THOUGHTS ON THE DAILY DAF
brought to you by Kollel Iyun Hadaf of Har Nof
Rosh Kollel: Rav Mordecai Kornfeld
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1) THE NEED FOR TWO SOURCES TO TEACH THAT BOTH "NEVEILAH" AND "TEREIFAH"
APPLY TO "CHELEV"
QUESTION: Rava learns from the apparently extra verse, "v'Chelev Neveilah
v'Chelev Tereifah... v'Achol Lo Sochluhu" -- "the Chelev of a Neveilah and
the Chelev of a Tereifah... you shall not eat it" (Vayikra 7:24), that the
Torah is teaching that both the Isur of Neveilah and the Isur of Tereifah
apply to Chelev. If not for this verse, we would have thought that *neither*
of these Isurim applies to Chelev, because of the principle of "Ein Isur
Chal Al Isur." Since the item is already prohibited because of the Isur of
Chelev, the Isur of Neveilah and the Isur of Tereifah cannot take effect.
The Torah here teaches an exception to the general rule.
The Gemara asks why the Torah needs to state that both the Isurim of
Neveilah and Tereifah apply to Chelev. It would have sufficed to teach us
that *one* of them applies, and we would have learned one from the other!
The Gemara answers that we would not have been able to learn one from the
other. Had the Torah told us that the Isur of Neveilah applies to Chelev, we
would have known only that Neveilah applies to Chelev and we would not have
been able to learn from there that the Isur of Tereifah applies to Chelev.
This is because we would have said that since Neveilah causes people to
become Tamei, it is a very severe prohibition, and thus it also applies to
Chelev. The Isur of Tereifah, in contrast, would not apply to Chelev because
of the general rule of "Ein Isur Chal Al Isur."
On the other hand, had the Torah told us only that the Isur of Tereifah
applies to Chelev, we would not have been able to learn Neveilah from
Tereifah, because we would have said that the Isur of Tereifah is more
severe since it applies even when the animal is alive. Thus, it is a strong
enough prohibition to apply to Chelev. The Isur of Neveilah, in contrast,
applies only after the animal dies, and thus the general rule of "Ein Isur
Chal Al Isur" would prevent it from applying to Chelev. This is why the
Torah needs to mention both Neveilah and Tereifah.
TOSFOS (DH v'Iy) asks that there seems to be a contradiction between the
logic of the Gemara here and the logic of the Gemara in Chulin (37b). The
logic which our Gemara uses to show that Tereifah is a stronger Isur is that
the Isur applies even when the animal is alive. However, the Gemara in
Chulin gives the same feature of the Isur of Tereifah as a reason why it is
a *weaker* prohibition! The Gemara there attempts to make a Kal v'Chomer to
learn Neveilah from Tereifah: if the Isur of Tereifah, which takes effect
when the animal is alive, applies to Chelev, then certainly the Isur of
Neveilah, which takes effect after the animal's death, should also apply to
Chelev. This is the exact opposite of the logic of our Gemara. How are we to
reconcile these two Gemaras?
(a) TOSFOS here refers to his explanation in Chulin (37b, DH u'Ma
me'Chayim). There, Tosfos quotes RABEINU TAM who explains that the Gemara in
Chulin is questioning its original assumption that a Mesukenes (an animal
with physiological symptoms of impending death, as discussed in the Mishnah
there) is forbidden and is considered a Tereifah. The Gemara asks that if
the Isur to eat an animal that is a Tereifah, which does not cause Tum'ah
while it is alive, takes effect on Chelev, then certainly the Isur of
Neveilah, which does cause Tum'ah, takes effect on Chelev. At this stage,
the Gemara assumes that every Neveilah is first a Mesukenes before it dies,
and thus the animal is forbidden, as Neveilah, even while it is alive,
because it will certainly become a real Neveilah. This is why the Gemara
cannot refute its Kal v'Chomer by saying that the Isur of Tereifah is unique
because it applies even when the animal is alive; the Isur of Neveilah also
applies when the animal is alive, because of its status as a Mesukenes! The
Gemara here in Zevachim, however, knows that a Mesukenes is *not* forbidden.
Consequently, the Isur of Neveilah takes effect only when the animal dies,
and thus the Isur of Tereifah, which takes effect while the animal is still
alive, is considered to be a stronger prohibition.
(b) The MAHARAM in Chulin has a different text of Tosfos here in Zevachim.
Instead of the words of Tosfos reading, "v'Sham Pirashti" -- "and there (in
Chulin) I explained it," as our text of Tosfos reads, the Maharam's text of
Tosfos reads, "v'Sham Piresh Rashi" -- "and there Rashi explained it."
