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Zevachim, 8

ZEVACHIM 8 - dedicated by Mrs. Rita Grunberger of Queens, N.Y., in loving memory of her husband, Reb Yitzchok Yakov ben Eliyahu Grunberger. Irving Grunberger helped many people quietly in an unassuming manner and is dearly missed by all who knew him. His Yahrzeit is 10 Sivan.


QUESTION: The Gemara asks what the source in the Torah is for the law that if a Kohen has in mind, during any of the various stages of offering a Korban Chatas, intent that the animal should be a different type of Korban, the Chatas is Pasul and may not be offered at all. The Gemara says that the source that such intent -- during the Shechitah of the animal -- invalidates the Chatas is the verse, "v'Shachat Osah l'Chatas" -- "he shall slaughter it for a Chatas" (Vayikra 4:33), which teaches that it is a valid Chatas only when it was slaughtered with the intent that it should be a Chatas. Similarly, the next verse, "The Kohen will take from the blood of the Chatas" (4:34), teaches that the Kabalas ha'Dam must be done with intent that the Korban is a Chatas, and it is Pasul if the Kohen has intent that it be any other Korban. The same law applies to the Zerikas ha'Dam, as we learn from the verse, "v'Chiper Alav ha'Kohen me'Chataso" -- "the Kohen will provide atonement for him for his sin" (Vayikra 5:6). We see that all of the stages of the Avodah must be done only with intent for a Chatas. All of the Derashos seem to be based on the fact that the verse emphasizes that the Korban must be offered for the sake of a Chatas and not with any other Korban in mind.

The two verses that the Gemara quotes to teach that the wrong intent during Shechitah or during Kabalah invalidates the Chatas are written with regard to a normal Korban Chatas. However, the verse that the Gemara quotes that discusses the Zerikas ha'Dam of a Chatas is written with regard to a Korban Oleh v'Yored, which is not the normal type of Korban Chatas. Why does the Gemara cite a verse about Zerikah which is written with regard to an unusual form of Korban Chatas, when the same verse is written with regard to the normal Korban Chatas? The verse says, "v'Chiper Alav ha'Kohen Al Chataso Asher Chata" -- "The Kohen will provide atonement for him for his sin which he transgressed" (4:35)! (TOSFOS DH Zerikah)


(a) The SHITAH MEKUBETZES answers that the verse written with regard to the normal Korban Chatas (4:35) is not referring to the Zerikas ha'Dam of the Korban Chatas, but rather it is referring to the Kohen who provides atonement for the sinner "for his sin (Chataso) which he transgressed (Asher Chata)." TOSFOS adds that, similarly, when the Torah says that the "Kohen will provide atonement for him from his sin (me'Chataso)" with regard to the Nasi's Korban (Vayikra 4:26), it is not referring to the Korban Chatas itself, but rather to the actual sin that was transgressed, as is indicated by the words "v'Nislach Lo" -- "and it will be forgiven for him." Only in the verse of the Korban Oleh v'Yored is it written, "The Kohen will provide atonement for him for his sin (me'Chataso)," without any other modifier to imply that this "Chatas" is referring to the sin and not the Korban. Therefore, it is from this verse that we learn that the Zerikas ha'Dam must not be done with intent for any other Korban other than a Chatas.

(b) TOSFOS, in his first answer, explains that the context of the verse written with regard to the normal Chatas (4:35) shows that it is not discussing the Zerikas ha'Dam of the Chatas. The Torah there states that the Kohen is to put the blood on the Mizbe'ach, and then it states that the fats must be burned on the Mizbe'ach. Only afterwards does the verse say that the Kohen will provide atonement for him. Even though atonement is usually accomplished at the moment of Zerikas ha'Dam, it is not clear that this verse is referring to Zerikah, because it is separated from the earlier verse which discusses the Zerikah of a normal Chatas. Therefore, the Derashah instead is derived from the verse regarding the Oleh v'Yored, which is clearly referring to Zerikah.

Tosfos has difficulty with this explanation. The Gemara later (8b) asks that now that we have learned that the Zerikah must be done l'Shem Chatas for an ordinary Chatas, from where do we learn that the same applies for an Oleh v'Yored. What is the Gemara's question? The verse from which the Gemara derived that the Zerikah must be done l'Shem Chatas is written with regard to the Oleh v'Yored!

Tosfos answers that the Gemara later means to say as follows. The Gemara earlier (7b) teaches, regarding a Korban Shelamim, that there is no reason to differentiate between Shechitah and the other Avodos with regard to the requirement to perform them with proper intent. Similarly, for an ordinary Chatas, all that is necessary is a verse teaching that the *Shechitah* must be done l'Shem Chatas and not for the sake of any other Korban, and then we would know that all of the other Avodos also have this requirement. In contrast, in the case of a Korban Oleh v'Yored, the only verse that implies that it must be l'Shem Chatas is the verse regarding Zerikah. The law of Zerikah cannot teach us anything about the other Avodos, since the Zerikah is the main part of the atonement and thus what applies to it might not apply to the other Avodos! Therefore, we still need other sources to teach that the other Avodos of an Oleh v'Yored cannot be preformed with another Korban in mind.

