates a cloth one.