What is Rashi's answer to this question? The Maharam explains, based on
Rashi in Chulin (DH u'Ma me'Chayim and DH Michlal), that the Gemara's
conclusion is that the Isur of Tereifah is indeed more stringent than the
Isur of Neveilah. The Isur of Tereifah is not due to the fact that the
animal is going to die and become a Neveilah. Rather, the Torah forbids
eating an animal which is missing vital parts. Therefore, the Gemara here in
Zevachim says that if the Torah would have told us only that the Isur of
Tereifah takes effect on Chelev, we would not have known that the Isur of
Neveilah also applies to Chelev, since Neveilah takes effect only after the
animal dies. The Gemara in Chulin, however, originally assumed that the Isur
of Tereifah is due to the fact that the animal is about to become a
Neveilah. If that is the reasoning behind the prohibition, then it makes
sense to say that Neveilah is the stronger prohibition, since a Tereifah is
forbidden only because of Neveilah. This also seems to be the opinion of the
BIRKAS HA'ZEVACH in his comments to Tosfos here. (Y. Montrose)
2) WHEN IS AN "EGLAH ARUFAH" FORBIDDEN FROM BENEFIT?
QUESTION: The Gemara says that an Eglah Arufah is forbidden from benefit
once it descends to Nachal Eisan, the place where it is supposed to be
beheaded. In Kerisus (24b), this opinion is expressed by Rav Hamnuna, while
Rava argues that it becomes forbidden from benefit only after it is
beheaded. The RAMBAM (Hilchos Rotze'ach 10:6) rules like our Gemara and the
opinion of Rav Hamnuna and writes that the Eglah Arufah's descent to Nachal
Eisan forbids it from benefit.
The RASHBA (Teshuvos 5:16) was asked that the Rambam apparently contradicts
himself. The Rambam, in the same chapter (Hilchos Rotze'ach 10:8), rules
that if the killer was found before the calf was beheaded, then the calf may
return to graze with its herd, which means that it is permitted to benefit
from the calf. If the Rambam rules that the Eglah Arufah becomes Asur
b'Hana'ah at its descent to Nachal Eisan (even before it is beheaded), then
it should remain Asur even if the killer is found! (The Rashba responds that
he, too, was troubled by this contradiction, and after much effort had not
come up with a resolution.)
(a) The KESEF MISHNEH (Hilchos Rotze'ach 10:6) and BE'ER SHEVA (Sotah 47a)
answer that the case in which the killer is found differs from the normal
case of Eglah Arufah. The Eglah Arufah is designated as such precisely
because no killer was identified. If the person who designated the calf
would have known that the killer would be found, then he never would have
been Makdish the animal. Consequently, the Kedushah of the animal is no
longer present, as it is deemed "Hekdesh b'Ta'us" (Hekdesh made in error)
which is not valid. This is why it is permitted to benefit from the animal,
even though the Rambam rules that, normally, once the calf descends into
Nachal Eisan it becomes forbidden.
The Kesef Mishneh and Be'er Sheva note that TOSFOS in Chulin (82a, DH
v'ha'Tenan) discusses and rejects this approach. Nevertheless, they point
out, the Rambam maintains that it is a valid approach. This answer also
seems to be the intention of the ME'IRI in Kidushin (57a). (See also EVEN
HA'AZEL to Hilchos Rotze'ach 10:6 who discusses this answer at length.)
(b) The KEHILOS YAKOV (Sotah #7) points out that the Yerushalmi in Sotah
(9:6) also rules that the Eglah Arufah becomes Asur b'Hana'ah when it
descends to Nachal Eisan, and that it is *not* forbidden if the killer is
found. However, the Bavli clearly maintains that the two Halachos are
mutually exclusive, as it explicitly says (Kerisus 25a) that these two
opinions argue. Why does the Rambam follow the Yerushalmi's view instead of
keeping with the straightforward understanding of the Bavli?
The Kehilos Yakov quotes the PACHAD YITZCHAK (who wrote a composition
regarding how to approach the differences between the Bavli and Yerushalmi).
He quotes the MAHARIK who stated that the Rambam relies on the Yerushalmi
when the Yerushalmi gives a simple answer where the Bavli gives a more
complex answer. The Kehilos Yakov suggests that the Rambam knew that the
Halachah follows the opinion that the Eglah Arufah is forbidden once it
descends into Nachal Eisan, and therefore he decided to align all rulings
with this opinion once the Yerushalmi said that this is possible, even
though the Bavli says that these Mishnayos are arguing. (See MIRKEVES
HA'MISHNEH who suggests another answer.) (Y. Montrose)