(c) The KEREN ORAH has difficulty with the approach of Tosfos. He suggests instead that the correct text of the Gemara should read that the verse from which we derive the law of Zerikah *is* the verse of an ordinary Chatas. Accordingly, the Gemara later (8b) is certainly justified in asking for the source that the Zerikah of an Oleh v'Yored must be done with the proper intent. (Y. Montrose)


QUESTION: The Gemara discusses the source for the law that a Korban Pesach that was slaughtered at any time other than Erev Pesach is a valid Korban Shelamim, as long as it was not slaughtered with intention that it should serve as a Korban Pesach. The Gemara at one stage says that this law can be derived from the verse, "If his Korban, for a Zevach Shelamim to Hashem, is from the flock..." (Vayikra 3:6). Using the method of "Kelal u'Ferat u'Chelal," the words "l'Zevach" and "la'Hashem" are general terms, and the word "Shelamim" is a specific term. Accordingly, we learn that just as a Korban Pesach which was slaughtered to be a Shelamim is a valid Korban, it is a valid Korban if it is slaughtered with intent to be any other type of Korban, with the except of one; the only time it should not be valid is when it was slaughtered, on any day other than Erev Pesach, with intent that it be a Korban Pesach.

The Gemara asks that if we are learning a law from the "Perat," then we should learn only that if the Pesach is slaughtered in the name of a Korban which can be offered voluntarily is it a valid Korban, but not if it is slaughtered in the name of a Chatas or Asham (which cannot be offered voluntarily). The Gemara answers that the word "l'Zevach" is a "Ribuy" (inclusive). How does this answer the Gemara's question?


(a) RASHI (DH Ela) explains that the Gemara, in its answer, is giving an entirely different approach which has nothing to do with "is starting an entirely new train of thought, which has nothing to do with "Kelal u'Ferat u'Chelal." The Gemara retracts the application of "Kelal u'Ferat" here, because it determines that the word "l'Zevach" is not a "Kelal" (a general term) but rather a "Ribuy" (an inclusive word). A "Kelal" in this context would be the word "Behemah," for example, which would include all animals. The word "Zevach," however, is not only a general term, but it is also apparently unnecessary, since it is connected to the next word of "Shelamim." Hence, the Gemara decides to derive the law through a "Ribuy" instead of through the principle of "Kelal u'Ferat."

(There are three different opinions regarding the correct Girsa of Rashi's words in explaining what "l'Zevach Shelamim" means. Our text in Rashi is that of the TZON KODASHIM. See other texts of Rashi in the SHITAH MEKUBETZES and CHOK NASAN quoting the PANIM ME'IROS.)

The verse could have said merely "l'Shelamim." Since the word "l'Zevach" is extra and therefore inclusive, we cannot use it to derive a "Kelal u'Ferat u'Chelal." The Gemara is explaining that we do not use "Kelal u'Ferat u'Chelal" here, but instead we derive from the extra word "l'Zevach" that regardless of the what Korban it was slaughtered for, it will remain a valid Korban.

The Shitah Mekubetzes (in Hashmatos) says that Rashi does not mean that a word used in a "Kelal u'Ferat u'Chelal" cannot be inclusive. Rather, Rashi means that in this verse, there are two consecutive words that are both inclusive. The verse states, "v'Im Min ha'Tzon Korban, l'Zevach Shelamim la'Hashem" -- both the word "Korbano" and the word "l'Zevach" are general terms. Two consecutive general terms in a verse teaches us that anything is considered valid. In this context, this means that a Pesach brought in the name of any Korban is valid, including a Chatas and an Asham as well.

The Shitah Mekubetzes has difficulty with his explanation of Rashi. If everything is learned from the words "Korbano l'Zevach," then how can the Gemara immediately ask that this Korban Pesach should acquire the Halachos of whatever Korban for which it was intended? This certainly cannot be the case, because the word "Shelamim" in the verse tells us that the Pesach should have the Halachos of a Shelamim!

(b) The Shitah Mekubetzes concludes that the correct explanation is that of TOSFOS (DH Ela). Tosfos explains that the word "l'Zevach" is not a Kelal (a general term), but rather a "Ribuy" (an inclusive term). There is a similar principle, known as "Ribah u'Mi'et v'Ribah," when there are two inclusive terms and one exclusive term. This principle tells us to include everything possible besides one thing, regardless of whether or not all of the things being included are similar to the exclusive word or not. Now that the Gemara tells us to learn the verse as teaching a "Ribuy" from the word "l'Zevach," the question that Chatas and Asham are not similar is no longer a problem, since they do not have to be similar. The only thing that the verse excludes is a Korban Pesach slaughtered on any day other than Erev Pesach in the name of a Pesach, which is indeed unfit. (Y. Montrose)

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